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ABSTRACT 
 
Temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) is a complex neurological condition associated with a variety of 
memory problems. This thesis attempted to elucidate the nature and extent of memory 
impairments further in this clinical group by drawing on dual-process theory of memory 
(Tulving, 1985; Jacoby, 1991; Yonelinas, 1994). This theory asserts that memory is subserved 
by two interrelated but independent memory processes. Recollection involves the vivid 
retrieval of contextual and associative information from memory. Conversely, familiarity 
involves recognition in the absence of this contextual information. The novel approach taken 
in this work was to compare paradigms that assess participants’ objective and strategic use of 
these two processes with measures of people’s subjective experience of their memory. 
Chapter 2 set the scene by presenting the extent of objective memory impairment in the 
current patient sample by means of standardised neuropsychological testing. Chapter 3 – 5 
assessed subjective and objective recollection in anterograde recognition memory tasks. 
Chapter 3 showed that patients’ subjective experience of remembering may be driven by 
qualitatively different types of information to healthy adults. Chapter 4 demonstrated that 
patients were impaired in their strategic use of recollection and concurrently showed reduced 
levels of subjective remembering. This demonstrated that patients can be consciously aware of 
deficits in underlying cognitive processes contributing to memory performance. Chapter 5 
specifically examined a metacognitive account of this recollection deficit. Patients were found 
to have impairments in a number of measures that index relational binding ability. However, 
their subjective confidence was assigned appropriately; they were lesser confident in their 
recognition judgments overall and adjusted this confidence in line with the difficulty of 
materials and task demands comparably to controls. Chapter 6 took a more naturalistic 
approach and assessed self-reported memory complaint as well as retrograde memory for 
salient public news events. As expected, people with TLE subjectively complained of 
dissatisfaction with their day-to-day to memory. The public events task revealed that although 
patients had reductions in subjective measures associated with recollecting the events, they 
were just as able as controls to accurately date the news items and monitor their memory for 
these. Chapter 7 found correlations between a variety of the subjective and objective 
recollection scores derived in the various tasks. 
 This thesis provides confirmatory evidence that memory impairment in TLE is characterised by 
disordered recollection and recollective experience. Several important theoretical and clinical 
applications of these findings are discussed.
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1  Introduction 
 
 
 “I enter a friend’s room and see on the wall a painting. At first, I have the strange, wondering 
consciousness, ‘surely I have seen that before,’ but when or how does not become clear. There 
clings to the picture a sort of penumbra of familiarity, — when suddenly I exclaim: ‘I have it, it 
is a copy of part of one of the Fra Angelicos in the Florentine Academy’ — I recollect it there! 
(emphasis added)” 
(William James, 1890, p.658) 
1.1 Overview 
 
The above quote by William James illustrates how personal introspections on our mental 
happenings can be revealing about the underlying processes which govern our conscious 
experience. The terms he uses – recollection and familiarity – are now common parlance 
within the psychological literature. They are identified by some researchers as cognitive 
processes that contribute to memory performance (Jacoby, 1991; Yonelinas, 1994) and similar 
to James’ description above, others view them as subjective states of consciousness that arise 
from a constellation of processes (Tulving, 1985, Gardiner, 2001). According to these dual-
process theories, recollection involves the retrieval of qualitative information about a prior 
event, whereas familiarity is characterised by a feeling of oldness in the absence of such 
contextual information. Although recent research has provided compelling evidence for the 
existence of recollection and familiarity, the nature of the relationship between underlying 
cognitive memory processes and subjective experiences is still relatively unexplored. 
The discipline of neuropsychology is well suited to this area. By definition, neuropsychology is 
concerned with examining the relationship between behaviour and cognition. Studying 
conditions in which there is a breakdown in some cognitive system contributes to our 
understanding not only of the architecture of the healthy brain, but also provides important 
understanding of the neuropsychological condition under investigation. This thesis takes such 
an approach, and uses temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) as its basis.  
The study of memory in TLE has a long history, but the application of empirically driven 
approaches, such as those briefly mentioned above, has not been so widespread. The main 
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aim of this thesis was thus to provide added depth to our knowledge about memory 
impairment in this group using the dual-process theory of memory as an empirical framework. 
This was achieved by identifying behavioural aspects of memory in terms of separable 
processes, as well as exploring the conscious experiences associated with these. Therefore, the 
work makes a novel attempt at delineating the relationship between memory dysfunction and 
awareness in this patient group. This has important theoretical applications for the wider 
memory literature, and adds to ongoing clinical debate within the field of TLE. 
This chapter first sets the scene by describing the clinical characteristics of TLE in more detail, 
including what has been learnt from traditional neuropsychological approaches over the years. 
Some of the major clinical questions in the TLE literature are then outlined, which further 
emphasises the rationale for the present research. Following this, a detailed review is 
presented of alternative dual-process theories, the measurement methods used throughout 
this thesis, and what has already been learnt from the application of these to TLE. The chapter 
ends with some clearly defined aims, based on this review of the literature. 
  
1.2  Temporal lobe epilepsy  
 
Epilepsy is a complex neurological condition characterised by recurring episodes of abnormally 
synchronized electrical discharges in clusters of neurons —commonly known as seizures. 
Temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) is the name given to a heterogeneous group of disorders that 
share the same focal onset of these seizures, i.e. in the temporal lobes of the brain. Other 
types of focal, or partial-onset epilepsies exist, and are likewise determined by the lobe where 
the seizure activity begins; TLE is however, the most common of this class of epilepsy, and is 
estimated to comprise approximately 30-35% of all the epilepsies (Panayiotopoulos, 2005). 
Based on recommendations by the International League Against Epilepsy, TLE can be further 
broadly divided by the anatomical regions of onset within this area of the brain; mesial TLE 
(MTLE) seizures originate in amygdalo-hippocampal areas, and lateral TLE seizures originate in 
more neocortical areas. The former is by far the most common, occurring in approximately 
two-thirds of cases, and of these, about 65% of patients have an aetiology of hippocampal 
sclerosis (Berg et al., 2010; Wolf et al., 1993). There are a variety of other causes however, 
including infectious diseases (e.g. encephalitis), cerebrovascular disorders (e.g. stroke), head 
trauma, tumours, and abnormal cortical development, among others. 
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Accurate diagnosis of TLE requires a synthetic approach, combining both subjective evaluation 
of seizure semiology and objective evidence from magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), 
electroencephalography (EEG) and neuropsychological evaluation. The primary overt clinical 
manifestations of TLE come in the form of simple partial seizures (SPS), complex partial 
seizures (CPS) and secondary generalised tonic clonic seizures (SGTCs). These terms are used to 
define the onset and relative spread of epileptic activity in the brain; SPS have a focal onset in 
the temporal lobe, and may or may not evolve into a CPS, where consciousness is impaired 
due to activity propagating throughout a network of brain regions. In SGTCs, consciousness is 
lost due to widespread neuronal discharge, including the motor cortex, which results in the 
convulsions that are most often associated with epileptic seizures.   
Subjective ictal manifestations during SPS, sometimes referred to as ‘auras’, are experienced 
by more than 90% of TLE patients (Gloor, Olivier, Quesney, Andermann, & Horowitz, 1982). 
The most common of these are rising sensations in the stomach or gut (epigastric aura); 
experiential phenomenon (alterations of perception, thought, memory and affect); fear and 
panic; auditory hallucinations and olfactory or gustatory hallucinations. SPS can often quickly 
spread into CPS, and a number of objective ictal manifestations are visible to an observer. 
These include automatisms (semi-purposeful, coordinated involuntary motor activity), 
autonomic disturbances, speech disturbances and deviations of the head and eye. The careful 
assessment of these ictal features in early neurology by researchers such as Hughlings-Jackson 
(1888) suggested the dependence of human behaviour on activity in localised areas of the 
brain.  
 
1.3 Temporal lobe seizures and memory  
 
The crucial role of the medial temporal lobes (MTL) in human memory was provided in the 
classic work of Brenda Milner with the TLE patient HM throughout the latter twentieth-century 
(Milner, 1968; Scoville & Milner, 1957). However, certain mnestic characteristics of the ictal 
phase in TLE pointed towards the involvement of memory in the MTL much beforehand. As 
mentioned above, experiential symptoms are often encountered by patients during partial-
onset seizures, and although disturbances in thought and cognition in general occur, other 
memory based phenomena are quite frequent. For example, the experiences of déjà vu 
(already seen), déjà vecu (already lived) or the ‘dreamy state’ were recorded early on by 
pioneers such as Hughlings-Jackson, and these investigations began linking the mnestic quality 
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of these experiences directly to their origin in medial temporal areas. These alterations in 
normal cognitive processing are now thought to be a result of transient dysfunction of specific 
neuroanatomical areas responsible for separable memory processes (see Illman, Butler, 
Souchay, & Moulin, 2012, for a review). Although this is a topic of burgeoning interest in itself, 
the key point is that early observations of patients’ memory ‘illusions’ or ‘flashbacks’ implied 
involvement of the temporal lobes in memory. 
When consciousness is impaired or lost during CPS or SGTCs, patients are also unable to recall 
what happened during the ictal phase. Post-ictal confusion and amnesia for the events that 
occurred during the seizure can last for up to several hours afterwards. If this also involves 
drowsiness, headache and concentration problems, the post-ictal phase may even be more 
debilitating than the seizure itself. This lack of memory for the events suggests that the activity 
in the temporal lobes has interfered with, or temporarily disabled encoding and consolidation 
mechanisms. Although such post-ictal memory phenomenon are interesting in their own right, 
it is the disturbance to memory in between seizures, or the inter-ictal phase, that is the topic  
under investigation throughout this thesis. 
 
1.4 The consequences of TLE 
 
For most people with epilepsy, treatment with anti-epileptic drugs (AEDs) provides an 
excellent clinical prognosis, as approximately 60-70% of people will experience seizure-
freedom (Sander & Sillampaa, 1998). However, for those remaining who are medically 
refractory and unsuitable for resective surgery of the epileptic temporal lobe, quality of life 
(QOL) can be significantly reduced (McLachlan et al., 1997). The reduction in QOL in TLE has 
been linked to the existence of co morbid psychiatric problems such as anxiety and depression, 
which have a higher prevalence rate in this group than in the normal population (Bragatti et 
al., 2010; Hermann et al., 2000; Jones et al., 2007). Patients also face the social stigma of 
having the condition, with potentially catastrophic affects on their social identity, and hence 
QOL ( Jacoby, Snape, & Baker, 2005).  
People with chronic TLE are often left with significant problems with their general cognitive 
function (Jokeit & Ebner, 1999) . Of these, memory complaints are the most common, with up 
to 80% of patients reporting some degree of impairment in memory functioning and 
approximately 50% stating that these are moderate to severe (Thompson & Corcoran, 1992). 
Appreciating patients’ subjective perception of memory is of both theoretical and clinical 
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importance; therefore, this issue is approached later in Chapter 6 where a novel self-report 
questionnaire was administered to people with TLE and healthy adults.  
A variety of factors contribute to memory problems in TLE. In terms of brain pathology, this 
neurological condition is associated with bilateral structural abnormalities in sulcal and gyral 
shape, and significant reductions in neocortical thickness and complexity (Lin et al., 2007; 
Oyegbile et al., 2004). Memory impairment is particularly exacerbated by atrophy of the 
hippocampus and amygdala (Cendes et al., 1993; Lencz et al., 1992; Trennery & Ivnik, 1993) 
and entorhinal (EC) and perirhinal cortices (PRc) (Bernasconi, 2003). As will be discussed 
below, it is episodic, or declarative (conscious) memory that is most affected, due to the 
involvement of the above structures in the encoding, consolidating and retrieval of 
experiences bound to these representations (Eichenbaum, 2000). 
Whereas discrete structural alterations to medial temporal areas have long been associated 
with memory impairment in this group, more recently, decreases in white matter have been 
found in chronic TLE in both temporal and extra-temporal areas (Seidenberg et al., 2005), with 
other research showing that synchronisation between these dispersed networks is paramount 
to memory and cognitive function (Gaffan, 2002). 
There are also other factors that affect memory in TLE. For example, both human and animal 
research suggests the seizures themselves can accelerate forgetting in patients (Hermann et 
al., 2006; Jokeit, Daamen, Zang, Janszky, & Ebner, 2001; Lin, Holmes, Kubie, & Muller, 2009). 
Moreover, there can also be adverse neurocognitive effects associated with high serum levels 
of AEDs (Arif et al., 2009; Jokeit, Krämer, & Ebner, 2005; Motamedi & Meador, 2004), which in 
itself presents a major challenge to the treatment of the disorder. Finally, as mentioned above, 
co morbid anxiety and depression is common, and these are well known factors that impact 
memory (Hall, Isaac, & Harris, 2009; Salas-Puig et al., 2009). Because of this constellation of 
interacting variables in TLE related memory disorder, diagnosis and treatment is a complex 
process. However, important developments in neuropsychological approaches to the 
measurement of memory and cognition over the twentieth-century have aided this process. 
 
1.5 Neuropsychological assessment of TLE 
 
The importance of neuropsychological assessment in TLE exploded following the devastating 
impairments found in anterograde memory after the removal of epileptic medial temporal 
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lobe tissue in classic patients such as HM, PB and FC (Penfield & Milner, 1958; Scoville & 
Milner, 1957). These early surgical interventions and subsequent investigations with the 
patients revealed the importance of the MTL in memory. Since this time, neuropsychological 
assessment has been a core part of epilepsy surgical interventions; memory assessment can be 
used to aid information regarding localisation, functional adequacy of the epileptic lobe, 
reserve capacity of the contralateral hemisphere, and ultimately be used to predict how 
function may change following the resective procedure (McAndrews & Cohn, 2012). This is 
achieved by the administration of an array of standardised psychometric tests that focus on 
episodic learning of new visual and verbal materials, whilst also incorporating an extensive 
assessment of other cognitive functions such as language, attention, executive function and 
intellectual ability. A patient’s score is compared to some age scaled normative value derived 
from population estimates, and significant impairment or sparing in function is used in the 
surgical decision process. This history of assessment in surgical patients with refractory TLE has 
provided immeasurable amounts of knowledge to the study of human memory. However, as 
McDonald et al. (2011) recently advocated, neuropsychological assessment of people with 
newly diagnosed epilepsy and systematic long-term follow up is likely to reveal more about the 
cognitive sequalae of the condition. Studying groups of patients with diverse clinical profiles is 
therefore likely to further enhance our understanding of the architecture of memory. This was 
the approach taken in this thesis. 
 
1.5.1 Lateralisation and the material specificity principle 
 
At the heart of neuropsychological assessment and surgical decision making in TLE is the 
‘material specificity principle’ (Milner, 1970), which posits that in language dominant 
individuals, the left temporal lobe is preferentially involved in verbal memory and the right in 
visual or non-verbal forms of memory. Material specific verbal memory impairments in left 
temporal lobe epilepsy (LTLE) are generally well accepted, and a higher level of functioning in 
verbal tasks pre-operatively has consistently been found to be a risk factor for significant post-
operative decline (Alpherts, Vermeulen, van Rijen, da Silva, & van Veelen, 2006). In this 
respect, neuropsychological assessment of memory function before surgery can be 
instrumental not only in providing complementary evidence regarding lateralisation of seizure 
focus, but also in providing useful evaluation of the risk of  surgery. As McAndrews and Cohn 
(2012) discuss, this role is currently evolving due to the advent of advanced structural and 
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functional neuroimaging techniques that are able to provide laterality analyses for both 
language and memory. 
Although research does exist to support the non-verbal functions of the right medial temporal 
lobe (Baxendale et al., 1998; Golby, 2001; Pegna et al., 2002), its strict functional 
independence in this form of memory is typically much more contested in the literature (e.g. 
Vingerhoets, Miatton, Vonck, Seurinck, & Boon, 2006). Typical standardised ‘non-verbal’ tests 
are often confounded by the fact that their contextual elements can be covertly verbalised 
internally by the candidate (Helmstaedter, Pohl, & Elger, 1995), and much variation exists in 
performance between the different tests available due to the wider network of 
interhemispheric regions involved in their processing. Visuospatial memory tests can thus be 
inaccurate in providing lateralising information, mainly because they tap into a variety of other 
cognitive domains (Wisniewski, Wendling, Manning, & Steinhoff, 2012). Language dominance 
and gender differences also play a role in this.  
 In a recent article, Saling (2009) discussed the current problems with the adoption of the 
material specificity principle as it currently stands. He makes a critique of the assumption that 
the two forms of memory are unitary constructs, and are independent from one another. In 
what he urges to be a paradigmatic shift in methods of assessing memory, he draws on 
research showing that individual differences in performance within-domains reflects the fact 
that verbal and non-verbal memory can be further fractionated by their localisation within the 
temporal lobe. Thus, memory impairments may be task-specific. 
The above issues are addressed in the experiments throughout this thesis; as will be outlined 
later. Although assessment of laterality differences was not a fundamental objective here, 
efforts were made to make some contribution to this aspect of the study of memory in TLE. 
One important theme in this thesis mirroring Saling’s (2009) suggestions relates to the issue of 
task-specificity, and the sensitivity of tests in measuring differential impairments in the various 
components of memory. From Section 1.7 and thereafter, the utility in applying a process 
rather than task-driven approach is discussed. 
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1.6 The clinical context: Differences between patients’ subjective memory reports and 
neuropsychological assessment 
 
In the UK, the National Institute for Clinical Excellence guidelines stipulate that referral for 
neuropsychological assessment must be completed not only as part of comprehensive 
neurosurgical work-up, but also in cases where the patient subjectively complains of memory 
decline. However, evidence has consistently shown that patients’ subjective reports of their 
memory difficulties are often weakly correlated with results of psychometric assessments. 
Studies have overwhelmingly displayed patients tend to overestimate their memory problems 
(Elixhauser, Leidy, Meador, Means, & Willian, 1999; Giovagnoli, Mascheroni, & Avanzini, 1997; 
Gleißner, Helmstaedter, Quiske, & Elger, 1998; Helmstaedter & Elger, 2000; Hendriks, 
Aldenkamp, van der Vlugt, Alpherts, & Vermeulen, 2002; McGlone, 1994; Piazzini, Canevini, 
Maggiori, & Canger, 2001; Sawrie et al., 1999; Vermeulen, Aldenkamp, & Alpherts, 1993). 
There are also reports of underestimation (Thompson & Corcoran, 1992) and instances where 
correspondence exists between self-report and objective measurements; for example, Rayner, 
Wrench, and Wilson (2010) found that objective performance was a significant predictor of 
subjective memory scores along with mood in patients with MTLE. 
This discrepancy between a patient’s beliefs about their memory and scores on standardised 
instruments presents a variety of challenges. Worries about a poor memory are likely to fuel 
further psychosocial problems – significant anxiety can result when someone feels that others 
will notice a memory problem. For example, unemployment is disproportionately high in 
people with epilepsy, and although a life with uncontrolled seizures may be the cause of this in 
some cases, people’s worries that others will notice them making mistakes in a working 
environment due to memory failure may also contribute to a lack of willingness in pursuing a 
vocation. If a patient presents to a clinician with these worries, and objective performance 
does not match up, then simply telling the person that their memory is fine is of little use.  
Some estimates suggest that between 30-70% of epilepsy patients experience depressive 
disorders (Prueter & Norra, 2005), and a number of studies have found a significant 
relationship between subjective memory, depression and anxiety in this group (Au et al., 2006; 
Baños et al., 2004; Butler et al., 2009; Giovagnoli et al., 1997; Piazzini et al., 2001; Salas-Puig et 
al., 2009). This clearly has clinical implications and suggests that patients presenting with 
epilepsy and memory complaints should be screened for other neuropsychiatric disorders as 
well as a possible amnesic syndrome. Successful psychological and pharmacological 
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intervention targeting depressive or anxious symptoms may then ameliorate any subjective 
memory problems. 
In their recent comprehensive review on this topic, Hall et al. (2009) discuss a number of other 
factors that may have an influence on the subjective-objective memory discrepancy, and why 
variations are seen between similar studies. They note that differences in sampling methods, 
patients’ premorbid functioning, laterality, gender and statistical analyses all partially explain 
the discordance in the literature. However, pertinent to the current thesis is their discussion 
about the effect different measurement methods have.  
One of the key aims of neuropsychological tests is to measure underlying memory constructs 
that are purported to give rise to subjectively experienced memory problems. Hall et al. (2009) 
suggest a potential reason for differences in subjective and objective memory measures may 
be due to a lack of ecological validity in these tests, a lack of sensitivity, and lack of 
correspondence between the domains assessed. In recent years, a number of unusual memory 
impairments have begun to surface in TLE through careful and detailed experimental testing 
(see Butler & Zeman, 2008, for a review). The study of these memory disorders, which are 
often undiagnosable through the use of standardised instruments, strongly suggests that 
disruption to memory processes not specifically addressed in neuropsychological instruments 
may play a causal role in the subjective-objective discrepancy. Therefore, below I provide a 
review of dual-process theories of memory and discuss their application to TLE. 
 
1.7 Recollection and Familiarity  
 
For approximately 30 years, dual-process theories of human memory have permeated through 
experimental research and have provided a useful way of conceptualising how recognition and 
retrieval of information is conducted by humans. Differences between the theories themselves 
will be discussed below, but essentially the commonality between them is that recognition 
memory is proposed to be subserved by two independently arising processes: recollection and 
familiarity. Recollection involves the effortful retrieval of contextual and associative 
information from a prior study event whereas familiarity involves recognition in the absence of 
such contextual information. For some theorists, these are viewed as underlying cognitive 
processes that are used in synchrony to govern behaviour during memorial operations (Jacoby, 
1991; Mandler, 1980; Yonelinas, 1994). For others, however, they are viewed as personally 
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experienced subjective states of awareness that accompany recognition experiences 
(Gardiner, Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1998; Tulving, 1985). 
Tulving’s (1985) re-introduction of introspective methods in memory had an immeasurable 
impact on the psychological community. By advocating the use of subjective report, he paved 
the way for decades of fruitful research regarding the inextricable link between memory and 
consciousness. As later researchers began to understand and research cognitive processing 
accounts of the memory systems he proposed, this area quickly began to depart from purely 
theoretical debate to genuine applied research. For example, following a variety of evidence 
that impairments in recollection are more pervasive than familiarity in aging (Cohn, Emrich, & 
Moscovitch, 2008; Friedman & Trott, 2000; Java, 1996; Jennings & Jacoby, 1997; Norman & 
Schacter, 1997; Perfect & Dasgupta, 1997; Souchay, Moulin, Clarys, Taconnat, & Isingrini, 
2007), a training paradigm that specifically targets recollective processes has shown success in 
increasing older adult participants’ performance on an experimental task, as well as 
transferring performance to other tasks that rely on recollection (Jennings, Webster, 
Klaykamp, & Dagenbach, 2005; Jennings & Jacoby, 2003). Moreover, Tse, Balota, Moynan, 
Duchek, and Jacoby (2010) recently displayed that the recollective component of their 
experimental task (exclusion test performance, explained in Section 1.9.2.3.1) was able to 
reliably differentiate between healthy older adults and those with early stage Alzheimer’s 
disease, and between healthy older adults with the presence or absence of the apolipoprotein 
ε4 (APOe4) allele, a hereditary gene known to increase the risk of earlier stage Alzheimer’s 
disease. 
Although there are relatively few studies looking at rehabilitation of recollection or its real 
world correlates, this is an area of research of value in TLE. The above work is pertinent to the 
current thesis as it shows how there is clear benefit from an applied clinical perspective in 
studying, and extrapolating the results of dual-process led research to memory impaired 
populations.  
 
1.8 Dual-process theories 
 
Several dual-process theories have been proposed in the literature. In the experiments 
presented throughout this thesis, the central tenets and corresponding measurement methods 
proposed by the theories of Jacoby (1991) and Tulving (1985) were adopted. Therefore, I 
concentrate on these in the discussion that follows. Because the model developed by 
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Yonelinas and colleagues (Dobbins, Kroll, Yonelinas, & Liu, 1998; Yonelinas, 2001; Yonelinas, 
Dobbins, Szymanski, Dhaliwal, & King, 1996; Yonelinas, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2001a, 2001b) has 
had such a huge impact within this literature, and due the fact that its measurement method 
(the receiver operating characteristic curve; ROC) has been used alongside those of Tulving 
and Jacoby, I will also cover this. For the interested reader, two other earlier models proposed 
by Atkinson et al. (Atkinson, Hertman, & Wescourt, 1974; Atkinson & Juola, 1973, 1974) and 
Mandler (Mandler, 1980, 1991) are reviewed in Yonelinas (2002). 
 
 
1.8.1 Tulving and the Remember/Know paradigm 
 
The distinction between recollection and familiarity began following Tulving’s (1972) 
suggestion that researchers had only been assessing what he called ‘episodic memory’. He 
likened this to our autobiographical memory (AM) of singular events from our past, and 
contrasted it with ‘semantic memory’, which he considered to comprise context-free 
knowledge of our life and the world around us. An example of an episodic memory would be 
the detailed recall of a fine summer evening in the park picnicking with friends two weeks ago. 
In comparison, knowing that the United Kingdom is made up of England, Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Island is an example of a semantic memory, or semantic knowledge. Tulving 
described how typical laboratory tasks using verbal material tested episodic memory because 
they involved recall and recognition tests for items in a particular personal context; other tasks 
that were emerging at the time tapped into general knowledge (or semantic memory). 
Later, Tulving (1983) introduced the idea that these two types of memory formed functionally 
distinct systems within the brain, and that each type gives rise to a qualitatively different 
phenomenological experience. Episodic remembering, he proposed, was experienced as 
‘autonoetic’ (self-knowing) consciousness. It involves a mental reliving of a prior episode and is 
associated with the retrieval of specific contextual elements from that singular event. A later, 
and oft cited addition to this included the idea of sensory-perceptual cognitive-affective detail, 
to describe the integration of processing that is involved in this contextual retrieval (Conway, 
2001; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). 
‘Noetic’ (knowing) consciousness on the other hand, is experienced simply as knowledge of 
something’s prior occurrence, in the absence of subjective recollection of associative detail. In 
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other words, there is mere familiarity for prior occurrence. In Tulving’s view, these two states, 
Remembering and Knowing, were subjective experiences that occurred independently. For the 
retrieval of past events, or AMs, subjective remembering accompanied information from the 
episodic system; activation of the semantic memory system incurred a subjective sense of 
knowing.  
Based on these distinctions, Tulving (1985) developed an experimental paradigm, the 
Remember/Know (R/K) procedure, to test his hypothesis with respect to people’s anterograde 
recognition memory. As mentioned above, the R/K procedure relied on introspective reports 
by participants regarding their subjective state of awareness of ‘Old’ items during a recognition 
test. Tulving (1985) and later, Gardiner, Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn (1998) provided 
sound empirical evidence that people are reliably able to differentiate between subjective 
Remembering and Knowing. Following the retrieval of some kind of thought or association 
from the encoding phase, participants responded Remember, and in the absence of any 
contextual retrieval but knowledge of previous occurrence, they responded Know.  
The R/K paradigm was used in three out of the four experiments in this thesis; further 
description of this method and findings related to its previous use are described later in 
Sections 1.9.1.1, 1.10.1 and 1.10.2. 
 
1.8.2 Jacoby and the process-dissociation procedure  
 
In 1981, Jacoby and Dallas conducted perceptual identification experiments in which words 
were briefly presented  before a subsequent recognition phase; first, they found that Old 
words were more likely to be identified than New words. Further, using levels-of-processing 
manipulations (LOP; Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Lockhart & Craik, 1990), they found that encoding 
instructions that facilitated conceptual or semantic properties of words boosted recognition 
but not perceptual identification, where as instructions to focus on perceptual aspects of 
words boosted only perceptual identification. Based on these findings, Jacoby and others went 
on to suggest that there must be different forms or uses of memory. Specifically, it was 
suggested that recollection and familiarity are alternative basis for responding Old in 
recognition tests. By this account, recollection is viewed as an analytical controlled process 
that enables the retrieval of contextual information; familiarity is viewed as a more automatic 
process and arrives when fluent processing is attributed to prior occurrence of an item  
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(Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989; Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby & Kelley, 1992; Jacoby & Witherspoon, 
1982; Kelley & Jacoby, 1990; Whittlesea, Jacoby, & Girard, 1990) 
Similar to other dual-process theories, Jacoby postulated that these two processes acted 
independently, but both contributed to performance; because of the automaticity of 
familiarity, this process was proposed to operate in a quicker manner than recollection. 
Jacoby’s test of his assumptions came from work using the process-dissociation procedure 
(PDP; described in detail in Section 1.9.2.3.1) which is a theoretical framework designed to 
tease apart the relative contributions of recollection and familiarity to performance by putting 
them in opposition to one another. 
 
 
1.8.3 Yonelinas and the dual-process signal detection model 
 
Yonelinas and colleagues (Dobbins, Kroll, & Liu, 1998; Dobbins, Kroll, Yonelinas, et al., 1998;  
Yonelinas et al., 1996; Yonelinas, Kroll, Dobbins, & Soltani, 1999;  Yonelinas, 1994, 1997, 1999, 
2001a, 2001b) proposed an alternative to the view of recollection and familiarity as subjective 
states of awareness or intentional control mechanisms. Instead, they saw the two processes 
differing in the type of information associated with them and corresponding levels of 
confidence. In the dual-process signal detection model, familiarity is assumed to be a signal 
detection like process – a quantitative index of memory strength of items where an item is 
recognised if its familiarity exceeds a participant’s response criterion (i.e. a participant’s 
propensity to make a positive recognition response). Hence, the most familiar items will be 
accepted as having been studied. On the other hand, recollection reflects a threshold process 
represented by high-confidence responses whereby qualitative information is recovered (e.g. 
where the item was studied). If the level of contextual information does not reach the given 
threshold, assessments of familiarity will prevail. This is not to say that recollection is an all-or-
none process; rather, a certain level of contextual detail must be present in order for 
recollection to succeed, and beyond this threshold, varying amounts of qualitative information 
are retrieved (Yonelinas, Aly, Wang, & Koen, 2010; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007). During 
recognition tasks that involve both processes, recollection and familiarity are postulated to be 
activated simultaneously but independently, with familiarity being quicker than recollection.   
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Estimations of the two processes are obtained by fitting receiver operating characteristic (ROC) 
curves to different levels of confidence responses associated with correctly recognised Old 
items (hits) and falsely recognised New items (false positives; FPs). The ROC method is 
described in more detail in Section 1.9.2.4. 
 
 
1.8.4 Alternatives to dual-process models 
 
As with any theory attempting to explain such a complex and multifaceted problem, dual-
process accounts are not without criticism. A dual-process approach was adopted throughout 
this thesis, but it is important to acknowledge other theories of recognition memory, which are 
presented in the following section. 
 
1.8.4.1 Single trace accounts 
 
A number of researchers have suggested that a more parsimonious way of looking at 
recognition memory is from a single process view, where memory reflects a unitary continuum 
of trace strength (Donaldson, 1996; Dunn, 2004; Hirshman & Master, 1997). This view is borne 
out of signal detection theory (Swets, Tanner, & Birdsall, 1961) and holds that for item 
recognition, studied items have a greater memory strength than new, unseen items, but there 
is variability in overall memory strength such that the two types have overlapping Gaussian 
(normal) distributions. The distance between these distributions is d’, which reflects how much 
stronger studied items are than new items. A recognition decision is made when old items 
exceed the response criterion. Variations on this model essentially depend on how they 
perceive the variance of the two distributions. 
In the equal variance signal detection model, the variance associated with target items is equal 
to new items. This model suggests that differences between R/K responses simply reflect the 
fact that R responses reflect stronger memories and K responses reflect weaker memories. In 
the alternative unequal variance signal detection model, a second memory component is 
added; the difference between the variances of the old item distribution and new item 
distribution (VT). Differences in these variances will have corresponding effects on the ROC 
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curves derived from recognition performance. Although no specific predictions are made 
about such differences, it has been suggested that the old item distribution may be more 
variable, because of encoding variability (Wixted, 2007). The unequal variance signal detection 
model similarly predicts that Remember judgments simply reflect high confidence recognition 
responses. 
There are many more recent examples of signal detection approaches to recognition memory, 
such as the ‘sum difference theory of remembering and knowing’ (STREAK; Rotello, Macmillan, 
& Reeder, 2004), the ‘source activation confusion model‘ (SAC; Diana, Reder, Arndt, & Park, 
2006), the theory of distributed associative memory (TODAM; Murdock, 2006) and a model 
proposed by Wixted and Stretch (2004). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to describe these 
models in great detail. However, the fundamental differences between them can be 
summarised as follows: a) their assumptions about the distribution of old and new items; b) 
whether or not they include a unitary strength dimension or two to account for recollection 
and familiarity; c) the inclusion (or exclusion) of a threshold process to account for 
recollection; d) whether they include additional parameters to account for differences in 
associative memory rather than single item memory and; d) fundamentally, the decision rule 
that they adopt, i.e. exactly what leads to a positive recognition response (see Rotello & 
Macmillan, 2006, and Yonelinas & Parks, 2007, for reviews).  
 This area of research is highly complex and continues to provide knowledge about the basis of 
recognition memory. However, the aim of the current thesis was not to explore such issues. 
Although one could inevitably add to understanding about memory impairment in TLE by 
adopting a single trace approach, for the purposes of my aim in bridging together measures of 
subjective awareness and objective performance, dual-process theory was better suited. 
Moreover, despite differences in theoretical viewpoint, the paradigms are the same in that 
they ascribe subjective reports to objective memory performance. 
Later in Section  1.10  I will describe the body of evidence from the TLE literature that has 
shown recollection and familiarity are functionally dissociable, independent processes, hence 
validating the methods used in the my experiments. 
 
1.8.4.2 The Source Monitoring Framework  
An alternative viewpoint is the Source Monitoring Framework (SMF; Johnson, 2006; Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Johnson & Raye, 1981; Mitchell & Johnson, 2009), which provides 
a conceptual understanding of how the construction and reconstruction of experiences is 
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dependent on people’s knowledge, beliefs, goals and metamemory assumptions (Mitchell & 
Johnson, 2009).  
According to the SMF, complex event memories are made up from disparate features such as 
perceptual, spatial, temporal, semantic and emotional information. When specific 
combinations of these elements are reconstructed, the differentiation between them gives rise 
to an episodic memory. When a high degree of differentiation occurs including a number of 
bound specific details, the resultant subjective experience is likely to be one of recollection. 
However, other source attributions are relatively non-specific as they are based on relatively 
undifferentiated information. These will be experienced as familiarity. Further, the features 
involved in source attributions are flexibly weighted according to the demands of the task. For 
example, asking a participant “Do you recognise this item?” is likely to place emphasis on 
purely cognitive information, whereas asking “Was this item presented in red?” will lead to a 
heavier weighting on perceptual information. The SMF assumes that all episodic memory tasks 
involve some kind of source attribution (described further in Section 1.9.2.2), and the 
difference between them lies in the extent to which one or a number of processes are 
operating along with things like a person’s knowledge and beliefs. It therefore predicts that 
there is overlap in the brain processes involved. 
As mentioned, the SMF views recollection and familiarity as subjective experiences arising 
from attributions. However, like single trace accounts, the SMF views this as a continuous 
process, along the trajectory of differentiation. In other words, a memory is experienced as 
continuous, comprising more, and less specific information. Therefore, like the single trace 
accounts above, it uses behavioural evidence of graded recollection as support for its 
prediction (e.g. Simons, Dodson, Bell, & Schacter, 2004; Wais, Mickes, & Wixted, 2008). 
 
 
1.8.5 Neuroanatomical models 
 
Dissociations found in memory processes of amnesic patients led to the development of the 
theories of recognition outlined above. However, due to the selectivity of neuropathology in 
these patients, a vast literature has developed in order to understand the neurobiological basis 
of memory also. This has predominantly involved the study of functional specialisation in the 
MTL. 
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1.8.5.1 Dual- process neuroanatomical accounts of recognition memory 
 
Drawing on findings from amnesics, Eichenbaum, Otto, and Cohen (1994) and Aggleton and 
Brown (1999; Brown & Aggleton, 2001) both suggested that the hippocampus is critical for 
recollection, where as the adjacent parahippocampal gyrus is responsible for familiarity. 
Aggleton and Brown (1999) further suggested that due to the network connecting the 
hippocampus to the fornix, mamilliary bodies, and anterior thalamic nuclei, these structures 
are also engaged during the encoding and retrieval stages of recollection. Moreover, they 
suggested that familiarity is supported specifically by the most anterior portion of the 
parahippocampal region - the PRc.  
Both of these models make the prediction that hippocampal damage should affect recollection 
but not familiarity, and parahippocampal damage should lead to impairments in familiarity, 
not recollection. In support of such predictions, patients with damage restricted to the 
hippocampus have displayed isolated impairments in recollection through the use of the R/K 
paradigm and process dissociation methods (Bowles et al., 2010; Holdstock, Mayes, Gong, 
Roberts, & Kapur, 2005), and analysis of a patient with a lesion restricted to the PRc revealed 
impaired familiarity but intact recollection using the R/K paradigm, ROC method and response-
deadline procedure (Bowles et al., 2007). 
Later models have elaborated on the specific roles of the PRc, EC and parahippocampal 
cortices (PHc) due to the emergence of findings that extrahippocampal structures may be able 
to support associative memory when items are sufficiently unitized during encoding (e.g. 
Quamme, Yonelinas, & Norman, 2007). Such a departure, as Montaldi and Mayes (2010) 
describe, begins to view recollection and familiarity as ‘kinds’ of memory, because “each is a 
complex function, likely to depend on several different processes that are probably mediated 
by different structures that are functionally connected in a system” (p.1294).  
 
A schematic representation of a neuroanatomical model of recognition is presented in Figure 
1.1, based on Dickerson and Eichenbaum (2010) and Montaldi and Mayes (2010). In their 
Convergence, Recollection and Familiarity Theory (CRAFT) model, Montaldi and Mayes (2010) 
argue that the PRc rapidly forms weakly pattern separated1 memories that support familiarity 
                                                          
1
 Pattern separation is a neurobiological process of transforming similar representations or memories 
into highly dissimilar, non-overlapping representations. 
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well, but recollection poorly, so memory binding will occur in the hippocampus. Further, intra-
item associations can be supported by this area when unitised (e.g. the words ‘ice’ and ‘shaft’ 
encoded as iceshaft), but inter-item representations may also be formed giving rise to a feeling 
that the two were presented before (e.g. face-word pairs). The ability of the PRc cortex to 
support such representations is dependent on the manner in which they are encoded; intra-
item associations rely on a unifying conceptual link, inter-item associations rely on a linking of 
components. These representations are highly inflexible and if the linked components are 
altered, familiarity will diminish. In recognising the similarities in cytoarchitecture between PRc 
and PHc, these authors further postulate that the parahippocampal cortex can also support 
associations, but for context-context relations. Such ‘contexts’, although difficult to fully 
define, can include visual, spatial or semantic information that is peripheral to the item that is 
the focus of attention (Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007).  
 
Recollection, on the other hand, supports highly flexible associations and as it lies at the top of 
the MTL hierarchy, it alone can support between-domain associations (object-context links). Its 
cytoarchitecture allows rapid pattern separation (and completion), which supports recollection 
and not familiarity.  
 
Whereas the CRAFT model ascribes importance to the role of the PHc in familiarity based 
context recognition through bound associations, the ‘Binding of Item and Context’ (BIC) model 
proposed by Diana et al. (2007) makes a slightly different assumption about this MTL sub 
region. The model by Diana and colleagues, based on a variety of neuroimaging data, similarly 
suggests that the PRc and PHc encode item and context information, with the hippocampus 
encoding representations between them. However, they suggest that because context 
representations support recollection in item recognition tests, the PHc is involved in 
recollection as well as the hippocampus.  
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Another view of MTL involvement in declarative memory departs from the dual-process focus 
of recollection and familiarity and instead sees this brain system as fundamentally relational in 
nature (Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1993; Eichenbaum & Cohen, 2001). Relational theory posits that 
the hippocampus is involved in forming relations between spatial information, associative 
information and temporal information. This is distinguished from memory for items 
themselves that are bound together. Evidence for this theory is derived from the finding that 
patients with restricted hippocampal damage show preserved item memory, but impairments 
in both spatial and non-spatial relations (e.g. Kan, Giovanello, Schnyer, Makris, & Verfaellie, 
2007; Mayes et al., 2004) and neuroimaging results that show increased activation in the 
hippocampus when forming new relationships among items, rather than the individual 
encoding of items (e.g. Davachi & Wagner, 2002; Davachi, Mitchell, & Wagner, 2003). Clearly, 
this relational view shares many common traits with the above CRAFT and BIC models, and all 
are able to use similar neuropsychological and neuroimaging results to support them.  
 
1.8.5.2 The single trace neuroanatomical account of recognition memory 
 
Just as cognitive single trace accounts contest the assumptions of dual-process theories, there 
is also opposition to the above neuroanatomical models. Squire and colleagues (Squire, 
Figure 1.1 Functional organisation of the medial temporal lobe - proposed input and convergence. 
Taken from Dickerson and Eichenbaum (2010). Object features converge from neocortex in perirhinal 
cortex (PRC) and lateral entorhinal area (LEA); location and context input converge in parahippocampal 
cortex (PHC) and medial entorhinal area (MEA); hippocampus supports binding of complex item-in-
context relations. 
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Wixted, & Clark, 2007; Wixted & Squire, 2011; Zola-Morgan, Squire, & Ramus, 1994) argue that 
all structures within the MTL mediate recollection and familiarity equally. Their MTL Unitary 
Trace Strength (MUST) account suggests that functional heterogeneity does exist within the 
MTL, but not for recollection and familiarity. Although the theory does not question the 
existence of these two processes, it sees that examination of the components within the MTL 
cannot be illuminated by this distinction in psychological constructs; rather, the distinction is 
likely to benefit from findings from neuroanatomy and neurophysiology that identify attributes 
of memory supported by different structures (Wixted & Squire, 2011).  
 
The MUST account criticises the interpretations gleaned from lesion and neuroimaging studies 
regarding the role of recollection in the hippocampus on the basis that their interpretations 
strongly assume that confidence and accuracy are high whenever recollection occurs. 
Correspondingly, all of the methods used in support of the recollection/familiarity distinction 
(ROC, R/K, source memory etc) also assume that familiarity is associated with low confidence 
and weaker memories. As Wixted (2007) and Wixted and Squire (2011) argue, recollection is a 
continuous process just like familiarity. Based on this assumption, previous work suggesting 
the hippocampus supports recollection equally supports the interpretation that the 
hippocampus is simply involved in the encoding and retrieval of strong memories, which may 
be recollection or familiarity based. In order to provide evidence for this, they suggest 
methods must be used that do not confound recollection and familiarity with memory 
strength. For example, in a source memory experiment using functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI), Wais, Squire, & Wixted (2010) measured hippocampal activity at retrieval after 
equating memory strength of recognition decisions on item-correct plus source-correct or 
item-correct plus source-incorrect trials. Their analysis focused only on Old/New trials where 
participants assigned high confidence ratings, regardless of whether the correct source was 
retrieved. They found that hippocampal activity was similarly elevated for both 
correct/incorrect source judgments, suggesting it is involved in both recollection and 
familiarity.  
 
 
1.8.6 Consolidation theories of hippocampal function 
 
The research discussed so far has concentrated on the functional specialisation of the MTL in 
anterograde recognition memory. However, similar debate exists regarding the role of the 
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hippocampus in the encoding and consolidation of memories over longer periods of time. 
Hence, these structures also play an important role in autobiographical memories. The 
experiment presented in Chapter 6 of this thesis explores the interaction between episodic 
and semantic aspects of AM in TLE. Previous findings in the TLE literature regarding AM will be 
discussed later in Sections  1.10.2 and 1.10.4, but I will briefly outline the two neurobiological 
theories of consolidation here, as they extend from the above discussion. 
 
 
 
1.8.6.1 The Standard Model of Consolidation  
 
According to the standard model of consolidation (SMC; Bayley, Hopkins, & Squire, 2006; 
McClelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995; Murre, 1996; Squire & Alvarez, 1995), MTL 
structures are only involved in the consolidation and retrieval of memories (both episodic and 
semantic) for a time-limited period. Upon encoding, these memories are presumed to be 
stored initially by synaptic changes in the hippocampal system, but over time, these mnemonic 
representations become independent of the hippocampus due to storage in neocortical 
structures. Although the exact period over which the links between the hippocampus and 
neocortex is unknown, it has been suggested to be in the order of around 5-10 years (e.g. 
Schmidtke & Vollmer, 1997).  
Evidence for the SMC initially came from studies of amnesics who appeared to show a ‘Ribot’ 
gradient (Ribot, 1888)  following MTL insult. That is, a relative preservation of remote 
memories in light of significant impairments in newer acquired ones (more commonly known 
as a temporal gradient). The model assumes that retrograde amnesia is temporally limited and 
directly related to the locus and extent of damage. When there is isolated hippocampal 
damage, the retrograde amnesia will be limited to several years, but following extended 
damage into other MTL areas (which are still crucially involved in the transfer of 
representations), the retrograde amnesia will be temporally extended backwards (Reed & 
Squire, 1998). Evidence for the SMC has come from studies of amnesics with either selective 
hippocampal damage or more diffuse MTL damage whose remote autobiographical memories 
are indistinguishable from healthy controls (e.g. Bayley, Hopkins, & Squire, 2003; Zola-Morgan, 
Squire, & Amaral, 1986). 
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1.8.6.2 The Multiple Trace theory  
 
The multiple trace theory (MTT) is the alternative view to the SMC (Nadel & Moscovitch, 1997, 
2001). Like the standard model of consolidation, it agrees that the hippocampal complex 
rapidly encodes information and binds neocortical neurons into a memory trace. However, 
MTT does not agree that there is a prolonged consolidation process that strengthens 
neocortical representations, removing the involvement of the hippocampus over time. Instead, 
each time memories are retrieved, MTT posits that a new hippocampally mediated trace is 
created so that older memories are represented by stronger hippocampal and MTL traces than 
newer memories, and become far less susceptible to disruption from neurological insult. One 
of the other key differences between MTT and SMC is that only the former accounts for 
differences in episodic and semantic memory; each autobiographical episode forms a unique 
trace, but the formation of multiple related traces helps retrieve neocortically mediated 
information that is common between them. This information is combined with pre-existing 
knowledge and forms semantic memories that exist independently of the MTL. MTT suggests 
that the prolonged consolidation account of the SMC is explained by the fact that with 
repeated experience, semanticization of the knowledge acquired with individual episodes 
occurs.   
The specific predictions of each model heavily rest on the methodology employed in 
experimental studies (i.e. how many years in the past does the instrument measure; whether 
the instrument separates episodic from semantic memories) and also on the extent of lesions 
in patients. In recent years, support for the MTT has been garnered from studies that 
employed sensitive testing methods that specifically assess the difference between contextual 
episodic memories and those consisting of semantic knowledge, or repeated experiences 
(Moscovitch et al., 2005).  
 
1.8.7 Summary 
 
The discussion above indicates how there is ongoing debate within the recognition and 
neuroscience literatures regarding functional specialisation of the MTL. Patients with TLE 
provide a useful sample to test the predictions of such theories, particularly in post-operative 
cases where precise anatomical information is available regarding the extent of excisions. Pre-
operative patient samples are also interesting , because comparisons can be made between 
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those with hippocampal sclerosis and those with more a more lateral epileptic focus. Obtaining 
precise lesion data is dependent on high resolution and costly neuroimaging, however.  
The aim of this thesis was not to help delineate the individual processes that contribute to 
recollection and familiarity, or understand their exact anatomical nature. Rather, reflecting on 
Montaldi and Mayes’ (2010) statement above, the experiments were aimed at shedding light 
on these ‘kinds’ of memory and their associated subjective experience as there is value in this 
approach also. Below, I describe the experimental measurement techniques that are used 
throughout this thesis. 
 
 
1.9 Measuring recollection and familiarity  
 
A useful distinction, and one that is critical for the current thesis, is between the methods that 
provide a subjective measure of recollection and familiarity and those that provide objective 
measures. 
 
 
 
1.9.1 Subjective measures and awareness 
 
1.9.1.1 The R/K paradigm 
 
The R/K paradigm is a first-person approach to recognition memory which asks participants to 
reflect on their experiential state during recognition, or autobiographical memory retrieval. In 
recognition memory, a Remember response is assigned to an item if it evokes contextual detail 
from the encoding phase (thoughts, feelings and associations) and a Know response is assigned 
to items that are recognised in the absence of such context but with a feeling of ‘oldness’. The 
proportion of items assigned a Remember response in such paradigms is thus thought to 
reflect the contribution of recollective experience to recognition, and this is compared to the 
probability of items subjectively experienced as known. There have been many developments 
in this paradigm over the years, several of which are pertinent to the current thesis. These 
include the addition of a Guess response, using Familiar rather than Know judgments, and the 
introduction of mathematical procedures in order to satisfy the independence assumption of 
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the two processes. These theoretical considerations, as well as the boundary conditions of the 
PDP used in the current thesis are covered in Section 1.9.3 below. 
Tulving’s (1972, 1985) development of the R/K paradigm was based on his theory regarding 
the functional separation of the episodic and semantic memory systems. Hence, the idea of 
autonoetic and noetic conscious states of awareness was directly related to the 
phenomenology of past experience. Based on this distinction, and the emerging debates 
regarding the temporal gradient of retrograde memory loss in amnesia (see Section 1.8.6), the 
Autobiographical Memory Interview (AMI; Kopelman, Wilson, & Baddeley, 1990) was 
developed. This was the first development of a standardised tool to separately assess episodic 
and semantic AMs in neurological populations and involves the retrieval of event memories, or 
factual information, from different lifetime periods. Drawing on the phenomenological aspect 
of Tulving’s work, Piolino and colleagues (Noulhiane et al., 2007; Piolino et al., 2003, 2005) 
later developed a much more detailed semi-structured interview; this requires the assignment 
of Remember and Know judgments to retrieved memories that are cued by themes (e.g. 
holdays) and lifetime periods. The resultant narratives are also scored on an episodic scale, 
according to their contextual richness. This method, and the equally detailed Autobiographical 
Interview (AI; Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2002) have provided a large body 
of evidence elucidating the functional separation of these systems, and the phenomenology 
associated with them in a variety of neuropsychological groups.  
The R/K paradigm can however, be applied in its simpler form following the retrieval of any 
kind of autobiographical memory. In Chapter 6 of the current thesis, the R/K paradigm was 
applied in the context of retrieval of specific memories that contribute to semantic knowledge 
of public events. AM in TLE is discussed further in Section 1.10. 
 
1.9.2 Objective measures 
 
1.9.2.1 Item vs. associative memory 
 
Dual-process models argue that recollection involves a process of retrieving qualitative 
contextual and associative information from a prior episode. Therefore, when units of 
information are bound together, recollection is used to retrieve the relation between them. On 
the other hand, familiarity only discriminates between single (or, as above, unitised) 
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representations in a quantitative fashion. One commonly used way to test this is through 
paradigms that incorporate both aspects; item and associative recognition. In such 
experiments, participants are usually presented with unrelated word pairs (although other 
stimuli, such as faces, or pictures may be used) that they must encode. They are later tested 
on recognition memory for either single items, or on the association between those items (e.g. 
Hockley, 1992; Hockley & Cristi, 1996). Item memory is calculated as the probability of correct 
discrimination between Old items and New, lure items. Associative memory is calculated as 
the probability of correct discrimination between pairs consisting of two originally bound items 
and pairs consisting of two items that were both encoded, but from different pairs 
(recombined pairs). Because both old and recombined pairs are comprised of previously seen 
information, successful discrimination between them is thought to rely heavily on recollection 
(i.e. qualitative information about the association is retrieved). As Cohn et al. (2008) describe, 
this associative identification is dependent on successful binding, but due to the high level of 
familiarity for old recombined pairs, recollection based recall-to-reject processes are needed to 
oppose this, which involve extensive memory search and post-retrieval monitoring 
mechanisms also. For intact pairs, recollection supplements familiarity by using a recall-to-
accept mechanism to reinstate the pair, hence these authors name this associative 
reinstatement. Because of the contrasting influences recollection and familiarity have on these 
types of items, the paradigm is particularly suited for application of the PDP. This is described 
later in Section 1.9.3.1. 
 
1.9.2.2 Source memory 
 
Source memory, or source monitoring paradigms, involve learning a range of stimuli that differ 
in some contextual aspect. These differences are generally perceptual differences, such as 
modality (words encoded by reading vs. auditorily presented) or spatially (item presented on 
the top or bottom of the screen). It could also be differences in the whole context an item was 
learnt (different lists of words, or different test sessions). Consistent with item and associative 
recognition memory tests, recollection and familiarity are proposed to contribute in a similar 
way; simple Yes/No recognition of Old vs New items can be supported by both processes, but 
it is assumed that the retrieval of the correct source feature is dependent on recollection only.   
As in the study cited above by Squire and Wixted (2010), estimates of the contribution of 
recollection and familiarity can be observed in ROC curves derived from confidence responses 
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to correct item/source discriminations. However, the R/K paradigm has been utilised in this 
area to a great extent also, as the subjective state of remembering is theorised to be 
accompanied by retrieval of source or contextual information, where as subjective knowing, or 
familiarity, is not. For example, experiments have shown that ‘Remember’ judgments are 
associated with significantly better source memory than ‘Know’ judgments in a variety of 
experimental manipulations (Dewhurst & Hitch, 1999; Humphreys et al., 2003; Meiser & 
Sattler, 2007; Perfect, Mayes, Downes, & Eijk, 1996) and Remember judgments have also been 
found to be associated with the correct retrieval of two or more bound representations, 
further suggesting a relationship between the binding of context and recollective experience 
(Meiser, Sattler, & Weisser, 2008).  
Understanding the processes by which we bind and integrate information is important as part 
of consciousness is inherently related to our experience of the world as a coherent set of 
features. Comparing the effect memory impairment has on this with healthy adults is likely to 
elucidate further how such conscious processes operate. Therefore, both source and 
associative memory are explored in detail in Chapters 3 and 5 of this thesis. 
 
1.9.2.3 Process estimations 
 
The PDP and ROC methods have already been mentioned above several times; both of these 
methods allow for an objective estimation of the contribution of recollection and familiarity to 
recognition memory.  
 
1.9.2.3.1 Process dissociation procedure 
 
The process-dissociation procedure (PDP) was first developed by Jacoby (1991) as a way to 
separate automatic and controlled uses of memory to recognition performance. Jacoby, and 
other researchers at this time had observed that performance on indirect tests of memory, 
such as implicit memory, were preserved in amnesics, whilst performance on direct tests that 
tapped declarative memory (e.g. recall) were impaired (Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1988; Tulving & 
Schacter, 1990). Such dissociations led to the development of dual-process theories, as they 
suggested there were different forms, or uses of memory. However, Jacoby acknowledged that 
comparing memory for implicit/explicit tests to provide evidence for a dual-process model was 
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problematic because such tests were not process pure. In particular, indirect tests of memory 
may be particularly susceptible to the influence of explicit memory, therefore, measurement 
of any ‘automatic’ process is contaminated. 
To overcome this problem, Jacoby’s PDP (1991) assessed the contribution of different 
processes within one task. Early studies examined this by the use of word-stem completion 
tasks (e.g. Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas, 1993); participants were to study a list of words under 
full, or divided attention and were subsequently given an inclusion and exclusion test. In the 
inclusion test, stems of the word were presented (e.g. fl_ _ _ for ‘flame’) and participants 
simply had to attempt to recall a word from the study phase to fill in the gaps. In the exclusion 
test, stems were again presented, but participants were instructed to complete the item 
without using a word from the study phase. In the inclusion test, performance is subserved by 
automatic (A) and controlled (recollection; R) processes, or the combined use of the two. In 
the exclusion test, an incorrect response (i.e. the participant fills the stem with a study word) 
would only occur if recollection did not overcome, or successfully oppose familiarity. By 
making the assumptions that the two processes operate independently and have similar 
influence in the two tests, the contribution of recollection and familiarity to performance can 
be derived mathematically using algebraic formulations (details of these equations are 
presented in the method sections of Chapters 4 and 5). In Jacoby et al’s. (1993) study, they 
found that dividing attention during encoding reduced recollection estimates in healthy adults 
to zero, whereas familiarity estimates were left unchanged; hence, the two processes were 
behaviourally dissociable.  
The PDP can be applied to many different experimental paradigms. The manipulation of 
different encoding conditions has elucidated a range of variables that selectively effect either 
recollection or familiarity, hence adding to the hypothesis that they are dissociable processes 
(see Yonelinas & Jacoby, 2012, for a review). Of particular importance however, is the 
application of the PDP to populations in which memory impairments are theorised to result as 
a specific deficit in recollection. The procedure, or variants of it, was therefore used in two 
experiments within the current thesis to examine recollection and familiarity in TLE. In the first 
experiment presented in Chapter 4, the ‘repetition-lag’ procedure described by Jennings & 
Jacoby (1997) was used. This variant of the PDP was originally designed to test one of the 
fundamental errors of recollection commonly observed in older adults; an inability to 
overcome the repetition of storytelling. As Jennings and Jacoby theorised, this was a result of 
the fact that the automatic influences from an earlier encounter of storytelling are not 
opposed by recollection to determine that they had been told before. Although this may, or 
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may not be a common feature of TLE, the repetition-lag procedure nevertheless allows a 
suitable means of exploring the contribution of recollection and familiarity to recognition.  
As was mentioned in Section 1.9.2.3.1, the PDP can also be applied to associative recognition 
studies. Associative identification involves discriminating between studied and recombined 
pairs of items; for example, after studying pairs AB and CD, in the associative identification 
test, a participant would attempt to recognise AB and reject AD. Hence, relational information 
would have to be recollected in order to overcome familiarity for the two previously seen 
words in the recombined pair. In an associative reinstatement test, the instructions differ, in 
that any combination of old pairs can be accepted (i.e. both AB and AD). This does not require 
the explicit retrieval of the relation between items, but performance should be better for pairs 
that reinstate the original study context. As Cohn and colleagues discuss (Cohn et al., 2008; 
Cohn, McAndrews, & Moscovitch, 2009; Cohn & Moscovitch, 2007), these tests place varied 
demands on relational binding, recollection and familiarity, and strategic retrieval operations. 
Associative identification is dependent on intact MTL binding operations, but also strategic 
recall-to-reject strategies, which are suggested to rely on integrity of frontal-lobe functioning 
(Cohn et al., 2008). Associative reinstatement, however, is less dependent on strategic 
retrieval, and is a purer index of MTL relational binding operations (Cohn et al., 2009). By 
incorporating associative identification and associative reinstatement into a single task (akin to 
inclusion and exclusion tests), one can derive behavioural measures reflective of recollection 
(e.g. FPs after failure in recalling-to-reject) and familiarity (e.g. item memory) but also derive 
objective PDP estimates of these two processes by contrasting hit and FP rates across tests. 
The formula for these are described in detail in Chapter 5.  
 
1.9.2.4 ROC  method 
 
The ROC method was not employed in the current thesis, but due to its widespread use and 
influence on the dual-process/single trace literature, I provide a brief overview of this 
objective measurement technique. 
An ROC is a function that relates the proportion of hits to FPs over different variations in 
response bias (Yonelinas & Parks, 2007). The most common way of measuring this is to obtain 
a continuous confidence rating over a six-point scale for recognised items (e.g. 1 – sure old to 6 
- sure new). Because this method allows one to plot a function of hits against FPs over different 
response criterion, it is more constraining than typical recognition tests, in which only one 
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point, the single hit and FP rate, are obtained. The ROC is generated by plotting hit and FP 
pairs starting with the most confidently recognised items (hits and FPs assigned a rating of 6) 
and subsequently plotting items with the next highest level of confidence (i.e. hit = 6, FP = 5; 
FP = 6, hit =5). This is continued until all permutations of confidence are plotted. The shape of 
the ROC curve and area beneath it, the intercept with the y-axis, and slope of the z-ROC curve 
are then derived from these responses.  Example ROC curves are displayed in Figure 1.2. 
Observing the left panel – chance performance would lie along the diagonal (as hits = FPs), but 
as the curve is pushed up toward the outer left quadrant, the greater area under the curve 
represents greater memory sensitivity or discriminability. In this example, the ‘strong’ curve 
represents an ROC function for a test where items were presented multiple times during 
encoding (versus one presentation for ‘weak’). Hence, this encoding benefit would lead to 
better memory discrimination performance between Old and New items.    
Another way of analysing the ROC is to obtain the z-score for each point and plot these as z-
space ROCs. If the z-ROC is linear, then the intercept can be used to approximate recognition 
accuracy, and the slope can be used to estimate the asymmetry of the ROC. In Figure 1.2, both 
diagonals appear to be slightly pushed up to the left hand-side, indicating that the z-slope is 
less than 1. Analysis of z-slope and z-intercept are the most common measures and regression 
analyses can be conducted on these to assess slope and intercept functions (Yonelinas & Parks, 
2007). However, one can also fit theoretically based models to the ROC using signal detection 
algorithms. Model based analytic approaches provide estimates of model parameters; for 
example, in the dual-process signal detection model, one can obtain estimates for each subject 
of the contribution of recollection and familiarity. These estimates can then be submitted to 
standard quantitative statistical analyses, such as ANOVA, to compare differences.  
There are numerous models that have been proposed to account for recognition memory, and 
the strength of the ROC method is that the ‘goodness-of-fit’ of each model can be calculated 
to show numerically whether one model has better explanatory power of the data than 
another. The dual-process signal detection model (Yonelinas, 1994) views recollection and 
familiarity as independent, with the former being a threshold process and the latter as 
continuous. Thus, familiarity is represented as a curved symmetrical ROC. Because recollection 
increases with high confidence hits during item recognition, the ROC becomes asymmetrical 
and the z-ROC will have a slope of less than 1. Based on these predictions, increasing 
recollection (through semantic encoding instructions, for example) should lead to a more 
asymmetrical ROC, whereas familiarity should be unchanged and hence symmetrical.  
1:30 
 
 
 
Each of the alternative signal detection approaches predicts different shapes to ROCs, and this 
is also dependent on the type of test used (e.g. item vs relational recognition). One of the 
strengths of the ROC method is that it can be applied to almost any recognition paradigm, and 
as Yonelinas (2002) discusses, the dual-process signal detection model has been used 
extensively to corroborate dissociations found in other methods, such as the PDP and R/K 
paradigm. As Yonelinas and Parks (2007) and Parks & Yonelinas (2008) review, single trace 
models of recognition cannot adequately account for recognition memory, and instead two 
processes must be responsible. 
The focus of the current thesis was to make comparisons between objective measures of 
performance and the subjective experience associated with them in TLE and healthy adults 
within-tasks. Comparison of subjective experience with ROC data has been conducted 
previously in the literature with healthy adults (Kapucu, Macmillan, & Rotello, 2010; Rotello, 
Macmillan, Reeder, & Wong, 2005). These studies have typically evaluated how well a number 
of alternative mathematical models fit recognition data. However, as mentioned, the aim of 
this thesis was not to prove or disprove dual or single process accounts. Therefore, the ROC 
method was not examined. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Example ROCs in probability space (left panel) and z-space (right panel) from Egan (1958), as cited by 
Yonelinas and Parks (2007). 
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1.9.3 Theoretical considerations and boundary conditions of methods 
 
Because all dual-process accounts have the central defining feature that recollection and 
familiarity operate independently, their ability to display this has been the focus of most 
criticism. However, there are a number of careful considerations that can be adopted, in both 
methodology and statistical analysis, which can ensure this assumption, and others, are met. 
Below, I discuss some of the theoretical issues relating to the two main methods employed in 
the present set of experiments; the PDP and R/K paradigm. 
 
1.9.3.1 Process Dissociation Procedure 
 
An early criticism of the PDP came from Curran & Hintzman (1995), who argued against the 
independence assumption on the basis that recollection is redundant with familiarity, rather 
than independent of it. For example, redundancy would occur in the inclusion stem 
completion test described earlier if a word automatically came to mind, and the participant 
then engaged in a memory search to see if the word was originally studied (‘generate-
recognise’ strategy). However, Jacoby (1998) displayed different patterns of responding when 
providing instructions that either encouraged the generate-recognise strategy, or direct 
retrieval. This argument led to the acknowledgment that instructions are critical to find the 
predicted dissociation in controlled and automatic processes. In a similar vein, as Jacoby (1998) 
discusses, varying instructions may have an effect on response bias in each test, such that base 
rate FPs differ. This would also pose a problem for the independence assumption. 
 Because the experiments in this thesis did not use this stem completion paradigm, the more 
important issue was whether participants understood the instructions for the inclusion and 
exclusion tests. To overcome this potential problem, the experiments in Chapters 4 and 5 both 
used the exact same instructions as the published studies on which they were based. 
Moreover, participants’ understanding of these instructions was verified and the instructions 
were available throughout the testing procedure. Moreover, as robust dissociations between 
recollection and familiarity had been previously shown using these paradigms, this precedent 
provided good basis to believe that this factor should not confound the independence 
assumption. With respect to response bias, this was checked and analysed via ANOVA in both 
studies. 
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A further problem for the independence assumption is if recollection and familiarity are not 
equally used as bases for responding in both inclusion and exclusion tasks. In depth-discussion 
of ways to counteract such a problem are provided by Yonelinas, Kroll, Dobbins, Lazzara and 
Knight (1998) and Yonelinas and Jacoby (1995). The important issue relating to this for the 
current thesis comes down to the type of recollection involved in these tests. The PDP only 
measures the extent to which a recollective process aids performance on a specific task. 
Hence, there may be other more automatic forms of recollection that are present that are not 
captured in the PDP derived estimates. This has been termed ‘noncriterial recollection’ 
(Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1996) . For example, when having to decide whether a word pair was 
studied together, a participant may automatically remember that they sneezed when they saw 
one of the words. However, this contextual information had not originally contributed to 
binding the items and hence could not be used as a recollective process to correctly accept the 
word pair. These kind of influences may thus exert an effect across inclusion and exclusion 
performance and one potential way of accounting for such differences is to use subjective 
reports, which reflect all available recollective information. This was the approach taken in the 
current set of experiments.  
 
1.9.3.2 R/K paradigm 
 
The original R/K paradigm only permits a participant to respond either Remember or Know to 
a single item, which inherently carries an exclusivity assumption that the two cannot co-exist. 
Although dual-process models treat knowing  as arising in the absence of recollection, as 
Yonelinas and Jacoby (1995)discuss, this does not mean that items that are recollected will not 
be experienced with familiarity also. Hence, the R/K procedure underestimates the 
contribution of familiarity. To overcome this problem and to provide a measure that satisfied 
the independence assumption, the independence-remember-know (IRK) procedure was 
introduced (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995). As well as providing a more accurate estimate of 
familiarity, the IRK procedure also acknowledges the problems that arise in estimates when 
groups differ in their response bias (i.e. FP rates differ). A number of studies have shown that 
the use of the IRK procedure makes comparison of data from subjective reports more 
consistent with the dissociations and findings gleaned from objective process estimates (Prull, 
Dawes, Martin, Rosenberg, & Light, 2006;  Yonelinas et al., 1998; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995; 
Yonelinas, 2001). This is of importance for the current thesis as a direct comparison of these 
measures in TLE was a primary focus. The calculation of recollection and familiarity using the 
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IRK procedure is outlined in Chapter 3, and further discussion about comparison of subjective 
and objective methods is covered in Section 1.11 below. 
Other methodological issues that have received attention in the literature have focused on the 
use of one-step or two-step procedures and the inclusion of a Guess response. With respect to 
the former, a question has been whether asking participants to state their subjective 
experience combined with the recognition decision (i.e. Remember, Know or New) would 
differ from when it is required following an Old/New decision (Old, followed by 
Remember/Know). A number of studies have examined this issue and compared recognition 
performance measures including sensitivity and response criterion, as well as accuracy 
associated with different subjective experience judgments (e.g. Bruno & Rutherford, 2010; 
Eldridge, Sarfatti, & Knowlton, 2002; Hicks & Marsh, 1999). In general, findings have suggested 
that recognition accuracy does not differ between one and two-step procedures. However, a 
consistent finding is that the one-step procedure leads to a more liberal response criterion, 
and Know judgments in particular appear to be assigned a higher level of hit and FPs with this 
method. As Hicks and Marsh (1999) discuss, this is likely due to the added difficulty of 
attempting to distinguish between different subjective states at the same time as recognition. 
For this reason, the two-step procedure was adopted in the current experiments where the 
R/K paradigm was utilised.   
From a similar line of enquiry, the inclusion of a Guess response in the R/K paradigm has been 
researched as it was suggested that inconsistencies in response bias between studies using LoP 
manipulations may have resulted from participants using the Know category when in fact they 
were guessing (Gardiner, Java, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1996). Gardiner and colleagues have 
examined differences between Guess and no-Guess procedures and made several conclusions 
(Gardiner, Richardson-Klavehn, & Ramponi, 1997; Gardiner, 2008; Gardiner, et al., 1996; 
Gardiner, Kaminska, Dixon, & Java, 1996). First, results suggest that inclusion of the Guess 
category produces similar results to when participants are actively encouraged not to guess, 
but are not actually given the Guess response option. However, in situations where guessing is 
not discouraged, or is not mentioned, participants may use the Know response option 
occasionally when guessing. Additionally, when assessing justifications for the different 
subjective experience judgments, it is apparent that participants draw on inferences, 
judgmental strategies and unrelated mnemonic information to the study episode when making 
a Guess response. For example, Guess justifications often reflect familiarity for a target derived 
from some other external source (Gardiner et al., 1998). In comparison, Know and Remember 
justifications are reliably different from experiences of guessing, and each other. As Gardiner 
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(2008) summarises, the inclusion of a Guess response in the R/K paradigm is of use, as it 
effectively removes instances where participants use the Know judgment when they are in fact 
guessing. As such, guessing was permitted in the experiments presented in Chapters 3 and 4 of 
this thesis that used the R/K paradigm along with recognition data.  
Just as the clarity and interpretation of instructions is critical in the PDP, this is also a major 
consideration in the R/K paradigm. The greatest problem lies in how Know judgments are 
described; published studies vary greatly in their description of what constitutes this subjective 
state, with some emphasising it as reflecting high confidence ‘just knowing’ that an item was 
present, some studies implying it is associated with lower confidence, and some studies using 
the term ‘Familiarity’ instead of Knowing. The present thesis aimed to compare subjective 
states of awareness of recollection and familiarity  with their underlying cognitive processes 
(measured by objective process estimates), therefore it was important to ensure the 
instructions given to participants regarding Familiarity in the R/K paradigm was a close to the 
cognitive process of familiarity as possible.  
A number of studies have explored whether the subjective states of Knowing and Familiarity 
are dissociable, although this has typically been in the context of learning meaningful 
information such as in higher education, to observe the semanticisation of knowledge over 
longer periods (Conway, Gardiner, Perfect, Anderson, & Cohen, 1997; Dewhurst, Conway, & 
Brandt, 2009; Herbert & Burt, 2001, 2004). Although not directly assessing the difference 
between the two states for recognition on a single test occasion, such studies have revealed 
that ‘just knowing’ reflects a state of awareness that is similar to subjective remembering in 
terms of accuracy, and may differ from subjective familiarity.  
A recent set of experiments presented in an unpublished thesis by Williams (2011) directly 
compared Remember, Know, Familiar and Guess responses using recognition tasks similar to 
those presented throughout this thesis. The conclusion drawn from this work was that Familiar 
and Know responses were dissociable; many similarities were in fact found between Know and 
Remember responses in measures of confidence, response speed, and accuracy. Hence, ‘just 
knowing’ (Know response) reflects a different state of awareness to ‘feelings of familiarity’ 
(Familiar) response. This was a further rationale for including the Familiar judgment, rather 
than Know, in the present study, as I wanted a measure that was likely to dissociate 
recollection and familiarity as best as possible.  
Moreover, a study by Geraci, McCabe, and Guillory (2009) recently showed that R/K judgments 
were most orthogonal to confidence (hence refuting single trace accounts) when Knowing was 
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described as a highly confident state, in the absence of recollected details. Therefore, the 
instructions provided to participants in the current experiments used the word Familiar, but 
emphasised this should reflect feelings of familiarity for the word along with high confidence it 
was previously seen. The instructions provided to participants can be found in Appendix A.  
 
1.10 Recollection and familiarity in TLE  
 
Support for dual-process theories of recollection and familiarity has come from various strands 
in the literature. A great deal of support for the existence of these two independent processes 
has come through application of the different methods described above to show that they are 
functionally dissociable processes via experimental manipulations in healthy subjects;  
neuroanatomically through lesion studies; neuroimaging and electrophysiological work; or in 
special populations. A thorough examination of this extant literature is beyond the scope of 
this thesis; reviews can be found in Eichenbaum, Yonelinas, & Ranganath (2007); Parks & 
Yonelinas (2008); Skinner and Fernandes, (2007) and Yonelinas and Jacoby (2012). For single 
trace arguments and responses to these dual-process accounts, see Squire et al. (2007); Wais 
et al. (2008); Wixted (2007) and Wixted & Squire (2010). As the current thesis was concerned 
with examining recollection and familiarity specifically in TLE, below I present a thorough 
review of previous studies assessing these processes in this patient group. 
 
 
1.10.1 Application of the R/K paradigm to recognition memory in TLE 
 
A number of studies have applied the R/K paradigm to assess the subjective states of 
Remembering and Knowing in TLE. As mentioned in Section 1.5.1, a critical neuropsychological 
issue in this patient group has been the assessment of laterality and material specific deficits, 
so as well as attempting to display patterns of reduced remembering in TLE, studies have also 
used the paradigm to explore subjective states of awareness for visual and verbal material in 
LTLE and RTLE. 
The fist study to apply the R/K paradigm to TLE came from Blaxton and Theodore (1997), who 
compared recognition and subjective experience for abstract designs in pre and post-surgical 
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LTLE, RTLE and healthy controls. They found that controls and LTLE patients’ recognition was 
dominated by subjective Knowing, whereas the opposite pattern was found in the RTLE group; 
they subjectively remembered far more of the designs. This was also reflected in FP rates, 
where the RTLE group had significantly fewer Remember FPs to new items. In a qualifying 
experiment, they assessed the influence of surgical status, by comparing equal numbers of left 
and right pre- and post-surgical patients. The results were identical to before as the presence 
of widespread MTL lesions did not alter the effects. Finally, they conducted another 
experiment using encoding manipulations to encourage conceptual and perceptual processing. 
As expected, controls provided more Remember responses to items encoded under 
conceptual encoding conditions, and more Know responses under perceptual encoding. 
However, LTLE patients consistently provided more Know responses regardless of encoding 
instructions, and the opposite was found for RTLE patients, as they consistently made more 
Remember judgments. Hence, the results were supportive of a ‘modes-of-processing’ view of 
laterality that emphasises the importance of the left temporal lobe in conceptual or distinctive 
processing, and the right temporal lobe in perceptual or fluent processing. 
 Moscovitch & McAndrews (2002) conducted a follow-up study and compared visual (face) and 
verbal material in left and right patients under conceptual and perceptual encoding conditions. 
Based on Blaxton and Theodore’s (1997) interpretation, LTLE patients should show global 
impairments in conceptual processing regardless of the type of material (i.e. more Know than 
Remember responses) and encoding instructions. RTLE patients on the other hand should 
show global impairments in perceptual processing. Instead, their evidence fully supported the 
material-specific view. Subjective remembering was significantly reduced for verbal material in 
LTLE patients, whilst non-verbal memory (faces) was associated with significant reductions in 
subjective Remember responses in RTLE patients. Moreover, for material processed by the 
hemisphere contralateral to the epileptic focus, Remember responses were increased by 
conceptual processing. For example, Remember responses to verbal stimuli were higher in 
RTLE patients after conceptual encoding. In contrast, the expected pattern was found in 
controls where conceptual processing enhanced Remember responses regardless of material 
type. Additionally, Know responses were unaffected in all groups by encoding manipulations. 
Moscovitch and McAndrews concluded that the results were in agreement with previous work 
suggesting the involvement of the hippocampus in the formation of conceptual relationships; 
although their patient sample included participants with excisions outside the hippocampus, 
they reasoned that there was good evidence indicating this was the most consistently 
damaged area. 
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Bengner and Malina (2008) sought to clarify some of the inconsistencies found between the 
above two studies. They assessed the impact of laterality of lesion, hippocampal sclerosis and 
proactive interference (PI) 2 on Remember/Know responses during face recognition. 
Surprisingly, they discovered that patients with hippocampal sclerosis made fewer Know 
responses, regardless of side of lesion. This result thus contradicted much of the previous 
amnesic and neuroimaging literature that has consistently suggested the hippocampus is 
critical for recollection and adjacent parahippocampal and rhinal cortices are responsible for 
familiarity (as discussed in Section 1.8.5 above). Moreover, the same result occurred with and 
without the influence of PI, despite the fact this manipulation was hypothesised to have an 
impact on Remember, not Know responses. They also found that Remember responses were 
significantly reduced in the RTLE group, and suggested that the combination of these results 
points to the involvement of a distributed network of regions involved in face recognition, 
located predominantly in the right temporal lobe. Because PI led to similar reductions in 
Remember responses in both LTLE and RTLE, the authors concluded that their results do not 
support the Blaxton and Theodore (1997) modes of processing account; support for this would 
have been evidenced in a left temporal lobe performance advantage following PI due to its 
hypothesised involvement in conceptual processing. 
One of the key weaknesses of group studies such as the three reported above is in the 
variability of the patient sample in terms of clinical aetiology, neuropsychological test 
performance, and most importantly, the extent of lesions. Even Bengner and Malina (2008), 
who used strict clinical data to classify patients into groups with, or without hippocampal 
sclerosis, acknowledged that it could not be discounted that patients may have subtle 
pathology extending beyond the hippocampus. To overcome these problems, Bowles and 
colleagues (Bowles et al., 2007, 2010) presented analyses of patients with extremely well 
documented lesion data following selective excision of hippocampal or anterior temporal lobe 
structures.  
In their first study, Bowles et al. (2007) presented the single case NB, who had had a 
lesionectomy for relief of intractable SPS, CPS and SGTC seizures. Surgical removal included her 
left amygdala and portions of the rhinal cortices, whilst leaving the hippocampus and PHc 
intact. Using the R/K paradigm, NB displayed a comparable discriminability score (d’) to a 
group of matched controls, which was expected in the context of normal neuropsychological 
                                                          
2
 Proactive interference is the phenomenon whereby previously learned information is detrimental to 
the learning of more recent information. In Bengner and Malina’s (2008) study, learning a list of faces 24 
hours before the next test phase was hypothesised to interfere with this subsequent material. Because 
PI reduces contextual distinctiveness in episodic memory, the authors predicted PI would reduce 
subjective levels of remembering. 
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evaluation. However, her recognition responses were characterised by elevated levels of 
Remember responses, with impaired Familiarity. Due to the precise lesion data, the results 
therefore argue against a unitary trace strength account because of the dissociation in the 
subjective experience of recollection and familiarity. 
From a single trace perspective, this dissociation can still be explained by the fact the 
hippocampus supports strong memories, whereas surrounding areas support weaker 
memories (e.g. Wais et al., 2008). Therefore, more convincing evidence would come from a 
double dissociation, displaying the opposite pattern of performance to NB in patients with 
selective hippocampal lesions. This is exactly what Bowles et al. (2010) achieved in their later 
study. They administered a verbal R/K task to a group of left and right sided TLE patients who 
had undergone selective amygdalo-hippocampectomy; a surgical procedure that spares 
surrounding neocortical structures. They found both groups to have significantly reduced 
recollection scores compared to controls, and their z-transformed scores further revealed 
recollection to be significantly less than familiarity also. They also found patients with milder 
overall recognition impairments to have the most reduced recollection scores. To provide 
evidence of a double dissociation, the authors identified a single patient from the larger group 
who was well matched with patient NB for overall recognition performance and showed a 
corresponding impairment in recollection, with familiarity intact. 
Taken together, the findings by Bowles et al. suggest a simple explanation involving differing 
memory strength in MTL regions is not adequate. The lack of difference between left and right 
patients in this verbal measure once again contrasts the results found in the studies cited 
above. As a possible explanation, the authors cite evidence suggesting the potential role of the 
right temporal lobe in imagery, which may be closely involved in the ‘re-experiencing’ aspect 
of hippocampally dependent recollection (e.g. Maguire, Valentine, Wilding, & Kapur, 2003; 
Viard et al., 2007).  
Another critical point addressed by these authors centres on the relationship between overall 
memory performance and selectivity of recollection impairments. As noted above, better 
overall recognition ability was associated with reduced recollection impairments, which 
supports findings from other documented cases of hippocampal amnesia where isolated 
recollection impairments were found in the context of normal recognition performance (Bird & 
Burgess, 2008). Variations in recollection impairments appear in groups of patients even when 
there is documented evidence of selective hippocampal pathology, and this is likely to be due 
to variations in extent of hippocampal damage and functional integrity of remaining tissue 
(Holdstock et al., 2008). Clearly, when evaluating differences in recollection, it is important to 
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consider the impact varying levels of memory strength may have. This is approached in 
Chapter 3, where qualitative differences in Remember responses are assessed between 
patients and controls after matching recognition performance. 
Attempting to bring some resolution to the above material specificity debate, Martin, Bowles, 
Mirsattari, and Köhler (2011) conducted further assessment of patient NB with a variety of 
material types to see if her selective familiarity impairment was exclusive to verbal stimuli. 
Three recognition tests were administered involving aurally presented non-words, unfamiliar 
faces and abstract designs. These were all selected on the basis that performance could not be 
enhanced, or influenced, by pre-existing semantic relationships; it has been suggested that 
lateral temporal structures in the left temporal lobe in particular are crucial for verbal tasks 
that require the use of such semantic representations (Saling, 2009). Therefore, using these 
difficult stimuli, any effect of damage to lateral areas in NB was predicted to be attenuated. 
Martin et al. (2011) found a selective impairment in the verbally presented stimuli, which 
manifest as a significant reduction in subjective familiarity. These results, along with other 
similar studies (Aly, Knight, & Yonelinas, 2010; Cohn et al., 2009) suggests that familiarity 
processes and not recollection, operate in a material-specific manner. 
As mentioned in Section 1.2, the experience of déjà vu is a common manifestation of SPS in 
TLE; this experience is characterised by inappropriate feelings of familiarity in the context of an 
assessment of novelty. In an extensive review of the TLE literature, Illman et al. (2012) 
assessed evidence from brain stimulation, neuroimaging and subjective report data in an 
attempt to clarify the underlying neurobiological bases of different forms of this 
phenomenological experience. Their conclusion focused on the suggestion of a separation 
between a hippocampal based recollective error (termed ‘déjà vecu’) and the more typically 
experienced familiarity error experienced in TLE, which is likely due to irregular neuronal firing 
of extrahippocampal structures. Martin et al. (2012) recently conducted a vital empirical study 
in this area by assessing both subjective and objective measures of recollection and familiarity 
in TLE patients who did and did not experience déjà vu as part of their habitual seizures. 
Recognition of visually categorised scenes was impaired in both groups compared to controls, 
and further analysis displayed the patient group with déjà vu to have selective impairments in 
assessments of familiarity, whilst the group without déjà vu had impairments in both 
recollection and familiarity. Moreover, volumetric analyses showed a trend for the déjà vu 
group to have more focal ipsilateral reductions in rhinal cortices, compared to more 
widespread MTL reduction in the non-déjà vu group. Thus, these authors displayed for the first 
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time in an experimental setting that the existence of this nebulous state during seizures can be 
linked to underlying pathology in line with the predictions of dual-process theories.  
 
1.10.2 Application of the R/K paradigm to autobiographical memory in TLE 
 
AM impairments in TLE have recently received much attention in the literature; clinically, this 
is relevant due to the devastating impact these can have on daily life and theoretically, the 
study of such a breakdown in memory systems is useful for exploring long-term consolidation 
processes (as covered in Section 1.8.5). Although this literature continues to grow, only two 
studies to date have applied the R/K paradigm to specifically address AM in TLE. Noulhiane et 
al. (2007) used the TEMPau task (Piolino et al., 2003) with left and right resected TLE patients 
in comparison to controls. This semi-structured interview requires the retrieval of thematically 
cued AMs from four lifetime periods, followed by R/K judgments to indicate the subjective 
experience associated with recall of events. An objective episodic score was derived from 
participants’ narratives according to specificity and richness of details, and participants were 
asked to justify Remember responses with factual, spatial and temporal contents of memories. 
Their findings revealed that both patient groups had temporally extensive impairments in 
objective episodic scores, matched by reduced levels of subjective remembering also. 
Correlations between MTL regions and their AM measures further revealed that the right 
temporal lobe is crucial for reliving the encoding context of memories throughout the lifespan.  
In a recent single case study, Illman et al. (2011) assessed AM and the self in a patient with 
transient epileptic amnesia (TEA), a late onset syndrome of TLE (see Butler & Zeman, 2007, for 
a review). They combined the R/K paradigm with the IAM task (Rathbone, Moulin, & Conway, 
2009, 2008) – a measure that has previously illustrated how AMs cluster around the 
emergence of different  perceptions in identity (e.g. I am a husband). Illman et al. (2011) 
displayed the patient to have reduced levels of subjective remembering for critical self-
defining memories from his past, but a preserved sense of self, presumably supported by intact 
semantic and conceptual knowledge of his life (see also, Rathbone et al., 2009, for a similar 
discussion).  
Many other studies have assessed AM in TLE and have found impairments especially in 
episodic components; although relying on the verbal reports of patients, these all use more 
objective scoring criteria to determine the episodic and semantic content of memories and 
therefore will be mentioned further in Section 1.10.4 below. 
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In summary, there are a number of studies that have utilised the R/K paradigm in TLE for both 
anterograde and retrograde memory. The findings from the patient samples, and the effect 
encoding manipulations have on controls, have provided consistent support for the functional 
dissociation of recollection and familiarity as states of conscious awareness. Although this 
research has done much to provide support for dual-process theories, and neuroanatomical 
theories of MTL functioning, the lack of group studies in this area means there are still 
potential avenues to explore. This was one of the main motivations for the present thesis; as 
will be described below, one gap in the literature is the extent to which patients’ metamemory 
judgments of their underlying recognition impairment (i.e. R/K judgment) is consistent with 
objectively measured indices of recollection and familiarity.  
 
1.10.3 Objective measurement of recollection and familiarity in TLE 
 
Studies have shown that whereas explicit measures of recall and recognition are impaired in 
TLE, implicit memory is often intact (e.g. Billingsley, McAndrews, & Smith, 2002; Zaidel, 
Oxbury, & Oxbury, 2006). In a recent review, Leritz, Grande, and Bauer (2006) summarised this 
literature, and concluded that results suggest that tasks that are more dependent on 
intentional and controlled uses of memory (i.e. they require explicit memory) are more reliant 
on the integrity of the hippocampal complex, whereas more automatic tests of priming are 
achievable with a non-functional hippocampal complex. As discussed in Section 1.9.2.3.1, the 
problem with the comparison of explicit and implicit tasks is that each process may be 
contaminated by the other. Therefore, using tasks that are able to dissociate these forms of 
memory is more useful. Only a handful of such studies exist in the TLE literature. 
Del Vecchio, Liporace, Nei, Sperling, & Tracy (2004) borrowed the verbal stem completion PDP 
from Jacoby (1991) to assess recollection and familiarity in LTLE (the method of which is 
described in Section 1.9.2.3.1). They found patients to be impaired in their use of recollection 
to complete the task, whilst estimates of familiarity were intact. Building on this work, Hudson, 
Flowers, and Roberts (2009) conducted a similar stem completion paradigm with inclusion and 
exclusion tests but included a RTLE group for further comparison and used a ‘guided 
procedure’ with visual prompts to ensure participants’ understanding of instructions. These 
authors displayed a significant reduction in recollection estimates in the left temporal group 
only, whereas familiarity was comparable between both patient groups and controls. Thus, 
these two studies both illustrated with one version of the PDP that recollective processes are 
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significantly impaired in TLE, and this has a material specific basis at least for verbal stimuli in 
the LTLE group. 
The studies cited in the above section by Bowles et al. (2007) and Martin et al. (2011, 2012) 
both incorporated objective assessments of recollection and familiarity as well as the R/K 
paradigm. For example, Bowles et al. (2007) displayed comparable selective reductions of 
familiarity in patient NB using the ROC method, and Martin et al. (2011) further used this 
method to support the material specific basis of this impairment. In their assessment of 
familiarity in patients experiencing déjà vu, Martin et al. (2012) used an exclusion task 
involving the repetition of visual scenes, similar to the repetition-lag procedure of Jennings and 
Jacoby (1997). They found that whereas both patient groups had equal impairments compared 
to controls in discriminating between Old and the first presentation of New items, only the 
group who did not experience déjà vu showed impairments in excluding repeating lures at all 
lag intervals. Therefore, the results converged with the R/K paradigm and suggested the 
presence of déjà vu in patients was related to more isolated impairments in familiarity, whilst 
leaving recollection intact and allowing patients to exclude repeated items on the basis of this 
process.  
As discussed in Section 1.9.2.1, associative recognition tests are accepted as a relatively 
reliable measure of recollective or relational memory and have been used extensively in the 
amnesia literature along with item recognition tests to compare familiarity and recollective 
dependent processing (Giovanello, Verfaellie, & Keane, 2003; Gold et al., 2006; Kan et al., 
2007a; Kan, Giovanello, Schnyer, Makris, & Verfaellie, 2007b; Quamme et al., 2007) . Empirical 
studies have also explored associative recognition impairments in the general TLE population.  
For example, Weniger, Boucsein, and Irle (2004) administered object and face associative tests 
to pre- and post-operative TLE patients and obtained detailed structural data regarding MTL 
lesions. They found that patients with large lesions in the hippocampus, PHc and amygdala 
performed worse than patients with smaller lesions and controls. Moreover, regression 
analyses revealed that increasing size of rhinal cortex lesions was significantly associated with 
worse performance on the associative task, whilst size of hippocampal and amygdala lesions 
provided no extra explanatory power. Thus, their results were consistent with the recent 
neuroanatomical models of MTL function discussed in Section 1.8.5.1 that propose the rhinal 
cortices can support binding of intra-item associations (Diana et al., 2007; Montaldi & Mayes, 
2010).  
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In the context of neuropsychological assessment, impairments in arbitrary associations for 
verbal stimuli are often used as lateralising evidence for LTLE during neurosurgical assessment 
(McAndrews & Cohn, 2012; see Saling, 2009, for a critical discussion of this). Other studies 
have, however, displayed preferential impairments in the formation of associations in non-
verbal stimuli in RTLE, such as musical tones (Wilson & Saling, 2008) and abstract design and 
symbols (Smith, Bigel, & Miller, 2011). 
Although this work provides further understanding of hemispheric specialisation in associative 
learning and helps elucidate the division of labour within MTL sub regions, only one study has 
specifically addressed the contribution of recollection and familiarity to item and associative 
memory in TLE (Cohn et al., 2009). In this study, the authors aimed to compare different forms 
of associative memory (associative identification and associative reinstatement, as described 
in Section 1.9.2.3.1) with item memory, and assess the contribution of recollection and 
familiarity to performance in post-operative TLE patients. They had two specific aims; first, to 
make a novel comparison between the different associative measures in TLE, and second, to 
assess the contribution of laterality and language dominance to these processes. Their results 
showed that associative identification, associative reinstatement and recollection measures for 
both dominant and non-dominant patient groups was significantly below that of controls. As 
was item memory, which although runs contra to other findings in the literature, the authors 
suggest that the pair recognition task they used to estimate item memory is influenced by 
recollective processes. Addressing their second aim, they found familiarity estimates to be 
significantly reduced only in the dominant TLE group, providing further evidence that 
familiarity processing, more so than recollection, has a material specific basis. 
 
1.10.4 Objective measurement of dual-processes in autobiographical memory in TLE 
 
Although the R/K paradigm has had limited use in AM studies in TLE, a number of studies have 
used other methods that specifically aim to fractionate episodic and semantic , or recollective 
and familiarity processes in retrograde memory (e.g. Addis, Moscovitch, & McAndrews, 2007; 
Herfurth, Kasper, Schwarz, Stefan, & Pauli, 2010; Lah, Grayson, Lee, & Miller, 2004; Lah, Lee, 
Grayson, & Miller, 2006, 2008; Manes, Graham, Zeman, de Luján Calcagno, & Hodges, 2005; 
Manes, Hodges, Graham, & Zeman, 2001; Park, St-Laurent, McAndrews, & Moscovitch, 2011; 
St-Laurent, Moscovitch, Levine, & McAndrews, 2009; Viskontas, McAndrews, & Moscovitch, 
2000). These studies have found impairments in both episodic and semantic aspects of AM in 
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TLE, but an examination of the interaction between the two, and a comparison of subjective 
and objective measures has not yet been explored. Chapter 6 addresses this gap in the 
literature by utilising a novel public events task that incorporated an objective measure of 
dating accuracy alongside several subjective measures that provided an index of recollective 
experience associated with the retrieval of memories for events.  
 
1.11 Comparisons of methods  
 
1.11.1 Convergence of subjective and objective dual-process methods 
 
As discussed in Section 1.8, the underlying assumptions about how recollection and familiarity 
operate differ somewhat between the dual-process theories proposed by Tulving (1985), 
Jacoby (1991) and Yonelinas (1994). For example, as Gardiner et al. (1996) and Gardiner (2001) 
discuss, the R/K procedure provides a first-person experiential account of the subjective 
experience associated with different recognition processes, whereas the PDP adopts an 
objective, third-person approach as it sees the two processes as differing in uses of intentional 
control in inclusion and exclusion tests. Further, as Yonelinas (2001a) describes, the ROC 
method assesses the two processes in terms of their contribution to the shape of a response 
confidence curve.  
Despite these apparent differences, a large body of evidence has accumulated suggesting a 
convergence between them. The most robust evidence for this has mainly come from studies 
investigating recollection impairments in memory impaired groups. For example, Yonelinas et 
al. (1998) compared the PDP, R/K paradigm and ROC method in amnesics and found 
comparable reductions in both recollection and familiarity for all methods. Further, Jacoby, 
Debner, and Hay (2001) assessed the influence of PI, study duration and divided attention on 
recollection and familiarity in the context of aging; they found similar effects on the two 
processes using both the PDP and R/K paradigm, and reported significant correlations between 
subjective reports of remembering and objective process estimates. Yonelinas (2001a) carried 
out a comprehensive assessment of the three methods to assess the influence of divided 
attention and levels-of-processing on recollection and familiarity. His set of experiments 
assessed the R/K paradigm and ROC together, and he also provided a separate examination of 
all methods in a between-subjects design. Yonelinas (2001a) concluded, “The current 
results...showed that these three characterisations of recollection and familiarity are quite 
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compatible and that the measurement procedures associated with these theories lead to 
converging conclusions about the two processes” (p. 373). Subsequent studies in the amnesic 
literature have provided similar results (e.g.Turriziani, Serra, Fadda, Caltagirone, & Carlesimo, 
2008; Vann et al., 2009) as did the study by Bowles et al. (2007) investigating the post-
operative TLE patient, NB.  
The comparability between these subjective and objective measures suggests the R/K 
paradigm is a viable means of assessing the consciousness associated with the underlying 
cognitive processes that contribute to human memory. Something that is lacking from this 
literature, however, is within-task comparisons of such measures. Although the ROC method of 
acquiring confidence ratings can, and has been used in conjunction with the R/K paradigm and 
PDP (Kapucu et al., 2010; Rotello et al., 2005; Yonelinas, 2002), there still exist other ways of 
exploring subjective experience with the objective indexes of memory performance within 
single tasks. One of the central aims of the current thesis was to broaden this literature further 
by using TLE as model to understand the relationship between subjective and objective forms 
of recollection. 
 
1.11.2 Comparison of dual-process methods with neuropsychological tests 
 
A similar comparison of methods has been conducted quite extensively in the aging literature 
in order to better understand the neurobiological and cognitive basis of age-related memory 
decline. Recollection impairments in this group have been linked to compromised medial-
temporal and frontal-lobe integrity through the comparison of subjective and objective tasks 
with neuropsychological test performance (Clarys, Bugaiska, Tapia, & Baudouin, 2009; Glisky, 
Rubin, & Davidson, 2001; Henkel, Johnson, & De Leonardis, 1998; Prull et al., 2006) and 
findings from the neuroimaging literature suggest that frontal and medial temporal lobes are 
most affected by aging (Buckner, Head, & Lustig, 2006). Such results are consistent with other 
neuroimaging data showing that recollection is dependent on a network of these areas 
(Skinner & Fernandes, 2007); specifically, the medial-temporal lobe being involved in the 
binding and integrating of information, and the frontal lobes involved in the elaboration of 
strategic encoding and retrieval operations (Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997). 
A neuropsychological test approach was also used in a recent meta-analysis by McCabe, 
Roediger, McDaniel, and Balota (2009), who compared the relationship between Remember 
hits and FPs in the R/K paradigm to neuropsychological test performance in older adults over a 
1:46 
 
 
 
range of studies. Their analysis revealed that whereas medial-temporal lobe functioning (in 
tests such as paired-associate recall and list learning) was related to Remember hits, age and 
frontal-lobe functioning (such as mental arithmetic and verbal fluency) was related to 
Remember FPs. Familiarity, however, was uncorrelated with neuropsychological test 
performance or age.  
As discussed in Section 1.6, discrepancies between TLE patients’ subjective report of memory 
and neuropsychological test performance have been consistently observed in the literature, 
and the causes of this still need investigating. No studies to date have incorporated a direct 
comparison between measures of recollection and familiarity, standardised test performance 
and subjective perception of memory in TLE. Because these measures all reflect the different 
aspects of consciousness to memory, a combined approach is likely to be both theoretically 
interesting as well as providing useful data for clinical practice. This was thus the clinical theme 
of this thesis. 
 
1.11.3 Self-awareness of memory: Metamemory 
 
The convergence found between subjective and objective measures of recollection and 
familiarity in MTL damaged patients suggests that these people have insight into the basis of 
their memory problems. For example, reduced levels of subjective remembering in the context 
of poor discriminatory performance, or corresponding low objective measures of recollection 
in the PDP suggest a person can reflect appropriately on their underlying cognitive processing. 
Thus, Remember/Know judgments can be seen as a form of metacognitive assessment. 
However, there is a vast literature that has examined metamemory, which also compares 
subjective reports of participants regarding their memory functioning with objective measures 
of performance.  
In the TLE literature, assessments of metamemory have typically come in the form of 
questionnaire based assessments of patients’ perception of their memory functioning, which 
are subsequently compared to objective neuropsychological test performance (as described in 
Section 1.6). Although providing mixed results, the general finding has been one of 
overestimation of memory difficulties in this group. However, an alternative assessment of 
metamemory is through the application of laboratory tasks to see how standard metacognitive 
measures match up with objective recall or recognition performance. Such tasks tap into 
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monitoring and control aspects of metacognition, following the influential model proposed by 
Nelson and Narens (1990). 
A handful of these experimental metacognition studies exist in the TLE literature. Early studies 
suggested that patients were inaccurate in monitoring memory performance measured by 
judgments-of-learning accuracy (JOL; Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991) and found impairments in 
their ability to predict subsequent recognition success for currently unrecallable information, 
evidenced in feeling-of-knowing (FOK; Hart, 1965) accuracy (Prevey, Delaney, Mattson, & Tice, 
1991; Prevey, Delaney, & Mattson, 1988). However, the results of these studies were 
dismissed on several methodological and statistical grounds by Howard et al. (2010a), who in a 
more tightly controlled experiment involving purely episodic materials displayed no 
impairment in memory monitoring in TLE patients (using JOL and FOK judgments), despite 
their lower overall memory ability. Moreover, another study from the same group found TLE 
patients memory predictions following study of material was accurately upgraded compared 
to predictions made before study, reflecting intact metacognitive control processes (Howard et 
al., 2010b). The conclusions of these two recent investigations suggest like the R/K literature, 
that although TLE patients have underlying recall and recognition deficits, their conscious 
assessment of memory accurately reflects this.  
Although the papers by Howard et al. (2010a, 2010b) suggest monitoring and control is intact 
in TLE, patients’ metacognitive awareness has never been examined in the context of more 
demanding tasks where successful performance is dependent on recollection. Therefore, 
although these previous studies have assessed whether a metacognitive impairment drives 
general impairments in recall and recognition, they have not drawn attention to the specific 
processes underlying these measures of memory. Associative recognition paradigms involve a 
complex interaction of recollection and familiarity processes so the experiment in Chapter 5 
further tested metacognitive accounts of memory impairment in TLE with the use of a novel 
measure of awareness – confidence judgments. This allowed a comparison of how subjective 
confidence judgments would differ between item types more, or less dependent on 
recollection. Moreover, monitoring has also only been examined in the context of anterograde 
memory tasks; a metacognitive account of AM impairment has not been explored before in 
TLE. Thus, a simple but informative measure of monitoring was included in the public events 
task in Chapter 6. 
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1.12 Aims of this thesis 
 
The overall aim of this thesis was to better understand the nature and extent of memory 
impairments in TLE using dual-process theory as an empirical framework. To this end, a variety 
of experimental paradigms are presented in the experimental chapters, each assessing 
recollection and familiarity in different ways. Based on previous findings, the general 
prediction was that patients would be impaired across all measures. 
Beyond this underlying aim, two broad themes were addressed. The first was theoretical in 
nature – although recollection impairments have previously been found in TLE, I wanted to 
provide a novel assessment of the relationship between subjective experience (in terms of 
remembering, familiarity and metacognitive awareness) and objective performance that is 
dependent on the cognitive use of these processes. As well as adding to our understanding 
about memory impairment in TLE, this theme ultimately contributes to the distinction 
between how different dual-process theories conceptualise recollection. The second theme 
was of a clinical nature and is discussed below.  
Recollection and familiarity were assessed in anterograde recognition memory in Chapters 3-5. 
This was achieved through the use of a contextual source memory paradigm (Chapter 3), a 
repetition-lag paradigm with the PDP (Chapter 4) and an associative recognition task, also 
involving a variant of the PDP (Chapter 5). The objective measurement of recollection varied in 
these. In the source memory task, recollection was operationalised by the amount of 
contextual information successfully retrieved during recognition; in the repetition-lag 
procedure recollection estimates were derived from the ability to successfully discriminate 
single items from alternative lists; and in the associative recognition experiment, recollection is 
measured as the ability to recapitulate originally bound relationships between two items. The 
R/K paradigm was used as a subjective measure of recollection and familiarity along with the 
objective tasks in Chapters 3 and 4, and confidence ratings of perceived accuracy of 
recognition was the subjective measure in Chapter 5.  
Having examined recollection and familiarity in laboratory tasks (Chapters 3-5), the experiment 
in Chapter 6 took a more naturalistic approach and assessed these processes in retrograde 
memory of prominent public news events. Although the objective measure (accuracy of dating 
events) diverged from the objective measures in the other experiments, the paradigm allowed 
an assessment of the extent to which recollective processes contribute to the retrieval of what 
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is typically assumed to be a product of the semantic memory system. As well as the R/K 
paradigm, a further metacognitive measure was included in this task to assess awareness. 
The synthesis of subjective and objective measures throughout these experiments afforded 
the opportunity to assess how patients have ‘on-line’ insight into their memory. Although 
important as stand-alone experiments, a natural progression was to examine these together in 
a more holistic approach. 
Thus, a correlational analysis of some key measures is presented in Chapter 7. This provides an 
appreciation of the extent to which different indices of recollection are comparable. The 
inclusion of neuropsychological assessment data of patients in this analysis helps draw 
conclusions of a clinical nature. For example, it helps understand whether dual-process led 
tasks reveal similar patterns of impairment to standardised tests; if differences are found, then 
it calls to question the scope and specificity of standardised instruments. By taking into 
account such a diverse range of subjective and objective measures, Chapter 7 aimed to 
elucidate the long-standing question of, what factors contribute to perceived memory 
impairment in TLE? 
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2 Sample Characteristics 
 
2.1  Overview 
 
 In this chapter, I present a detailed summary of the sample recruited for my research. 
Although many empirical TLE studies have presented rather homogenous groups of patients 
(such as operative status or laterality, for example), from the outset, this was not my aim. This 
was due to the difficulty with recruiting a large, pure sample in the absence of an established 
clinical infrastructure. More importantly, the aim of this work was to provide a novel 
comprehensive assessment of recollection and familiarity in a more naturalistic, 
heterogeneous group of TLE patients. Although this approach allows a generalisability of 
findings, it is limited in that patients are likely to have differing degrees of impairment. 
Moreover, it is difficult to establish precisely which neuroanatomical areas deficits derive from. 
However, the fact that nearly all patients and controls completed every task throughout 
afforded the opportunity to make a large scale comparison of measures, as will be presented 
in Chapter 7.  
Below I present an outline of all stages of the recruitment process, a summary of each 
patient’s clinical data, and finally, the results of the full neuropsychological assessment carried 
out with participants. 
2.2   Ethical approval 
 
NHS ethical approval was granted for recruitment and testing of TLE patients by Leeds Central 
Research Ethics Committee. Separate institutional ethics was granted by the Institute of 
Psychological Sciences, University of Leeds. The NHS approval covered recruitment and testing 
of patients at NHS sites and at their homes. Institutional ethics then further covered the 
recruitment of control participants and non-NHS TLE participants, and allowed testing at home 
or within the University.   
2.3 Recruitment process 
 
After gaining NHS ethical approval, I began recruiting patient participants with the help of a 
Consultant Neurologist and Consultant Clinical Neuropsychologist, both of whom have a 
special interest in epilepsy. To ensure a large enough sample was recruited, I later decided to 
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advertise my research in a bi-monthly magazine published by Epilepsy Action (EA) charity. 
Following this advert, I was approached by a number of people with TLE wanting to take part.  
Control participants were recruited from various sources; some were patients’ spouses or 
friends and others were my own friends or family. The majority of control participants were 
recruited after I had completed testing with patients, as this allowed me to select people who 
would be well matched demographically. 
 
2.4 Summary of patient data 
 
2.4.1 Further recruitment summary 
 
Table 2.1 displays a summary of all clinical information for patients, with the first column 
indicating how each was recruited. The majority of patients were recruited through NHS sites. 
Most participants attended Leeds General Infirmary or St James’ University Hospital for normal 
treatment and hence lived in West Yorkshire; two lived in Greater Manchester; one lived in 
South Yorkshire and one participant who was a friend’s relative, lived in Surrey (denoted as 
‘Other’ in column 1).  
For NHS patients, medical records were available along with the consultant neurologist/clinical 
psychologist’s opinion during or after a routine appointment. For EA participants, some 
patients kept letters from their consultant neurologists regarding diagnostic information, in 
which case, this evidence was used to ensure they had TLE. This was combined with 
information obtained during a semi-structured intake interview I carried out with each person. 
In other cases, with the patient’s permission, I requested their medical records from the 
hospital they had, or were being treated at. 
 
2.4.2 Diagnostic information 
 
Diagnosis of TLE and laterality of epileptic focus was determined by standard methods in 
patients (electrophysiological recordings, neuroimaging, seizure semiology and 
neuropsychological assessment). As can be seen in the ‘Evidence’ column of Table 2.1, some 
patients had identifiable structural abnormalities following MRI scans (patients 1-5, 14-16, 20-
23,27) – this was the case for all patients who had undergone, or were being prepared for 
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resective surgery. Patient 19 developed SGTC seizures following a bout of herpes simplex 
encephalitis (HSE) in the late 1980s before the advent of modern MRI, but a right temporal 
lesion was evidenced through a CT scan. In the case of standard EEG, patients’ diagnosis was 
based on temporal abnormalities during recording and supporting information during clinics 
regarding seizure semiology (patients 8, 17, 18, 25, 26). A diagnosis was aided in three patients 
using video-EEG (1, 8, 12) and three using intracranial EEG (6, 12, 27). A clinician’s report 
regarding neuropsychological assessment (NPA in Table 2.1) supplemented laterality diagnosis 
in certain surgical cases. Although my own neuropsychological assessment occasionally 
provided supporting evidence for a left or right sided diagnosis, this is not counted as the 
testing was carried out for research, and not clinical purposes. 
Based on the above information, the sample consisted mainly of patients with LTLE (N = 12). Of 
these, three had undergone resective surgery (patients 3, 20, 21). Of the nine patients with 
RTLE, three of these had also had surgery (patients 2, 14, 23). The post-surgical patients had all 
undergone their resections at least seven years prior to testing. Two of the remaining patients 
had a diagnosis of probable BTLE (patients 10 and 24) based on equivocal evidence from 
repeat MRI and EEG analyses. The other four patients (patients 6, 16 and 26-27) had more 
reliable evidence of a bilateral diagnosis through bihemispheric seizure onset during EEG or 
intracranial EEG (patients 6, 26 and 27) and structural abnormality as evidenced by MRI in both 
MTL (patient 16).  
The remarks in the ‘Lesion status’ column Table 2.1 reflect a summary of the information 
available to me for each patient. ‘Unknown’ in this column represents patients where MRI 
scans revealed no discrete abnormality. Although I made best efforts to obtain as detailed 
information as possible regarding the site and extent of resection in the surgical patients, 
surgical reports were not always available. Therefore, the information I was able to obtain is 
presented. For example, for patient 3, I was only able to ascertain that she had a ‘resection of 
the left temporal lobe’. In comparison, patient 14’s notes specifically described a ‘right 
hippocampectomy’. Although there were clearly differences in location and extent of excisions 
in these patients, the most important factor for the present thesis was that any damage was 
limited to the temporal lobes.
2-53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1. Summary of clinical characteristics in TLE group. 
Patient Recruited? Diagnosis Evidence Lesion status Onset  
(yrs) 
Duration 
(yrs) 
Seizure type No. 
AEDs 
1 NHS RTLE MRI/V-EEG/Sem/NPA MTL DNET 52 3 SPS 1 
2 NHS RTLE MRI/EEG/Sem/NPA Resection in 1999 16 38 Seizure free since 2002 1 
3 NHS LTLE MRI Resection in 2005 18 mnths 46 Seizure free since surgery 1 
4 NHS LTLE MRI MTL DNET 16 17 CPS – none for nine months prior to 
testing 
2 
5 NHS LTLE MRI/EEG/Sem Left lesion 17 13 SPS/CPS/Tonic phase 3 
6 NHS BTLE Bilateral discharge IC-EEG Unknown 4 22 CPS/SGTC 4 
7 NHS LTLE Sem/NPA Unknown 20 14 SPS 1 
8 NHS RTLE EEG/V-EEG/Sem Unknown 17 9 SPS/CPS 3 
9 NHS LTLE MRI MT sclerosis 5 43 SPS/CPS/SGTC 2 
10 NHS BTLE EEG/MRI/CT all normal  Unknown 14 24 SPS/nocturnal TC 1 
11 NHS LTLE EEG/Sem, MRI normal Unknown 4 38 SPS/CPS 2 
12 NHS LTLE V-EEG/IC-EEG/Sem Left posterior TL 16 29 SPS/CPS 4 
13 NHS RTLE EEG/Sem/MRI Probable right lesion 44 2 SPS/CPS/SGTC 1 
14 EA RTLE MRI Right hippocampectomy 2002 23 22 Seizure free since surgery 1 
15 EA LTLE MRI Left HS 14 33 CPS/SGTC 3 
16 EA BTLE MRI Right posterior H atrophy; Left anterior 
H atrophy 
0 38 CPS/SGTC 2 
17 EA LTLE EEG/Sem Unknown 21 18 SPS/CPS 2 
18 EA RTLE EEG/Sem Unknown 14 4 SPS/CPS 2 
19 EA RTLE CT/Sem RTL damage secondary to HSE 25 5 Seizure free since successful treatment of 
HSE in 1993 and introduction of AEDs 
1 
20 EA LTLE MRI Resected left posterior temporal 
cavernous angioma in 1997  
23 15 SPS 2 
21 NHS LTLE MRI/NPA  Left hippocampectomy 2001 6 22 Seizure free since surgery in 2001 0 
22 NHS LTLE MRI Possible LGA in left temporal horn  40 3 SPS 2 
23 EA RTLE MRI Right resection following benign 
meningioma SURGERY 2001 
33 11 SPS/TC 3 
24 EA BTLE MRI/EEG normal Unknown 51 6 SPS/SGTC 1 
25 EA RTLE EEG/Sem Unknown 21 2 Nocturnal TC 1 
26 Other BTLE EEG/Sem Unknown 5 25 SPS/CPS/SGTC 2 
27 NHS BTLE MRI/bilateral discharge IC-
EEG 
Left side unknown; high signal lesion in 
right MTL 
28 8 CPS/SGTC 2 
Note: TLE = temporal lobe epilepsy, NHS = National Health Service, EA = Epilepsy Action, RTLE = right temporal lobe epilepsy, LTLE = left temporal lobe epilepsy, BTLE = bilateral temporal lobe epilepsy, MRI = magnetic resonance imaging, V-EEG = video-
electroencephalography, Sem = semiology, NPA = neuropsychological assessment, IC-EEG = intracranial electroencephalography, CT = computed tomography, MTL = medial temporal lobe, DNET = dysembryoplastic neuroepithelial tumour, H = hippocampus, HS = 
hippocampal sclerosis, HSE = herpes simplex encephalitis,  LGA = low grade astrocytoma, SPS = simple partial seizure, CPS = complex partial seizure, SGTC = secondary generalised tonic-clonic seizure. 
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2.4.3 Epilepsy onset, duration and seizure types 
 
Mean age of onset in the sample was 20.25 years (SD = 13.51) and mean duration of TLE was 
18.77 (SD = 13.01).  
Almost all patients were suffering from seizures at time of recruitment. Patients 3, 14 and 21 
were completely seizure free following surgery. Patient 2 was seizure free for three years 
following surgery, but experienced a single, prolonged SGTC in 2002. This caused further 
memory difficulties and although no confirmatory notes were available, the patient informally 
told me that the specialist opinion was that the lack of oxygen to his MTL had caused this. 
Therefore, it seems he suffered from mild hypoxic damage. He had remained completely 
seizure free since this episode, however. Patient 4 had had a seizure free period of nine 
months prior to testing (although he had frequent CPS before this for a period of 17 years); 
patient 19 had been seizure free for approximately 15 years following treatment for HSE (as 
described above).  
The number of patients experiencing SPS (80%) was roughly consistent with other estimates in 
the literature (e.g. 90% in Gloor et al., 1982). Subjective manifestations were like those 
described in Section 1.2 of the main Introduction. For example, patient 5 reported that “a 
tingling sensation rises through my body”. In his case, SPS almost always evolved into CPS and 
TC seizures. Therefore, he identified the strange tingling sensation as a warning, and would 
make sure he located himself somewhere safe in case he lost consciousness. For patient 8, her 
SPS often involved an intense feeling of déjà vu, coupled with “a funny gustatory feeling”. She 
reported a variety of emotions associated with these experiences; a kind of warmth and 
embrace of the bodily sensation, but slight anxiety associated with the inappropriate 
familiarity that was part of the déjà vu experience. Her SPS would always evolve into a CPS 
with impaired consciousness, so she similarly described these feelings as an ‘aura’ or warning 
sign. 
There were ten patients who experienced CPS, and these either followed an initial SPS 
(patients 5, 7-9, 11-13, 17, 18 and 26), or occurred spontaneously with no warning or aura 
(patients 4, 6, 15 and 16 and 27).  Approximately one-third of patients experienced SGTC 
seizures (patients 5, 6, 9, 13, 15, 16, 24, 26 and 27). The frequency of these varied somewhat, 
however. For example, patient 6 could suffer up to twenty convulsive seizures each week. This 
was the most extreme case however, and most of these patients rarely had SGTC seizures. For 
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instance, patients 9 and 15 only had one or two each year, and these were directly related to 
periods of stress, or unrelated illness such as flu.  
The sample was thus comprised mainly of patients who were medically refractory. 
Disregarding those who were seizure free at time of testing, six patients were currently on 
monotherapy (patients 1, 7, 10, 13, 24 and 25) and the remaining 17 were on polytherapy. 
Three of the bilateral patients (16, 26 and 27) also had vagus-nerve stimulator implants; all of 
which reported that the device seemed ineffective in significantly reducing seizures over and 
above their medication. AEDs being taken by patients included: Leviteracetam, 
Carbamazepine, Phenobarbital, Topiramate, Zonisamide, Lacosamide, Oxcarbazepine, 
Pregabalin, Lamotrigine, Primidone, Retigabine and Clobazam (all patients who used this was 
in case of clusters of particularly bad seizures).  Additionally, two patients (24 and 26) were 
taking Citalopram for mood disturbances. This will be discussed further in Section 2.5.3, which 
covers levels of anxiety and depression in the whole sample. 
 
2.4.4 Subjective memory complaint 
 
Patients were asked during the initial intake interview and through informal discussion 
whether they experienced any subjective memory problems. Notably, all patients (apart from 
patient 6 – see below in Section 2.5.1) reported having some sort of memory difficulty. This 
varied considerably in terms of type of memory and the level of perceived impairment. For 
example, patient 1 simply reported having a generally poor memory; patient 7 reported 
difficulty with prospective memory and planning and patient 5 specifically stated his 
topographical memory for new places was very poor, and following a seizure, he felt that his 
memory of events for the preceding couple of weeks was affected. Problems with 
autobiographical memory were expressed quite frequently in the group as a whole, with most 
describing a loss of recent information (often following seizures) but there were two patients 
who reported more severe impairments encompassing remote periods of their life (patients 2 
and 17). Another common subjective complaint appeared to be with remembering people’s 
names. Perceived memory function is explored further in the experiment in Chapter 6, where 
participants were administered a self-report questionnaire. 
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2.5 Neuropsychological assessment 
 
Both patients and controls were administered a battery of standardised neuropsychological 
tests. These data, as well as demographic information, are presented in Table 2. Most 
participants completed all measures, but missing data is discussed further in Section 2.5.1 
below. The test battery included the Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale (HADs;Zigmond & 
Snaith, 1983), the National Adult Reading Test (NART; Nelson, 1982), the Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Psychological Corporation, 1999), the figure, word list 
and story learning components of the BIRT Memory and Information Processing Battery 
(BMIPB; Coughlan, Oddy, & Crawford, 2007), the Warrington Recognition Memory Test 
(WRMT; Warrington, 1984), digit span (forward and backwards) and the verbal (FAS) and 
category (animal names) fluency components of the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function Scale (D-
KEFS; Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001). Scores presented are either raw scores, or the z-score 
derived from the normative data associated with that specific test. In Table 2.2, Chi-square 
tests were used to compare gender and handedness distributions and one-way ANOVAs 
compared scores on all other measures. Statistical test value, significance level and effect sizes 
are presented for the comparison between the TLE group as a whole and controls. Further 
one-way ANOVAs assessing laterality differences are presented in the right section; if a main 
effect of group was found, the associated p value is reported. Alpha was set at p < .05 for all 
analyses. Following significant main effects in the laterality analysis, subgroup differences were 
assessed using Bonferroni post-hocs, where  the p value was adjusted to account for 
comparison of four groups (.05/4 = .013). Each participant’s individual scores for selected 
neuropsychological tests are presented in Appendix B.  
 
2.5.1 Attrition and missing data 
 
Patient 4 requested to end the project before completing the neuropsychological assessment; 
this was due to a lack of free time as he started a new demanding job. He did however 
complete the contextual source memory task (Chapter 3) and associative recognition task 
(Chapter 5).Because detailed diagnostic information had been obtained alongside his age and 
years of education, his data was included in analyses of results for those experiments.  
Patient 6 was completely removed from all analyses because she was non-compliant with 
certain parts of the neuropsychological memory assessment. She also showed an apparent lack 
of understanding of instructions on other tasks.  
2-57 
 
 
 
Patient 7 did not complete the WRMT, fluency measures or digit span, as her assessment 
session had to be cut short. The results of the measures she did complete are included in the 
analyses in Table 2.2. Following this session, the patient dropped out of the project for 
unknown reasons. She did carry out the contextual source memory task, however, so her data 
for this is included in the analysis in Chapter 3.  
Patients 11 and 13 were having detailed investigation for possible resective surgery, so the 
Consultant clinician preferred his assistant to conduct assessments with these patients. 
Because of this, slightly different tests were conducted. Instead of the WASI, both patients 
were administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale- Fourth Edition (WAIS-IV; Wechsler, 
2009). The subtests differ in the WAIS-IV, meaning the same verbal and performance IQ 
measures cannot be derived. However, because it yields a standardised predicted full-scale IQ 
(PFSIQ), this data was used in the analysis presented in Table 2.2. Additionally, for clinical 
reasons, patient 11 was administered the Wechsler Memory Scale-Fourth Edition (WMS-IV; 
Wechsler, 2010) rather than the BMIPB. Her scores on all measures of the WMS-IV were within 
the normal range (auditory memory; z = -0.47, visual memory; z = 0.2, visual working memory; 
z = 0.6, immediate memory index; z = -0.13, delayed memory index; z = -0.27).  
Patient 27 was initially recruited as part of a separate research project being conducted by 
myself but agreed to take part in some further memory testing. In an initial session, he 
completed the contextual source memory task presented in Chapter 3, and in the following 
neuropsychological assessment session he was only able to complete a number of measures. 
He found the story learning component of the BMIPB too taxing and wished not to continue 
with this. He completed the full WASI, word list learning and figure recall, but wanted to end 
the session following these. After this testing occasion, the patient had a particularly bad bout 
of seizures and subsequent hospitalisation; it was therefore decided to discontinue further 
testing. The data that were obtained from him are included in the analysis in Table 2.2 and in 
the experiment in Chapter 3. 
A summary of the numbers of participants included in each of the analyses in Table 2.2 can be 
found in Appendix C.
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Table 2.2 Demographic and neuropsychological assessment of patient and control group. 
Variable Controls 
 
 TLE combined 
 
Test  
value 
p Effect size (η
2
)  LTLE RTLE BTLE Sig.? Group diff. 
Demographics            
Age 38.63 (14.10) 40.88 (10.46)  F = 0.38 .54  .01  41.00 (7.12) 41.22 (14.86) 40.00 (10.07) n.s  
Gender (Male:Female) 11:8 6:20 χ² = 5.66 .02 n/a  3:9 2:7 1:4 n.s  
Yrs. Education 13.16 (1.68) 12.85 (2.29) F = 0.25 .62 .01  13.08 (2.27) 12.22 (1.72) 13.40 (3.36) n.s  
Handedness (Right:Left) 18:1 20:6 χ² = 1.85 .17 n/a  9:3 7:2 5:0 n.s  
            
Mood: HADscale (raw score/21)            
Anxiety 5.79 (3.38) 8.48 (4.16) F = 5.21 .03 0.11  8.45 (3.85) 8.17 (4.93) 9.25 (4.19) n.s  
Depression 3.42 (2.80) 4.95 (3.15) F = 2.76 .10 0.06  5.18 (2.75) 5.09 (3.90) 4.00 (2.94) n.s  
            
IQ (standard scores)            
NART pred. FSIQ 109.05 (9.24) 107.33 (10.25) F = 0.33 .57 .001  104.73 (9.46) 106.78 (10.58) 115.75 (9.39) n.s  
WASI VIQ 105.47 (14.54) 103.10 (15.94) F = 0.25 .62 .001  97.53 (10.45) 104.75 (17.81) 111.60 (20.56) n.s  
WASI PIQ 109.84 (13.32) 101.94 (12.24) F = 4.01 .05 .09  101.06 (10.11) 99.88 (15.87) 107.00 (10.51) n.s  
WASI FSIQ 108.89 (13.27) 103.21 (13.82) F = 1.89  .18 .04  100.21 (9.63) 103.00 (17.20) 110.20 (15.35) n.s  
            
Memory: BMIPB (z-scores)            
Figure Imm %  -0.02 (1.02) -1.38 (1.24) 12.99 .001 0.24  -1.29 (0.93) -1.39 (1.54) -1.52 (1.48) p =.01 No 
Figure Del % 0.33 (0.91) -0.98 (1.10) 17.64 .001 0.30  -0.99 (1.00) -0.71 (1.00) -1.47 (1.46) p =.001 L/BTLE<Ctrl 
List A1-5 0.27 (1.13) -0.54 (1.55) 3.67 .06 0.08  -0.84 (1.63) -0.35 (1.47) -0.28 (1.76) n.s  
List 6 0.14 (0.93) -0.86 (1.44) 6.83 .01 0.14  -1.14 (1.41) -0.84 (1.21) -0.33 (2.00) n.s  
Story Imm -0.01 (0.79) -1.32 (1.39) 13.56 .001 0.25  -1.94 (1.22) -0.79 (1.45) -0.81 (1.23) p =.001 LTLE<Ctrl 
Story Del 0.15 (0.91) -1.44 (1.30) 20.39 .001 0.33  -2.09 (1.26) -0.87 (1.22) -0.93 (0.90) p =.001 LTLE<Ctrl 
            
WRMT (raw score/50)            
Words 47.74 (2.66) 44.00 (4.47) F = 10.24 .003 .20  42.10 (3.63) 44.33 (5.17) 48.00 (1.41) p =.001 LTLE<Ctrl 
Faces 43.16 (4.18) 39.35 (6.17) F = 5.25 .03 .12  41.10 (5.28) 36.67 (6.89) 41.00 (5.77) p =.04 RTLE<Ctrl 
            
Working memory (raw scores)            
Digits forward 6.95 (1.03) 6.91 (1.03) F = 0.01 .91 .001  6.90 (0.99) 6.63 (1.41) 7.50 (1.29) n.s  
Digits backward 5.74 (1.15) 5.14 (1.32) F = 2.38 .13  .06  5.00 (1.05) 5.13 (1.73) 5.50 (1.29) n.s  
            
Fluency (z-scores)            
FAS -0.14 (0.94) -0.65 (1.08) F = 2.63 .11 .06  -1.05 (1.04) -0.25 (1.19) -0.57 (0.75) n.s  
Categories -0.04 (0.88) -0.44 (1.00) F = 1.82 .19 .04  -0.54 (0.86) -0.72 (1.05) 0.45 (0.92) n.s  
Note: HADs = Hospital Anxiety and Depression rating scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), NART = National Adult Reading Test (Nelson, 1982), FSIQ = Full-scale IQ, WASI = Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (Psychological 
Corporation, 1999), VIQ = Verbal IQ, PIQ = Performance IQ, BMIPB = BIRT Memory and Information Processing Battery (Coughlan et al., 2007), WRMT = Warrington Recognition Memory Test (Warrington, 1984). TLE = Temporal 
lobe epilepsy, LTLE = left temporal lobe epilepsy, RTLE = right temporal lobe epilepsy, BTLE = bilateral temporal lobe epilepsy. 
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2.5.2 Demographics 
 
All participants were aged between 18 and 58 years of age, and as shown in Table 2.2, this was well 
matched across all groups. The significant effect of gender was due to the fact that the control group 
comprised relatively equal numbers of males and females, whereas the TLE group was 
predominantly female. Unfortunately, this reflects a comparative lack of willingness to take part in 
research by males with TLE; many more men turned down the research project than women during 
recruitment in the hospital, and many more women volunteered through EA. Gender differences 
were not examined in this thesis. Importantly, the two groups were well matched on other key 
characteristics – years of education, for example. Handedness was also well matched, with the 
expected higher proportion of right, compared to left handed people. Handedness and language 
dominance are commonly used in assessments of laterality. Language dominance is only however 
determined by the intracarotid-amobarbital procedure (WADA test; Wada, 1949), or more recently, 
using fMRI paradigms. This information was not available for the patients recruited here. 
 
2.5.3 Mood scores 
 
For the majority of participants, a single administration of the HADs was used as all testing was 
completed within a short space of time (approximately one month). For participants whose testing 
took place over an extended period, the HADs was repeated in case of mood variations. For these 
participants, the average anxiety and depression score was used in analyses. Notably, mood scores in 
these participants had little fluctuation. As the data in Table 2.2 show, anxiety levels were 
significantly higher in the TLE group compared to controls, where as depression was better matched. 
There were no differences between subgroups. As discussed in Section 1.4 of the main Introduction, 
anxiety is a common psychosocial consequence of TLE, therefore this result is relatively unsurprising. 
The impact of this increase in anxiety on memory is explored further in Chapter 7. 
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2.5.4  IQ 
 
Levels of predicted premorbid intelligence estimated by NART scores suggested patients and controls 
were very well matched; patient subgroups were also, with the BTLE group having higher, but non-
significant IQ on this measure. 
Every patient and control had a WASI predicted FSIQ > 73. The PIQ subscale differed significantly 
between patients and controls, whereas VIQ was well matched. Importantly, FSIQ was matched 
between groups.  
 
2.5.5 BMIPB memory 
 
Comparison between patients and controls revealed significant differences in both visual 
(immediate/delayed complex figure) and verbal (delayed word list and immediate/delayed story) 
memory. This suggests that compared to the control sample recruited here, the patients as a whole 
were impaired on these measures. Taking the z-scores of patients in isolation however, only 
immediate figure memory and immediate/delayed story recall were more than 1 standard deviation 
lower than the normative data from the BMIPB. This is a value that is generally taken to suggest 
some level of impairment is present compared to the general population. 
The assessment of laterality revealed a mixture of results. The LTLE group performed poorly on both 
verbal tests, with story recall being the most impaired; both immediate and delayed performance 
differed significantly from controls. In contrast, there was no evidence of a lateralised impairment in 
figural memory in the RTLE group. In fact, it was the LTLE and BTLE groups that differed significantly 
to controls on both immediate and delayed performance on this measure. 
 
2.5.6 WRMT 
 
Significant group differences were found between patients and controls on both the word and face 
subtests of the WRMT; this was larger for words, however. Whereas the BMIPB analysis did not 
reveal a preferential impairment in figural memory in the RTLE group, the WRMT did indeed show 
evidence of lateralised impairments. For the face task, right sided patients had the lowest raw score, 
and the difference between this and controls reached significance. Similarly, the low score of the 
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LTLE group for the word version was significantly different from controls. Bilateral patients on the 
other hand, had performance comparable to controls for both tasks. These results provide some 
support for the material-specificity hypothesis of laterality. 
 
2.5.7 Working memory and fluency 
 
No difference was found between controls and patients (or patient subgroups) on the maximum 
number of digits recalled in forward, or backward order, or verbal and category fluency. Because 
these tasks are generally considered to tap into executive functioning, the results provide some 
evidence that frontal lobe functioning is intact in the patient group.  
 
2.6 Summary 
 
The results presented above suggest that the patient and control groups were well matched on a 
number of important demographic and neuropsychological variables (age, education level and IQ). 
Overall, memory was impaired on these standardised measures compared to controls, suggesting 
that the epileptic syndrome has resulted in identifiable deficits in MTL functioning in the patient 
group. Further, there is some evidence of lateralised impairments, especially with respect to the left 
temporal group. As outlined in the main Introduction, an important clinical and theoretical question 
concerns the extent to which standardised neuropsychological test performance relates to other 
measures of memory. Therefore, the relationship between recollection, subjective perception of 
memory and these test scores is examined in Chapter 7.
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3 An assessment of the contributions of 
contextual knowledge to subjective 
experience  
 
3.1  Introduction   
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, dual-process models of recognition memory posit that 
hippocampally mediated recollection is a reconstructive process involving the retrieval of 
contextual and associative information of a prior study event (Yonelinas, 2002). These complex 
types of information, including perceptual, temporal and spatial details, are what 
differentiates events in memory and makes them episodic in nature. As well as subsuming 
these contextual elements under the term of recollection, we can also view them as being the 
source of mental experiences. The source monitoring framework (SMF; Johnson, 2006; 
Johnson, Hastroudi & Lindsay, 1993; Johnson & Raye, 1981, 2000) has provided an 
understanding of how differences in representations lead to attributions about memory. It has 
provided important contributions regarding the influence of metamemory, knowledge and 
beliefs to the monitoring of source information.   
Although the SMF outlined by Johnson and colleagues disagrees with certain aspects of dual 
process accounts of recollection and familiarity, importantly for the current chapter, it 
converges on the idea that these are two distinct states of subjective awareness associated 
with different responses during recognition; standard old-new paradigms can be accomplished 
through a simple familiarity heuristic whereas Remember/Know tasks may involve a more 
systematic evaluation of the specifics of the encoding context, as this is what participants are 
oriented toward (Mitchell & Johnson, 2009). More specifically, source information is 
presumably monitored in these tasks, even though it is not always explicitly required. 
Therefore, tasks employing the R/K procedure include an element of source monitoring, albeit 
not as explicitly as those that require a participant to report the encoded colour or position of 
an item, for example. 
Within the source monitoring literature, one of the biggest debates has centred on the 
respective role of the frontal and temporal lobes in this type of memory. This is not an aim 
here, but importantly, the various studies reported in Section 1.10 showing recollection 
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deficits in TLE provide evidence to suggest that at least some aspects of source memory are 
clearly reliant on the MTL. Surprisingly, there are few studies that have assessed source 
memory explicitly in this patient group, and these have all used post-operative patients or 
those with extensive focal damage. Kopelman, Stanhope and Kingsley's (1997) early study 
displayed that frontal and diencephalic lesions led to impaired temporal context judgments, 
but not in temporal lesion patients. On the other hand, only temporal lesions led to 
impairments in spatial context. Schwerdt and Dopkins (2001) found that temporal lobectomy 
patients were impaired in both content and source memory in a paradigm where participants 
had to recall an action performed with a small object (content) and whether it was performed 
by the experimenter, self, or imagined (source). More recently, Thaiss and Petrides (2003) 
directly addressed the contention that pre-frontal areas are more responsible for source 
monitoring by comparing a group of frontal and temporal excision patients with controls in a 
source memory task. Subjects viewed two different trivia game shows and were tested on the 
trivia answers (content), who provided the answer, and when (source). They found the 
temporal excision group to be impaired on both fact and source information, with no such 
impairments seen in the frontal group. Therefore, previous studies in TLE that have assessed 
source memory have either done so with a primary focus on assessing the extent of subjective 
or objective impairments in recollection, or aimed to clarify the respective roles of the frontal 
or temporal lobes. Moreover, with current advances in functional neuroimaging, this literature 
is generally directed toward shedding light on the contributions of specific medial temporal 
areas to source memory. In particular, studies have often attempted to resolve the issue as to 
whether the hippocampus is responsible for source memory alone, or if it also supports item 
memory (e.g. Gold et al., 2006; Slotnick, 2010). 
The present study diverged from the common aim of delineating the neuroanatomical 
substrates of item and source memory and instead adopted a more direct behavioural 
approach. Drawing on the previous TLE literature, it was apparent that although evidence 
exists for both recollection and source memory impairments, no study has specifically 
compared the level of contextual (or source) information available to patients following 
different subjective states during retrieval. The only relevant example of this in the literature 
comes from Noulhiane et al.’s (2007) study looking at AM in temporal lobectomy patients, 
where the contextual information for a memory following remember and know responses was 
specifically analysed.  
Previous studies outside of the context of TLE have investigated the types of contextual source 
information that drive post-recognition Remember/Know judgments. Pertinent to the present 
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experiment, studies have revealed that Remember judgments are associated with better 
source memory for the previously encoded perceptual features of words (Meiser & Bröder, 
2002; Perfect et al., 1996) and Remember judgments are particularly diagnostic of the 
successful binding and retrieval of a number of contextual source elements (Dudukovic & 
Knowlton, 2006; Meiser & Bröder, 2002; Meiser & Sattler, 2007; Meiser et al., 2008; Starns & 
Hicks, 2005). Conclusions gleaned from this research suggest that subjective Remember 
judgments are characterised by binding processes that preserve the specific configuration of 
contextual features, whereas Know judgments involve residual memory for less integrated 
information.   
A critical issue that has also been examined in the R/K source monitoring literature that is of 
relevance here has been to examine the different cognitive bases of Remember judgments 
between younger and older adults. A study by Comblain, D’Argembeau, Van der Linden, and 
Aldenhoff (2004) found younger and older adults based Remember judgments on perceptual 
details equally often, but there were differences in the type of other qualitative information 
used to make them. For example, older adults reported basing Remember judgments on the 
emotional features of items and younger adults reported making these judgments on the basis 
of memory for thoughts or associations of items. Additionally, Boywitt, Kuhlmann, and Meiser 
(2012) demonstrated that the retrieval of perceptual source features does not distinguish  
between older adults subjective Remember and Know responses, whereas younger adults 
recollective experience is consistently driven by retrieval of experimentally manipulated 
perceptual elements of items. Therefore, in this group who share a common deficit in 
associative binding to TLE, the cognitive basis of subjective Remembering is different to 
healthy younger adults. Hence, the key aim of the current experiment was to examine the 
cognitive basis of Remember judgments in TLE. 
In this chapter, the methodology adopted by Perfect, Mayes and Downes (1996) was deployed. 
Like the other studies cited above, they aimed to examine the level of contextual knowledge 
available for Remember and Know judgments. In five experiments using the R/K procedure, 
they displayed that recollection was consistently associated with above-chance levels of 
spatiotemporal contextual retrieval. However, they also found evidence that under some 
conditions, above-chance levels of spatial information were supported by familiarity 
judgments. Moreover, in their final experiment, although they found Remember judgments to 
be accompanied by higher overall levels of contextual detail in general, contextual detail was 
available in approximately one third of Know responses. They concluded that their results 
were in line with dual process accounts, with the possibility that Know responses might not 
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solely reflect pure, context-free familiarity.  In any case, Perfect et al.’s methodology is suitable 
for testing the relationship between subjective experiences of memory and their basis in 
contextual and source information available to participants. 
Several modifications were made to their procedure; first, a number of contextual elements 
(item location, temporal order and colour) were incorporated into a single encoding trial to 
enable a within-subjects design (Perfect’s original study presented different types of 
contextual information to different participants in a between-subject design). These contextual 
features were then tested in a four-alternative forced choice format for ease of administration 
and scoring. Second, participants were explicitly instructed that the source information would 
later be tested – this was done because evidence suggests that incidental encoding of source 
information requires higher cognitive demands at test in the form of strategic retrieval 
operations (Johnson et al., 1993; Thaiss & Petrides, 2003). Hence, in the TLE group, presumably 
at least some level of contextual information was successfully encoded. Additionally, ‘familiar’, 
rather than ‘know’ judgments were used and the ‘guess’ response option was included, the 
reasons for which were described in the previous chapter. 
There were thus several aims. First, was the replication of previous TLE studies showing 
impairments in both recognition memory and the subjective experience of remembering. In 
controls, a similar pattern of performance was expected for contextual detail as found by 
Perfect et al. That is, successful retrieval of source information should generally only be above 
chance for Remember judgments. Although a lower level of Remember responses were 
expected in the TLE group, a motivation was to see whether subjectively remembered items 
could still be accompanied by appropriate source information. Despite differences in materials 
and methodology, it was predicted that like Schwerdt and Dopkins (2001) and Thaiss and 
Petrides (2003), the TLE group would show impairments in source memory. Any differences 
found between controls and TLE in the type and level of source information retrieved would 
imply a qualitatively distinct recognition experience between the two groups. To foreshadow 
the results, to provide a more convincing test of this account, data were re-analysed after 
equating recognition memory performance. Furthermore, following recognition of a target, 
participants were asked if they had made associations with other items, or made more 
personal external associations with that item. This allowed the comparison of objectively 
measured contextual information with subjectively experienced associations for Remember 
and Familiar responses.  In sum, the aim was to explore whether impairments in subjective 
remembering in TLE reflect deficits in the underlying cognitive retrieval processes responsible 
for the reconstruction of the contextual elements of a memory trace.  
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3.2 Method 
 
3.2.1 Participants 
 
All patient and control subjects described in Chapter 2 participated in the present study. One 
patient’s data (patient 14) was not included due to an administrative error with the testing 
protocol and another patient’s data (patient 16) was not included due to an equipment error 
during the testing session. 
 
3.2.2 Materials 
 
A list of 48 nouns was selected, with a range of 5-118 per million based on SUBTLEX word 
frequency data (Brysbaert & New, 2009). All words were between 4 and 10 letters in length. 
These stimuli were then split into two frequency matched lists of 24 words: one to be used at 
study and the other as test items. 
 
3.2.3 Procedure 
 
Participants were tested individually with study items presented on a 15” laptop computer 
screen using Microsoft Powerpoint. Onscreen instructions explained that participants were 
about to be shown 24 words which they were to try to remember for a later test. They were 
instructed that each word would appear in one of four locations of a grid, which was displayed 
below. They were also told that each word would appear in one of four colours: blue, green, 
yellow or red. None of the participants reported colour blindness. Words were presented in 
capitalised size 24 Times New Roman font for 2s each, followed by a 1s ISI. Participants were 
asked to read each word aloud. During the study phase instructions, it was stressed to 
participants that in the recognition test that would follow immediately, they would be asked to 
attempt to recognise the above source information, as well as discriminating old from new 
words. Hence, participants were told to encode the words with whatever strategy suited them, 
but location, colour, and temporal order information would be tested.  
The list of 24 study words was rotated resulting in four versions of the task, which were 
counterbalanced across participants. Following the study phase, the experimenter read 
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through instructions for the recognition test. The instructions explained that participants had 
to distinguish between old and new items, and for each old item recognised, they must first 
judge whether the item was Remembered (R response), Familiar (F response) or if they had 
guessed the item was previously studied (G response). They were instructed to give an R 
response if they could consciously recollect some form of contextual or associative information 
from the time of studying the item, including thoughts and feelings evoked by the word. An F 
response was given if participants were certain they recognised the item but in the absence of 
any conscious recollection about its prior occurrence. G responses were given if participants 
neither recollected nor found the item familiar (see APPENDIX A for exact wording of 
definitions). The rest of the instructions were not explained until the experimenter was 
confident in each participant’s understanding of these subjective experience judgments.  
Participants were also instructed that for each recognised item, they would be asked which 
location they thought the item was in at study, which colour it was displayed in and which 
temporal quartile of the list it appeared in (1st, 2nd, 3rd or 4th). This allowed for a four 
alternative forced choice for each category, and participants were forced to guess when they 
were unsure of the correct information. A prompt sheet was provided which displayed the four 
colours, a picture of the same grid used in the study phase with quadrants labelled A, B, C and 
D and a diagram of how the list could be separated into quartiles (see APPENDIX D). Finally, 
participants were asked to describe if they had recognised the item by making associations 
with other items in the list (Item association), if they had made external associations (External 
association), if they had formed a mental image of the item (Imagery) or provide any other 
contextual information (Other). The order in which this information was asked was kept 
constant for each recognised item (i.e. colour, quadrant, quartile). Following the provision of 
these instructions, each participant was presented with the same test sheet, which had the 
study words and lures randomly intermixed. For each word judged as old, the participant 
provided the information about their recognition in the order described above. The 
experimenter noted responses by hand. 
 
3.3 Results 
 
There were four main strands to the analyses. First, standard recognition memory scores were 
analysed focusing on signal detection measures of discriminability (A’) and bias (B”D).  Second, 
differences in subjective experience judgments between the two groups were compared for 
recognised items using process estimations. Third, to assess source memory, conditionalised 
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probability that participants would correctly report the required contextual information for 
responses classified as remembered and familiar was compared; finally, the extent to which 
alternative contextual information (i.e. item and external associations) was available during 
retrieval was assessed in both groups. As discussed in the Introduction, a comparison of the 
TLE group as a whole with controls was the main objective, but analysis of laterality subgroups 
is also presented at the end of each section. 
 
3.3.1 Recognition memory 
 
Recognition memory scores are presented in Table 3.1. As the means suggest, the control 
group had better recognition performance; one-way ANOVAs showed this was reliably higher 
for hits-FPs, F(1, 42) = 6.96, p = .01, η2 = .15 and A’, F(1, 42) = 12.60, p = .001, η2 = .23, but not 
for B”D, F(1, 42) = 0.46, p = .50, η
2 = .01. Therefore, the TLE group have significantly poorer 
discrimination ability than controls, but share a comparable level of conservative bias in their 
recognition. Further one-way ANOVAs were conducted on each measure to assess differences 
in the laterality subgroups. Significant group differences were found for the hit-FPs and A’ 
measures;  F(3, 42) = 3.17, p = .04, η2 = .20; F(3, 42) = 4.29, p = .01, η2 = .23.  Bonferroni post-
hocs revealed the effect for hits-FPs was due to a trend between the difference in LTLE and 
controls (p = .03), whereas this difference was significant for the A’ measure (p = .01) when 
taking into account multiple comparisons. No other significant differences were found 
between groups. The recognition memory results are consistent with previous literature 
suggesting a material specific deficit in verbal recognition memory in LTLE. 
 
Table 3.1 Mean (SD) recognition memory scores for study items. 
 Hits Hits - FPs A’ B”D 
Controls .69 (.17) .58 (.15) 0.88 (.05) 0.42 (0.52) 
TLE .60 (.18) .44 (.19) .81 (.07) .52 (.43) 
     
LTLE ( N = 12) .54 (.20) .39 (.18) .80 (.07) .59 (.28) 
RTLE (N = 8) .68 (.14) .51 (.21) .82 (.08) .40 (.51) 
BTLE (N = 4) .59 (.18) .43 (.18) .82 (.08) .54 (.70) 
Note: FP = false positive, TLE = temporal lobe epilepsy, LTLE = left temporal lobe epilepsy, RTLE = right temporal 
lobe epilepsy, BTLE = bilateral temporal lobe epilepsy. 
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3.3.2 Subjective experience 
 
To calculate recollection and familiarity from the R/K task, the IRK procedure was adopted, 
which takes into account variations in response bias (FP rates) and allows an estimation of the 
contribution of familiarity to recollected items also (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995; Yonelinas et al., 
1998). Using the IRK procedure, true recollection is measured either by a) subtracting 
remember FPs from remember hits or b) subtracting the probability of making a false 
remember response from the probability of making a true remember response, then dividing 
by the opportunity to observe a true remember response: R = (Rold – RNew)/(1 – RNew). Although 
these two calculations provide similar results, both are presented below. Similarly, familiarity 
can be computed in several ways. To take into account responses that are both recollected and 
familiar, the number of familiar responses (F) is divided by the opportunity one has to make a 
familiar response (1 – R): F = F/(1-R). To account for differences in base rate FPs, one can then 
subtract the FP rate from this value to obtain a corrected F value. Moreover, as the IRK 
procedure views familiarity as a signal like threshold process, a more precise discriminability 
score can be calculated taking into account the probability of accepting an old item as familiar 
and contrasting this with the probability a new item will be familiar: For old items, familiarity is 
defined as Fold = p(familiarold)/[1 – p(rememberold)]. For new items, familiarity is defined as Fnew 
= p(familiarnew)/[1 – p(remembernew)]. The difference between these is typically expressed as 
d’, with larger values indicating better use of familiarity to discriminate old and new items. As 
with the recognition scores above, for consistency, A’ was used. Similarly, following Macmillan 
and Creelman (2004) and Prull et al. (2006), proportions of 0 and 1 were converted to 0.02 and 
0.98, respectively. Table 3.2 displays all of the above IRK derived recollection and familiarity 
estimates for patients and controls. 
One-way ANOVAs displayed significant differences between the TLE and control group on the 
Remember hits-FP and Remember IRK measures, F(1, 42) = 8.87, p = .005, η2 = .18; F(1, 42) = 
4.87, p = .03, η2 = .11. In contrast, no difference was found in the Familiarity IRK, Familiar 
correct or Familiarity d’ measures, F(1, 42) = 0.76, p = .39, η2 = .02; F(1, 42) = 1.64, p = .21, η2 = 
.04; F(1, 42) = 0.23, p = .63, η2 = .01. Thus, the data for the subjective experience judgments 
are also consistent with previous TLE literature suggesting this patient group has a selective 
reduction in the ability to consciously remember previously studied items, whilst familiarity 
based recognition is left intact.  
One-way ANOVAs were conducted on all of these measures, using Bonferroni post-hocs to 
compare subgroup differences. A significant effect of group was found for Remember hits-FPs, 
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F(3, 42) = 3.46, p = .03, η2 = .21.  The lower score in the LTLE group compared to controls 
approached significance (p = .05). There was no difference between RTLE, BTLE and controls, 
or between any of the patient subgroups. The effect of group on Remember IRK estimates was 
of borderline significance, F(3, 42) = 2.75, p = .06, η2 = .18. Again, post-hocs suggested the low 
score in the LTLE group compared to controls was driving this near significant difference (p 
=.06). No significant effects were found for the Familiar IRK and Familiar corrected measures 
(Fs < 1). However, as would be expected from the means in Table 3.2, a significant group effect 
was found for the Familiarity d’ measure, F(3, 42) = 3.66, p = .02, η2 = .22. Post-hocs displayed 
a significant difference between the LTLE and BTLE groups (p = .01) but not between any other 
subgroup. This result must be interpreted with caution, because the groups were highly 
comparable in the other familiarity measures, and there was large variation in scores seen in 
the small number of BTLE patients for the d’ value. 
In sum, the data suggest that patients with left epileptic foci have a reduced ability to engage 
in subjective remembering (although the difference was non-significant); patients with RTLE 
also display lower levels of Remember responses to controls, but it seems from the small 
number of patients included here that BTLE is more resistant to reductions in recollective 
experience. Subjective familiarity, on the other hand, is largely intact in the TLE group.   
 
Table 3.2 Mean (SD) estimates of recollection and familiarity. 
 R Hits-FPs R IRK F IRK F Corrected F d’ 
Controls .69 (.22) .58 (.27) .94 (.14) .83 (.22) 1.83 (2.68) 
TLE .42 (.35) .36 (.37) .90 (.16) .74 (.23) 1.43 (2.74) 
      
LTLE (N = 12) .38 (.29) .26 (.26) .88 (.20) .74 (.25) 0.33 (0.79) 
RTLE (N = 8) .39 (.47) .40 (.52) .90 (.12) .72 (.23) 1.29 (2.95) 
BTLE (N = 4) .59 (.23) .59 (.23) .94 (.13) .78 (.20) 4.98 (3.64) 
Note: R = remember, FP = false positive, IRK = independence remember-know, F = familiarity, TLE = temporal lobe 
epilepsy, LTLE = left temporal lobe epilepsy, RTLE = right temporal lobe epilepsy, BLTE = bilateral temporal lobe 
epilepsy. 
 
 
3.3.3 Source judgments 
 
The above evidence is consistent with previous studies showing recognition memory and 
recollective impairments in TLE. The novel aim of the current experiment was to assess the 
extent to which patients would successfully be able to retrieve contextual information, given 
this deficit.  
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Table 3.3 presents the proportions associated with correct retrieval of contextual features 
following successful target recognition. As the means suggest, on the whole, the source 
element of the task was highly difficult, with both groups only achieving overall successful 
contextual retrieval between 30-40%. One-way ANOVAs displayed no significant differences in 
retrieval of the three individual contextual elements, or in the overall proportions (Fs < 2.82). 
Analysis of laterality also revealed no significant effects of group. Therefore, despite patients 
achieving lower recognition performance of individual study items, they were comparable to 
controls in their retrieval of the contextual features  This result diverges from those found in 
the previous TLE studies mentioned in the Introduction that have found impairments in source 
memory in this group. However, the main focus of the analysis was to assess the types of 
contextual information available during qualitatively different recognition experiences. 
Because of this, source judgments for incorrectly recognised items are not presented. 
 
 
Table 3.3 Proportion of successfully retrieved contextual features. 
 Prop. Location Prop. Order Prop. Colour Overall Prop. 
Control .39 (.15) .36 (.15) .36 (.10) .37 (.10) 
TLE .35 (.19) .34 (.13) .30 (.13) .33 (.11) 
     
LTLE (N = 12) .30 (.10) .29 (.11) .29 (.13) .29 (.06) 
RTLE (N = 8) .36 (.24) .34 (.12) .32 (.15) .34 (.14) 
BTLE (N = 4) .48 (.27) .47 (.14) .29 (.08) .41 (.14) 
Note: TLE = temporal lobe epilepsy, LTLE = left temporal lobe epilepsy, RTLE = right temporal lobe epilepsy, Prop = 
proportion. 
 
3.3.4 Accuracy of source judgments according to subjective experience 
 
Differences were assessed in the accuracy of source judgments according to subjective 
experience between groups. These data are presented in Figure 3.13. A 2 (group) x 2 
(subjective experience) x 3 (source type) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with 
group as a between subjects factor. As above, there was no effect of group. However, there 
was an effect of subjective experience, F(1, 38) = 11.83, p = .001, ηp
2 = .24, with the source 
judgements being more correct for Remember than Familiar responses. Most importantly, 
subjective experience interacted significantly with group, F(1, 38) = 5.36, p = .03, ηp
2 = .12; 
                                                          
3
 Guess responses were also recorded but were at very low levels for both the TLE group (Mean proportion = 0.05, 
SD = 0.08) and controls (Mean proportion = 0.03, SD = 0.06), i.e. around 5% of all responses made were assigned to 
the guess category. Initial analyses revealed guess responses in both groups to be at, or below chance level on all 
source measures, hence I focus the analysis on Remember and Familiar responses. 
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such that for controls, there was a large difference between the proportion of correctly 
reported source information for Remember (Marginal Mean = .42, SE = .04) and Familiar 
(Marginal Mean = .23, SE = .04) judgments, but for patients the combined means across the 
three types of source information were comparable between subjectively remembered 
(Marginal Mean = .36, SE = .03) and familiar items (Marginal Mean = .32, SE = .03). Further 
analysis with paired sample t-tests showed Remember judgments to have significantly higher 
accuracy compared to Familiar judgments for both location and order in the control group, 
t(16) = 3.79, p = .002; t(16) = 2.80, p = .01 but not colour, t(16) = 1.71, p = .12. Paired-samples 
t-tests also showed no significant differences in source accuracy between Remember and 
Familiar responses for location, order and colour (ps > .12). No other main effects or 
interactions were found in the ANOVA analysis (Fs < 2.20). 
The same repeated measures analysis was conducted but including all laterality subgroups 
within the group factor. There was no main effect of subgroup and it did not interact with the 
other factors (Fs < 2.00). Therefore, there was no evidence to suggest that Remember and 
Familiar responses differed between these groups in terms of the contextual features 
retrieved. 
After finding differences between the patient and control group in information retrieved 
during Remember and Familiar responses above, the next analysis checked whether 
performance was above chance for each of the source types. The dotted line in Figure 3.1 
represents chance performance (.25 due to four-alternative forced choice format) and 
significance levels following one-sample t-tests are indicated, where the test value was set at 
0.25. 
As expected, the control group were able to successfully retrieve the correct source 
information significantly above chance levels following Remember responses to old items. In 
contrast, the patient group only successfully retrieved location information above chance 
levels. Moreover, the accuracy of source information retrieved following Familiar responses 
was at chance in both groups4.  
One-sample t-tests were also computed in the same way for each type of response for all 
laterality subgroups. In these analyses, the left and right TLE groups did not display 
performance significantly above chance for any measure (ts < 1.668). However, the BTLE 
group’s accuracy for the order of stimuli following a Remember response (M = 0.52, SD = 0.07) 
                                                          
4
 Although the performance of location information for Familiar judgments appears to be lower than 
chance in the control group, this difference was non-significant. 
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was significantly higher than the 0.25 level, t(3) = 7.35, p = .01. Again, given the small sample 
size, the relevance of this result must be interpreted cautiously.  
 
In summary, the above analyses first displayed that the TLE group provided significantly lower 
levels of subjective Remember responses for study items. Further, the retrieval of 
experimentally manipulated contextual information during recognition did not reliably 
differentiate Remember and Familiar responses to the same extent as controls. For the TLE 
group, the ability to report the appropriate source was limited to the location of the target 
word in the grid, whereas controls were able to successfully generate all three types of source 
information above chance levels for Remember responses.  
However, subjectively remembering a target word in this experiment did not necessarily 
indicate that only the to-be-encoded source information would be retrieved; recollection can 
involve the retrieval of other item or associative information. Following source judgments, 
participants were asked to note if they had recognised an item along with information linked 
to other items in the test (item association), with other more personal external associations 
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Figure 3.1 Accuracy of source judgments conditionalised by Remember and Familiar 
responses. 
Note: R = Remember response, F = Familiar response, TLE = temporal lobe epilepsy, ** = p < .01, * = p < .05, dotted line 
indicates chance performance level. 
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(external association) or if the item created any mental images at the time of 
encoding/retrieval. Table 3.4 displays the proportion of hits associated with this information5.  
As predicted, the means suggest that Remember responses are characterised much more by 
the retrieval of external associations in addition to the experimental source information. Item 
associations were low, but higher for Remember responses. These data were entered into a 2 
(group) x 2 (association type) x 2 (subjective experience response) repeated measures ANOVA, 
with group as a between subjects factor. There was no effect of group, F(1, 38) = 0.05, p = .83, 
ηp
2 = .001, but significant main effects were found for both association type, F(1, 38) = 40.26, p 
= .001, ηp
2 = .51 and subjective experience, F(1, 38) = 50.96, p = .001, ηp
2 = .57 and the 
interaction between these was significant, F(1, 38) = 7.10, p = .011, ηp
2 = .16. The data suggest 
that there was a higher incidence of external associations in general, but this increased to a 
greater extent for Remember responses. There was no interaction between group and 
association type, F(1, 38) = 1.08, p = .30, ηp
2 = .03. A significant interaction was found however 
between group and subjective experience type, F(1, 38) = 4.17, p = .05, ηp
2 = .10, suggesting 
that whereas both groups had lower rates of external association for Familiar responses, the 
difference between these and for Remember responses was significantly greater for patients. 
Finally, the three-way interaction between group, association type and subjective experience 
type was statistically non significant, F(1, 38) = 0.12, p = .74, ηp
2 = .003.  
To assess laterality, the same ANOVA was conducted as above, but with the group factor 
including LTLE, RTLE and BTLE as well as controls. The missing cells in Table 3 for the RTLE and 
BTLE groups reflect the fact that none of these participants made item associations along with 
Familiar judgments. The ANOVA displayed no significant interactions, suggesting comparable 
levels of item and external association for Remember and Familiar responses across these 
subgroups. 
Taken with the above findings, these results suggest that despite decreased levels of subjective 
remembering and retrieval of experimentally manipulated contextual information, patients 
nevertheless report a comparable level of external associative detail accompanying these 
judgments compared to controls. The results were in the expected direction when assessing 
Remember and Familiar judgments overall; that is, Remember judgments were driven by more 
associative detail in general for both groups. However, the difference in available external 
associations between Familiar and Remember responses was larger for patients. Because 
                                                          
5
 Imagery was omitted from analyses because only one patient and two controls reported this recall 
feature, and at very low levels. 
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detailed information was not obtained regarding the content of such associations, it is difficult 
to know whether these were diagnostic of the items on which they were based.  
 
 
Table 3.4 Proportion of Remember and Familiar responses to hits accompanied by item and 
external associations. 
 R + Item 
Association 
R + External 
Association  
F + Item 
Association 
F + External 
Association 
Control .12 (.25) .37 (.29) .02 (.05) .21 (.33) 
TLE .12 (.15) .43 (.30) .01 (.05) .11 (.17) 
     
LTLE (N = 12) .16 (.18) .54 (.33) .03(.08) .09 (.17) 
RTLE (N =8) .11 (.11) .23 (.20) - .10 (.20) 
BTLE (N =4) .04 (.08) .52 (.14) - .17 (.15) 
Note: R = remember, F = familiarity, TLE = temporal lobe epilepsy, LTLE = left temporal lobe epilepsy, RTLE = right 
temporal lobe epilepsy, BLTE = bilateral temporal lobe epilepsy. 
 
 
3.3.5 Subjective experience and source memory after equating recognition performance 
 
To investigate the influence of overall memory strength on subjective experience and source 
memory, the sample was modified to include groups of patients and controls who were 
matched on recognition performance. After removing the eight lowest performing patients 
and five high performing controls, A’ scores were matched in a new sample of 16 patients 
(Mean = .85, SD = .04) and 14 controls (Mean = .86, SD = .04), F(1,29) = 0.24, p = .63. For 
subjective experience judgments, there was now no statistical difference found in either 
recollection score between the two matched groups (Fs < 1.75) and no difference in familiarity 
scores (Fs < 0.10). Therefore, in the current experiment, the ability to subjectively remember 
old items seems to be associated with increased memory performance.  
Source accuracy conditionalised by Remember and Familiar judgments was again assessed 
with a 2 (group) x 2 (subjective experience) x 3 (source type) repeated measures ANOVA as 
above, to test for differences between groups. The same pattern of results as earlier was 
found, except this time subjective experience interacted significantly with source type, F(2, 52) 
= 3.33, p = .04, ηp
2 = .11. To assess differences in accuracy rates for source information 
between the two subjective experience types, paired samples t-tests were conducted on the 
data set. With this subsample combined, only location information was significantly more 
accurate for Remember responses, t(27) = 3.41, p = .002. However, after splitting the data set, 
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this difference was not evident in the patient group, and now temporal order was significantly 
more accurate for Remember, rather than Familiar responses in controls also, t(12) = 2.48, p = 
.03. Finally, the proportion of Remember and Familiar responses that were accompanied by 
item and external associations in the subsample were analysed. The 2 (group) x 2 (association 
type) x 2 (subjective experience response) repeated measures ANOVA returned the same 
results as in the original analysis.  
One-sample t-tests for the proportion of Remember responses to old items accompanied by 
the correct source information revealed the exact same pattern as before; controls recalled 
the location, colour and order of items significantly above chance levels (ps < .005) and the 
high performing patient sample only recalled the location of items above chance levels (p = 
.01). Therefore, despite subjective remembering now being comparable between these two 
groups, patients were still less accurate in the objectively measured recollection aspect of the 
task. 
 The accuracy of source judgments accompanying Familiar responses changed slightly. Controls 
were now significantly below chance levels for location judgments (p = .015), providing further 
evidence that the specific location of a studied item is a unit of contextual information 
specifically indexed by recollective processes. In patients, the accuracy of temporal order was 
now significantly above chance levels for Familiarity responses (p = .02). I return to this point in 
the Discussion below. 
 
3.4 Discussion 
 
The present study aimed to build on previous TLE research that has demonstrated 
impairments in the ability to subjectively remember previously studied information; the novel 
contribution was to assess the extent to which recognition responses based on recollection or 
familiarity were accompanied by contextual and associative source information.  A number of 
important findings emerged. First, evidence was found to support studies that have displayed 
recognition memory in TLE to be characterised by reduced levels of phenomenological 
remembering using the R/K paradigm (Bengner & Malina, 2008; Blaxton & Theodore, 1997; 
Bowles et al., 2010; Moscovitch & McAndrews, 2002). Second, the results from the source 
component of the task revealed that patients were just as able as controls to successfully 
retrieve contextual features of items. However, controls were able to recall the spatiotemporal 
and item colour information at above-chance levels following Remember judgments whereas 
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patients on the other hand, were only able to retrieve spatial information at above-chance 
levels for Remember judgments. Because source memory was at chance for Familiar 
judgments in controls, the results suggest the retrieval of contextual information reliably 
differentiated these two qualitative recognition experiences. Finally, both patients and 
controls reported comparable levels of item and external associations, further suggesting a 
qualitatively distinct recognition experience between the two groups. In a subsample of 
participants matched for recognition performance and subjective levels of remembering, 
differences were still found in the quantity of objective contextual information retrieved.  
To date, there have only been a handful of studies assessing recollection and familiarity with 
the R/K paradigm in TLE. The present results are consistent with this previous work, in that all 
have displayed recollection deficits for either visual or verbal material. However, these 
previous studies, as discussed in the main Introduction, have all aimed to test material 
specificity accounts or modes of processing views of the temporal lobes in remembering and 
knowing. Unlike these, the sample here did not consist of equal numbers of left and right TLE 
patients, or have detailed structural information regarding the extent of MTL lesions; therefore 
the aim was not to specifically assess laterality differences or to provide any comprehensive 
input into debate surrounding the functional roles of specific neuroanatomical structures in 
the MTL. However, a preferential impairment in verbal memory was found in the larger LTLE 
group and the means suggested these patients also had the lowest levels of subjective 
remembering. There were no apparent laterality differences in the level of contextual 
information retrieved, however. An obvious extension of this study would be to replicate the 
procedure using non-verbal stimuli. This would provide a more concrete test of the material 
specificity hypothesis. 
Encouragingly, the results in the control sample for the source component of the task are 
supportive of Perfect et al.’s (1996) original paper, which the current study was based upon. 
The above-chance levels of retrieval for spatiotemporal and colour information for Remember, 
but not Familiar responses, provides evidence that indeed, more contextual information is 
available during recollection. In the present task, the spatial location of targets in the grid 
seemed to be the most salient contextual feature retrieved, as performance was numerically 
highest for controls, and this was the only to-be-encoded contextual information that was 
recalled at above-chance levels in patients. Despite showing an intact ability to successfully 
retrieve this spatial contextual information following Remember responses, the significant 
group x subjective experience response interaction suggested that overall, patients were no 
more likely to correctly retrieve contextual information after subjectively remembering than 
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after recognising information based on familiarity. This was in contrast to controls, whose 
source accuracy for contextual information was significantly increased for Remember 
responses, as dual process theory would predict. These results are thus in line with a number 
of other studies that have found source memory to be more accurate following subjective 
Remember responses (Dudukovic & Knowlton, 2006; Meiser & Bröder, 2002; Starns & Hicks, 
2005).   
Although memory for contextual source features was not impaired per se in the present study, 
the results build on the two previous studies that have assessed source memory in TLE, due to 
the differences in the kind of information and the conditions under which this was required 
from participants. Schwerdt and Dopkins (2001) found impairments in memory for the source 
of who had performed an action, and Thaiss and Petrides’ (2003) task similarly involved 
retrieving who had provided certain trivia facts after watching two videos of gameshows; they 
too found impairments in both source and factual memory in TLE. These studies used a source 
identification paradigm, where the information being tested could have come from one of a 
number of distinct study contexts. In the present study, the analogous source component to 
the task was the participant’s decision that an item was from a prior study phase, or new to 
the test phase. This successful source identification could be achieved by subjectively 
remembering the word, or simply through a feeling of familiarity. The findings thus build on 
the source identification deficits already observed in TLE and suggest that other contextual or 
feature information about items from that source do not become more available even when 
the participant subjectively experiences recollection for the word. 
One criticism of neuropsychological studies assessing memory performance in patients with 
MTL damage has typically been that lower rates of recognition performance (and also 
recollection) may simply be a by-product of initial encoding deficits. Clearly, in a task of this 
kind, to make any firm conclusions about the underlying basis of an impairment in contextual 
and source retrieval of item information, it is essential that both patients and controls are 
matched as far as possible at the encoding stage where such information is initially bound 
together. Therefore, the results of the re-analysis in which patients and controls were matched 
on recognition performance are less susceptible to scrutiny from this perspective. It was found 
in this subsample that subjective recollection, as measured by the IRK procedure, was now 
comparable in patients and controls. This finding is unsurprising given the diverse range of 
neuropsychological profiles within the whole sample. It is also consistent with recent work 
suggesting that high performing older adults (in terms of overall recognition ability) show 
similar levels of recollection to young controls (Duarte, Ranganath, Trujillo, & Knight, 2006). 
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Moreover, as Bowles et al. (2010) and Holdstock et al. (2008) discuss, variations in the 
selectivity of recollection impairments are apparent in this patient group, and there is no single 
agreed upon cause for this. Importantly, even in this subsample with intact subjective 
remembering, controls’ accuracy for correct contextual retrieval following Remember 
responses was sill significantly higher than for Familiar responses; in patients, again only 
spatial information was above chance for Remember responses and no overall difference was 
found in accuracy between Familiar and Remember judgments. As with other studies in this 
area that have assessed relational and associative memory in TLE, questions still remain as to 
what causes these impairments in binding and retrieval of contextual information. More 
pertinent to the topic of this thesis however is that it appears different types of information 
are driving the subjective experience of remembering in these groups. 
The SMF (Johnson et al., 1993) offers a possible interpretation of the present results. This 
framework suggests that the retrieval of source information involves a monitoring component 
following recognition. Hence, it has been argued that the source memory impairments seen in 
patients with frontal lobe damage and older adults with age-related decrements in frontal 
functioning may result from the requirement to use strategic, frontally mediated, retrieval 
operations following successful recognition (Castel & Craik, 2003; Cohn et al., 2009; Incisa della 
Rocchetta & Milner, 1993; Jetter, Poser, Freeman, & Markowitsch, 1986; Petrides & Milner, 
1982). Because recollection is thought to be dependent on a distributed network of fronto-
temporal connections (for a review, see Skinner & Fernandes, 2007), a plausible reason for the 
current patient group’s impairments may be that it is not the memory trace per se that is 
disrupted, but the integrity of the post-retrieval monitoring mechanism needed to search for 
extra contextual information is damaged. However, as mentioned earlier, participants were 
explicitly instructed that the contextual information would be tested later – a method 
advocated by Thaiss and Petrides (2003) in order to reduce task demands at retrieval, in 
comparison to when participants are given a ‘surprise’ test for source information. In a similar 
vein, Mitchell and Johnson (2009) discuss how the encoding of contextual features of items is 
flexibly weighted depending on goals and metacognitive beliefs participants hold about the 
task. From this perspective, lower performance on the contextual elements of items in the task 
would be explained by the fact that patients may simply have assigned less cognitive resources 
to encoding them, as they may have seen them as too difficult to encode, or simply 
unimportant. The above-chance performance for spatial information may suggest this feature 
was given a high flexible weighting by both groups. However, there is no evidence to suggest 
that patients did not try as hard, or assigned less importance to other features. In any case, 
this still would not explain why, in the matched subsample, patients still made an equal 
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number of Remember responses in the absence of a recollection advantage for contextual 
retrieval. 
 
The results are perhaps better explained as a recollection deficit mediated by selective damage 
to hippocampal areas, as outlined by similar previous TLE studies in Section 1.10. The fact that 
the smaller subsample of patients made a comparable number of Remember responses brings 
to question the quality and quantity of contextual or associative information that is needed 
during retrieval in order to subjectively experience recollection for a word. Given that that the 
data suggest less of the objectively measured contextual information was available for 
Remember responses (i.e. location, order, colour), it could be that differences in other kinds of 
associative information retrieved were driving the patients’ Remember responses. Unlike 
Perfect et al. (1996), who asked participants to note all the kinds of contextual and associative 
information available after making R/K judgments, participants in the current study were only 
asked a Yes/No question. In this format, the results displayed a similar number of items 
assigned a Remember response to be accompanied by external associations in both groups. 
Although dual process theories traditionally conceptualise recollection as an all-or-none 
process (i.e. one can either be recollecting, or not), recent evidence has suggested under 
certain circumstances it can be graded  (Parks & Yonelinas, 2008; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007). 
Therefore, it could be that the quality of patient’s more personal external associations was 
sufficient to recollect items, and hence assign them a Remember response. During the 
contextual source recognition component of the task, this external information is presumably 
of little relevance, and therefore one could argue this to be an example of non-criterial 
recollection (see Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1996; Parks, 2007).  
 
The SMF account of this would be that the differentiation created by the individual contextual 
elements of study items was not sufficient to distinguish their retrieval through different states 
of awareness. Instead, other external information (such as thoughts or feelings, for example) 
may have created the differentiation necessary for this recollection. Because the main point of 
controversy within this literature revolves around the extent to which the hippocampus 
supports source, rather than item memory, as Kurilla (2011) points out, future studies in this 
area will benefit from manipulating a variety of different contextual features in order to better 
understand the basis of recollection and familiarity judgments. Drawing on the present study, 
a simple follow up could involve varying the to-be-remembered contextual features, whilst 
also asking participants for detailed information regarding the quality of the external 
associations retrieved; the mental experiences that may contribute to recollection presumably 
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have different strengths, such as the vividness of the scene from a participants own personal 
holiday that is conjured after studying the word ‘holiday’. Comprehensively assessing this 
would no doubt illuminate further any differences in the subjective aspects of retrieval 
between TLE and healthy adults.  
 
The views above make a common assumption that participants are basing their subjective 
experience of recollection on veridical information. We must, however, take into account the 
actual raw performance data for both groups. Although controls showed significantly better 
performance for contextual information following Remember responses as compared to 
Familiar responses, overall performance was only 37% across the three contextual features. It 
would therefore be valuable to try and replicate the results of the current study with higher 
levels of source accuracy; using fewer contextual features would be a suitable approach. 
Because participants had to make a forced choice decision regarding source information, there 
may have been a number of occasions where participants confidently selected an incorrect 
option following a Remember judgment. Accordingly, the reconstructive nature of memories 
means they can be influenced by similarities between certain events, and hence retrieved with 
information from alternative representations (Lyle & Johnson, 2006).  
Returning to the idea of differentiation, it could be then that patients have disordered 
recollective processing, which leads them to make incorrect attributions about contextual 
information in this task. Unfortunately, it was not recorded whether participants believed the 
response to be correct, or how confident they were in that response. Obtaining confidence 
data for this would be particularly instructive, as it may inform the various theories that exist 
to account for source monitoring in the literature. For example, the SMF itself suggests that a 
high confidence ‘old’ response could be based on recollected, but erroneous information, as 
mentioned above. Alternatively, some single trace theorists (e.g. Kirwan, Wixted, & Squire, 
2008) assume incorrect source judgments are based on a strong familiarity response. Given 
the present two step-procedure for determining subjective experience and retrieved 
contextual information, assessing the confidence with which the source information is 
retrieved during these two states of awareness would be highly interesting. This, in fact, is a 
topic that is developed later in Chapter 6, where recollection and familiarity are assessed in 
the context of an associative recognition task, as well as corresponding confidence levels. It 
must be noted again though, that the overall aim of this thesis is not to resolve the dual 
process/single trace debate, rather to use TLE as a model to shed light on the differences and 
similarities in subjective and objective recollection and familiarity. 
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The performance data following familiarity judgments in the matched subsample also provided 
interesting results. It was found that temporal order information was above chance following 
patients’ Familiar judgments, but not for Remember judgments. Interestingly, in one of Perfect 
et al.’s (1996) experiments, they too found above-chance performance in temporal 
information for Know responses. These authors also found that about one-third of Know 
judgments were accompanied by some kind of associative information, suggesting that 
familiarity, as measured by the R/K paradigm, may not reflect the context-free process 
outlined by early proponents of dual process theories  (e.g. Mandler, 1980; Gardiner, 1988, 
Rajaram, 1993). In the present study, it too was found in both groups that familiarity 
judgments were accompanied by a certain degree of external association (11% vs 21% in 
patients and controls, respectively), albeit not as frequently as Perfect et al. At the time, these 
authors had provided one of the first demonstrations that conflicted with the idea of a 
context-free familiarity process (see also (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995). However, it has 
subsequently been shown that highly accurate source judgments can be done so on the basis 
of the partial information retrieved along with familiarity (Hicks, Marsh, & Ritschel, 2002). 
Moreover, recent neuropsychological, electrophysiological and neuroimaging work has 
displayed that familiarity can support source memory, especially under conditions in which the 
information is unitised, or is formed from intra-domain associations, such as word-word pairs 
(Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2008; Haskins, Yonelinas, Quamme, & Ranganath, 2008; Jäger, 
Mecklinger, & Kipp, 2006; Quamme, Yonelinas, & Norman, 2007; Rhodes, Castel, & Jacoby, 
2008; Rhodes & Donaldson, 2007; Speer & Curran, 2007; Yonelinas, Kroll, Dobbins, & Soltani, 
1999). Although we cannot be sure as to what kind of external information was available to 
participants during the familiarity process, at least the results are in partial agreement with 
this recent work. As for the finding that temporal information was above-chance in the higher 
performing patients for Familiar responses, this result can also be accommodated within dual 
process theory.  As Yonelinas (1999a) states, familiarity “is assumed to be a relatively fast 
process that reflects the global familiarity or strength of an item’’ (p. 1416). Therefore, the 
recency with which an item was presented may be experienced more as fluency, rather than a 
subjectively recollected detail. Any item above a certain criterion would be judged as familiar 
and old, and items that are processed more or less fluently may represent a subjective 
interpretation of recency. Moreover, the 4-AFC recognition format for temporal position 
would have placed fewer demands on recollecting information about the study phase than a 
serial order format (e.g. what word came after or before this one?). It is unclear though, why 
this would occur for patients, and not in healthy adults, especially in the context of invariant 
familiarity responses measured by the IRK procedure. This could be further evidence that 
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subtle differences in the underlying processes within medial temporal areas give rise to 
qualitatively different subjective experiences in TLE. Recent work that has been able to utilise 
precise structural information regarding lesion size and extent in TLE patients (Bowles et al., 
2007; 2010) has helped, and will continue to aid the process of understanding exactly what 
drives such differences in recollection and familiarity in these patients. 
 
In summary, the present study has highlighted how the subjective state of conscious 
awareness experienced in TLE may be qualitatively and quantitatively distinct from the healthy 
brain. One of the overarching aims of this thesis was to explore whether the 
phenomenological experience of remembering truly reflects a parallel underlying cognitive 
process of recollection. Using TLE as an example, the experiment in this chapter provides some 
interesting data on this topic.  
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4 Comparing subjective and objective 
recollection with a repetition-lag procedure 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, subjective states of awareness were compared with the amount of 
information consciously available to participants during recognition. As well as demonstrating 
significant reductions in the likelihood TLE patients would subjectively remember studied 
items, the results also suggested that the basis for the Remember responses they did give was 
qualitatively different to healthy controls. The experiments presented in the following chapter 
aimed to build on these findings by assessing recollection and familiarity using the PDP 
(Jacoby, 1991), as described in Section 1.8.2. 
The objective measure of recollection used in the previous experiment was the level of 
contextual or associative information provided by participants during recognition. In this 
paradigm, after matching subjects on recognition performance (and thus assuming similar item 
encoding success), the extent to which a participant will engage in recollective processes 
during recognition can be assumed to be directly related to the functional integrity of the 
neuroanatomical regions involved in this cognitive process. In other words, participants will 
use the process that is available to them during recognition. A useful extension of this then is 
to engage participants in a task that directs or forces them to use one process over the other. 
The PDP does exactly this, as it requires participants to overcome the automatic influences of 
memory (familiarity) with controlled, effortful processing (recollection). The first aim of the 
following experiments was thus to build on the TLE literature by using a variant of this 
paradigm to tease apart the separate contributions of recollection and familiarity to task 
performance. 
The main attraction of the PDP is its ability to provide uncontaminated, process-pure estimates 
of recollection and familiarity (Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby et al., 1993). It is therefore surprising that 
given the increasing body of evidence that suggests TLE is associated with relatively selective 
recollection deficits, there have only been four previous studies using the PDP to investigate 
these impairments further (Cohn et al., 2009; Del Vecchio et al., 2004; Hudson, Flowers, & 
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Roberts, 2009; Martin et al., 2012 – these studies are discussed in Section 1.10.3). This seems 
to be due to a focus on studying amnesics in the literature, as when there is gross pathology in 
an identifiable neuroanatomical area, results of such neuropsychological studies are highly 
useful for informing theoretical models of memory processing. However, as Yonelinas and 
Jacoby (2012) discuss in their recent review, because of the sensitivity of the PDP in its 
measurement of these dual-processes, it has a potentially more applied utility in the diagnosis 
of memory disorders. Because the PDP has had limited application to studying the TLE 
population at large, my first motivation was to explore the contribution recollection and 
familiarity to performance in this group using a novel variant of this paradigm. 
To this end, Jennings and Jacoby’s (1997) repetition-lag procedure was used in the following 
two experiments. In their original study, the authors compared inclusion and exclusion test 
performance in young and older adults to add weight to then developing argument that aging 
is associated with significant impairments in recollection, whilst familiarity is intact. After 
studying a list of words, each test condition involved the presentation of half the study items, 
as well as new items, which were presented twice, with the second presentation varying 
between two and 48 intervening items. Under inclusion instructions, participants were told to 
respond ‘Yes’ to any item they had previously seen (study item or repetition of new item). 
Under exclusion instructions, they were told to only respond ‘Yes’ to items that were initially 
studied, and reject new items and repetitions of those new items. Under inclusion instructions 
then, successful recognition of a target or repeated item is not dependent on the retrieval of 
the source of that item. Conversely, under exclusion instructions, participants must utilise 
recollection to determine whether an item was previously studied, or if it was presented for 
the first time in the test phase. Because of this difference in the way recognition can be 
supported for repeated items in each condition, estimates of recollection and familiarity can 
be calculated at each lag interval (explained in more detail below).   
As well as replicating this verbal repetition-lag procedure, a further motivation of the present 
study was to explore recollection and familiarity in this patient group with different types of 
materials. As such, it was decided to construct an identical task using facial stimuli. As 
discussed in Section 1.5.1, the material specific basis of the right temporal lobe in non-verbal 
forms of memory is a more contested issue than that of the verbal memory functions of the 
left temporal lobe. It has been suggested that lack of hemispheric group differences is 
dramatically influenced by the form of ‘visual’ test used (Helmstaedter, Pohl, & Elger, 1995; 
Vaz, 2004). However, recent work indicates that face recognition in particular is a non-verbal 
cognitive function that, under certain conditions, lateralises well to the right temporal lobe 
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(Bengner et al., 2006c; Bengner & Malina, 2010; Coleshill et al., 2004; Gainotti, 2007). For 
example, testing after delayed intervals has greater sensitivity in detecting face recognition 
deficits in RTLE, and differences are found between subgroups of patients with and without 
MRI evidence of focal lesions (Bengner et al., 2006c). For practical reasons, the 24 hour delay 
used in the above mentioned study was not possible, but instead a 10 minute filled interval 
was incorporated into the present experiments to overcome the potential problem of simply 
using an immediate recognition paradigm.  
As well as conducting visual and verbal variants of the repetition-lag paradigm to explore 
laterality differences in PDP estimates, the most important novel addition to the task was the 
requirement for participants to make subjective experience judgments during recognition. As 
discussed in Section 1.11, there has been some attempt in the literature to compare subjective 
and objective measures of recollection. Most notably, Prull et al. (2006) compared three 
measures of recollection and familiarity (inclusion/exclusion performance; R/K paradigm; ROC 
method) with neuropsychological test performance in young and older adults. These authors 
found that all measures of recollection (subjective and objective), converged on the finding of 
an impairment in older adults. As the authors note, this is despite the differences in how 
recollection is defined in each task. Another more recent study by McCabe et al. (2011) used 
inclusion and exclusion tasks and subjective experience judgments to provide evidence that 
free recall is partially influenced by automatic memory processes. Therefore, these two studies 
suggest that the different methods of estimating recollection and familiarity can be used 
synergistically to test both neuropsychological and more theoretical hypotheses. By requiring 
participants to report on their experiential state during inclusion and exclusion tasks in the 
present experiments, the aim was to compare the extent to which any significant reduction in 
objective process estimations of recollection were paralleled by a reduction in the subjective 
experience of remembering items in TLE also. To my knowledge, this is the first example of an 
intra-task comparison of this type in this patient group. 
Based on the results of the previous chapter and those provided elsewhere in this literature, 
several hypotheses were generated. First, performance in the exclusion condition was 
predicted to be worse in the patient sample in both experiments. As mentioned above, 
committing FPs to repeated exclusion items is thought to rely on a failure to recollect the 
source of that item (Jennings & Jacoby, 1997). Therefore, this is the first behavioural measure 
of recollection to be observed. Moreover, an increase in the number of FPs was expected as 
the lag intervals between items increased, as after the processing of more interfering 
information, recollection should be required to a greater extent as the task becomes more 
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difficult. This difference was expected to be greater in patients, however. Turning to objective 
PDP estimates, these were expected to be characterised by significantly lower levels of 
recollection in the TLE sample, with familiarity left intact. In previous studies using this 
repetition-lag methodology, the familiarity estimate has been found to increase over intervals 
(and thus in line with the explanation above regarding FPs), so it was hypothesised that this 
pattern should be evident in both groups. As described later, IRK calculations were computed 
for the subjective experience judgments associated with old study items. These data were 
expected to show that controls’ experiential state during recognition of these items was 
predominantly one of remembering, where in comparison, TLE patients would rely more on 
feelings of familiarity. Although the absolute values of the various estimates of these two 
processes were not predicted to be directly comparable, the main expectation was that all of 
the evidence would converge on a consistent recollection impairment.  
During the testing session, all participants carried out the face version of the task first, 
followed immediately by the word version. However, because the previous chapter hinted 
toward laterality effects in the LTLE group, I present the word version as Experiment 4.1, as 
this seemed to be a logical transition. With regard to the face task (Experiment 4.2), despite 
the modest number of participants in the RTLE group, it was predicted that there would be at 
least some evidence of lateralised deficits, either on performance measures, recollection 
estimates, or both. Importantly, despite the use of a visual and verbal task, the overriding aim 
of the present study was more to comprehensively explore the subjective-objective 
comparisons of recollection and familiarity in TLE. 
 
 
4.2 Experiment 4.1: Word task 
 
4.2.1 Participants 
 
All patient and control participants described in Chapter 2 completed the experiment with the 
exception of patients 4, 6, 7 and 27. Additionally, patient 23’s data was lost due to a system 
fault during testing.  
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4.3 Method 
 
4.3.1 Materials 
 
The stimuli consisted of 100 nouns, which were drawn from the SUBTLEXUS word frequency 
corpus (Brysbaert & New, 2009). All words were between four and eight letters in length. 
Imageability and concreteness values were separately obtained for each word from the MRC 
psycholinguistic database (Coltheart, 1981b). Four of these words served as buffer items, with 
two presented at the beginning and end of study and test cycles in the same fixed order. The 
remaining 96 words were split into two sets of 48 items, A and B, which were matched on the 
above psycholinguistic variables (Mean SUBTLEXWF = 63.11, Mean concreteness= 479.04, Mean 
imageability = 517.72, Mean number of letters = 5.77). The presentation of these sets as study 
and test items was counterbalanced across participants. Within the study set, half of the words 
were assigned to each of the inclusion and exclusion conditions. These were presented in 
random order to each participant. In the test phase, the order of inclusion and exclusion 
conditions was also counterbalanced between participants. The lags used were 2, 4, 8 and 16. 
The running order of new items forming the lags and number of intervening old or new items 
was kept constant, however, the six item groupings that formed each lag were rotated across 
participants. Thus, each set of 6 items was used as often in each lag and in study/test inclusion 
and exclusion trials.  
 
4.3.2 Design and Procedure 
 
There were two within subjects manipulations: 2 (test type: inclusion vs exclusion) x 4 (lag 
interval: 2, 4, 8 and 16).  Participants were instructed that they were about to be shown a 
series of words to learn, which would be followed by a ten minute filler task and finally a test 
phase consisting of two recognition tests. In the encoding phase, words were presented at a 
rate of 3 seconds per item, with an ISI of one second during which a fixation cross was 
displayed in the centre of the screen. Participants were also instructed to verbalise how 
pleasant they judged each word to be, on a scale of 1 (very unpleasant), 2 (unpleasant), 3 
(neutral), 4 (pleasant) and 5 (Very pleasant). The pleasantness judgment options always 
appeared on the right side of the screen and the experimenter keyed participants’ responses.  
This instruction was included to ensure participants encoded items on a relatively conceptual 
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level. Although it should be noted that previous literature has shown conceptual encoding of 
stimuli leads to an increase in the number of Remember responses in the R/K paradigm in 
healthy subjects, but not for TLE patients (Moscovitch & McAndrews, 2002). 
After encoding, participants completed ‘spot-the-difference’ problems for approximately ten 
minutes. In the following test phase, participants were told they were about to see the old 
studied words and new words, which would be repeated at varying intervals. The inclusion 
instructions explained that they were to respond ‘yes’ to any word that had been seen 
previously (old studied words and repetitions of new words) and ‘no’ to the first presentation 
of new words. The exclusion instructions asked participants to respond ‘yes’ only to words 
from the study phase and respond ‘no’ to new words and repetitions.  
They were then told that if they had responded ‘Yes’, indicating they recognised a word (based 
on inclusion or exclusion instructions), they must then report their subjective experience for 
that item (R/K procedure: Tulving, 1985). At this point, they were directed to an information 
sheet in front of them which gave definitions of Remember, Familiar and Guess responses, 
which were identical to those in Chapter 2. The instruction sheet also provided examples of 
daily situations in which one might report these states of awareness (e.g. finding a person’s 
face familiar in the absence of remembering where you know them vs. remembering what 
happened in the last film you watched). The study did not proceed until the experimenter was 
satisfied the participant correctly understood each definition.  
Following instructions for the R/K procedure, the experimenter completed a walked-through 
practice with the participant to ensure they understood the test procedure. This was 
completed for both the inclusion and exclusion conditions. Participants verbalised all 
responses in the test phases and the experimenter entered these by a mouse click. During the 
test phase, the Yes and No options were presented in boxes to the right of each word; if the 
participant responded No, the word would disappear and was followed by a fixation cross for 
one second before the next word appeared. If they responded Yes, the word disappeared and 
a message asking ‘What was your subjective experience of the word?’ appeared, as well as 
three boxes with the letters R, F and G, corresponding to Remember, Familiar and Guess. 
Following completion of one test phase (inclusion/exclusion), the participant was immediately 
given the instructions for the remaining test and the above procedure was repeated. 
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4.3.3 Process estimations 
 
The combination of inclusion/exclusion conditions and the instructions to report subjective 
experience for recognised items allowed the calculation of the contribution of recollection and 
familiarity to performance in two ways. As described by Jennings and Jacoby (1997), 
participants will make a FP to a repeated item in the exclusion condition if it is familiar (F) and 
its source (i.e. the test phase) is not recollected (1-R). Therefore, false alarming in the exclusion 
condition is explained by the equation: Exclusion = F (1-R). 
Conversely, the instructions to respond Yes to any previously seen item in the inclusion means 
that successful performance can be achieved through the use of both recollection and 
familiarity.  Therefore, the probability of a Yes response to a repetition on the inclusion test 
can be calculated as Inclusion = R + F (1-R).  
Recollection can then be computed by subtracting the FP rate for the exclusion condition from 
the hit rate for the inclusion condition: R = Inclusion – Exclusion. Finally, familiarity can be 
calculated by dividing the FP rate in the exclusion condition by the inverse of the recollection 
estimate: F = Exclusion/(1 –R).  
Subjective experience responses derived from the Remember/Know procedure can also be 
used to calculate process estimations in a similar way using the independence remember-
know procedure (IRK: Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995). In the present study, estimates of 
recollection and familiarity were calculated in the same way as the previous chapter, using the 
hit rate to old study items and FP rate to the first presentation of new items. 
 
4.4 Results  
 
4.4.1 Recognition performance 
 
The proportions of each item type that were assigned a Yes response in each condition for 
controls and the TLE group are presented in Table 4.1. Old items represent studied words and 
FP 1st represents the false alarm rate to each lag item on its first presentation in the test phase. 
For the lag intervals, a Yes response in the inclusion condition represents a hit to a repeated 
item, whereas in the exclusion condition it represents a false alarm, as participants were 
instructed to reject any items other than those studied initially. 
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Overall recognition of study items was high in both groups for each condition. A 2 (group) x 2 
(hit vs. FP1st) x 2 (condition) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to assess differences 
in recognition performance, with group as a between subjects factor. There was no main effect 
of group or condition, F(1, 39) = 0.21, p = .65, ηp
2 = .01; F(1, 39) = 0.96, p = .33, ηp
2 = .02.  
Condition did not interact with any other variable (Fs < .13, ps > .72), suggesting performance 
was comparable across inclusion and exclusion tasks in both groups for old and new items. 
However, the item type x group interaction reached significance, F(1, 39) = 5.38, p = .03, ηp
2 = 
.12, displaying that across conditions, the difference between controls’ FP rate and hit rate was 
greater than patients, suggesting better overall recognition performance.  
The same analysis as above was repeated but with the group factor including separate left, 
right, bilateral and control participant groups. No effect of subgroup was found, F(1, 37) = 0.41, 
p = .75, ηp
2 = .03 but the interaction between subgroup and item type was significant, F(3, 37) 
= 2.92, p = .05, ηp
2 = .19. The means suggested that as well as the result discussed above, an 
increased hit rate without correspondingly low FP rate in the bilateral group was also driving 
the interaction.  
 
Table 4.1 Mean (SD) probability of responding ‘yes’ to old, new and repeated items at each 
lag interval in Experiment 4.1. 
                                                                   Lag interval 
Test Old FP 1st  2 4 8 16 
Inclusion 
Control 
TLE  
 
LTLE (N=11) 
RTLE (N=7) 
BTLE (N=4) 
 
.85 (.21) 
.79 (.19) 
 
.78 (.12) 
.75 (.29) 
.92 (.09) 
 
.09 (.09) 
.18 (.15) 
 
.22 (.16) 
.13 (.16) 
.14 (.08) 
 
.81 (.06) 
.77 (.12)  
 
.74 (.15) 
.76 (.09) 
.83 (.00) 
 
.96 (.09) 
.90 (.12) 
 
.88 (.13) 
.90 (.13) 
.96 (.09) 
 
.95 (.10) 
.94 (.13) 
 
.95 (.08) 
.88 (.21) 
1.00 (.00) 
 
.96 (.09) 
.92 (.14) 
 
.89 (.17) 
.95 (.08) 
.92 (.17) 
 
Exclusion 
Control  
TLE 
 
LTLE (N=11) 
RTLE (N=7) 
BTLE (N=4) 
 
 
.83 (.15) 
.78 (.16)  
 
.75 (.13) 
.78 (.22) 
.90 (.08) 
 
 
.07 (.10) 
.15 (.15) 
 
.14 (.17) 
.16 (.14) 
.15 (.15) 
 
 
.01 (.04) 
.07 (.11) 
 
.08 (.11) 
.05 (.08) 
.08 (.17) 
 
 
.07 (.10) 
.14 (.19) 
 
.20 (.22) 
.05 (.08) 
.17 (.19) 
 
 
.10 (.04) 
.26 (.29) 
 
.32 (.29) 
.24 (.30) 
.13 (.25) 
 
 
.18 (.16) 
.30 (.30) 
 
.41 (.33) 
.22 (.27) 
.17 (.19) 
Note: TLE = temporal lobe epilepsy, LTLE = left temporal lobe epilepsy, RTLE = right temporal lobe epilepsy, BTLE = 
bilateral temporal lobe epilepsy, FP 1
st
 = false positives to first presentation of new items. 
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4.4.2 Repeated lag item performance 
 
Inclusion task performance on the repeated lag items was assessed with a 2 (group) x 4 (lag 
interval) repeated measures ANOVA, with group as a between subjects factor. No effect of 
group was found, F(1, 39) = 2.56, p = .12, ηp
2 = .06, suggesting TLE patients were unimpaired in 
the ability to correctly recognise words that had recently been presented once already in the 
test phase; this result is consistent with the thesis that  familiarity alone can support 
recognition of these items . Somewhat surprisingly, a significant effect of lag was found, F(3, 
117) = 23.56, p = .001, ηp
2 = .38, due to lag 2 items achieving significantly poorer performance 
than other repeated items in both groups; we return to this finding in the discussion below. An 
ANOVA looking at laterality revealed no effect of subgroup, or interaction with lag, F(1, 37) = 
1.56, p = .22, ηp
2 = .11; F(9, 111) = 0.73, p = .65, ηp
2 = .06. 
Exclusion task performance on repeated lag items is where differences were expected 
between groups, and lag intervals. As discussed earlier, this is because correct rejection of 
repeated items on this task requires the use of recollection. Moreover, as past research has 
shown, as lag intervals increase, the demands on recollection also increase, as one must 
oppose the sense of familiarity created by the first presentation of a word. Consistent with 
these hypotheses, a 2 (group) x 4 (lag interval) repeated measures ANOVA on the data 
revealed a significant effect of group, F(1, 39) = 6.75, p = .01, ηp
2 = .15 and a significant effect 
of lag, F(3, 117) = 17.35, p = .001, ηp
2 = .31 but no interaction group and lag (F < 1). Bonferroni 
post-hoc comparisons assessing the lag effect revealed that lag 8 FPs were significantly higher 
than lag 2 (Mean difference = .14, p  = .001) and lag 4 (Mean difference = .09, p  = .02); lag 16 
FPs were also higher than lag 2 (Mean difference = .20, p  = .001) and lag 4 (Mean difference = 
.15, p  = .001) but lag 2 and 4 did not differ from one another (Mean difference = .05, p  = .12), 
nor did lags 8 and 16 (Mean difference = .06, p  = .27). Therefore, the results suggest that both 
groups made more FPs to items at the longer intervals, but this failure to oppose the 
experimentally manipulated familiarity was more evident in the TLE group.  
This analysis was repeated to assess the contribution of laterality and a significant effect of 
subgroup was found, F(1, 37) = 3.55, p = .02, ηp
2 = .22. Bonferroni post-hocs displayed a 
significant difference between the control group and LTLE (Mean difference = .17, p = .01), but 
not between the other patient subgroups, or other patient subgroups and controls (ps > .63). 
Therefore, the results provide evidence that the LTLE group is capable of completing a test 
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where recognition is achievable solely by familiarity (inclusion condition), but when recall-to-
reject recollective processes are needed (exclusion condition), performance is impaired.  
 
4.4.3 Objective process estimations 
 
The results from the above analysis implied that the behavioural marker of recollection in this 
task was preferentially impaired in the LTLE group (i.e. FPs to exclusion items). The objective 
process estimates of recollection and familiarity outlined earlier were this computed to 
examine this further. 
Table 4.2 displays the recollection and familiarity estimates for patients and controls for each 
lag interval on the task. A 2 (group) x 2 (process) x 4 (lag interval) repeated measures ANOVA 
was conducted on this data, with group as the between subjects factor. No overall effect of 
group was found, F(1, 39) = 2.81, p = .10, ηp
2 = .07. However, an effect of process was found, 
F(1, 39) = 30.78, p = .001, ηp
2 = .44 and central to the experimental hypothesis, this interacted 
significantly with group, F(1, 39) = 4.79, p = .04, ηp
2 = .11. This was qualified with follow-up 
one-way ANOVAs, where a significant difference was revealed between the collapsed mean 
recollection estimate for controls (Mean = .81, SD = .06) and patients (Mean = .67, SD = .21), 
F(1, 39)= 8.61, p = .01, η2= .18, but not between familiarity estimates for controls (Mean = .46, 
SD = .16) and patients (Mean = .51, SD = .20), F(1, 39)= 0.82, p = .37, η2= .02.  
Of further interest was the significant process x lag interval interaction, F(3, 117) = 29.02, p = 
.001, ηp
2 = .43. The means suggest this is a result of recollection estimates remaining relatively 
stable with no clear pattern of increase or decrease across intervals, in comparison to 
familiarity estimates which increased in a uniform fashion with increasing intervals in both 
groups. As such, the group factor did not interact with lag interval, F(3, 117) = 0.77, p = .52, ηp
2 
= .02, and the three-way interaction between group,  process and lag interval was also non-
significant, F(3, 117) = 0.11, p = .95, ηp
2 = .003. The results of the process estimate analysis are 
thus supportive of the recognition performance data; poorer performance on the components 
of the task that are theoretically reliant on recollective processes is supported by a reduction 
in objective estimations of the contribution of recollection to the task as a whole in TLE. 
Familiarity, on the other hand, is invariant between patients and controls, and is presumably 
utilised in exactly the same way as controls as the difficulty of the repeated lag intervals 
increases. 
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Given that the recognition findings above showed the LTLE group to be preferentially impaired 
on the recollective component of the task, the process estimation analyses were re-ran and 
looked specifically at individual patient subgroups. There was no significant effect of subgroup 
or interaction between this factor and the other variables (Fs < 2.81, ps < .10). Therefore, 
although LTLE was associated with the lowest recollection based recognition performance 
(exclusion FPs), when taking into account both conditions with PDP estimates, the significantly 
lower contribution of recollection to the task is better explained by the performance of the TLE 
group as a whole. 
Table 4.2 Mean (SD) recollection and familiarity process estimations from performance on 
inclusion and exclusion lag items in Experiment 4.1. 
 Recollection  Familiarity 
 Lag 2 Lag 4 Lag 8 Lag 16  Lag 2 Lag 4 Lag 8 Lag 16 
Control  .78 (.07) .90 (.09) .82 (.11) .76 (.15)  .12 (.09) .48 (.25) .57 (.34) .68 (.30) 
TLE 
 
.68 (.18) .74 (.20) .66 (.31) .59 (.34)  .21 (.19) .51 (.30) .64 (.28) .69 (.28) 
LTLE (N=11) .65 (.23) .66 (.21) .61 (.28) .47 (.34)  .20 (.16) .52 (.35) .70 (.29) .72 (.35) 
RTLE (N=7) .70 (.07) .83 (.16) .62 (.38) .71 (.33)  .20 (.21) .42 (.27) .57 (.31) .69 (.18) 
BTLE (N=4) .73 (.16) .77 (.23) .84 (.24) .73 (.30)  .25 (.28) .65 (.21) .62 (.23) .61 (.22) 
Note: TLE = temporal lobe epilepsy, LTLE = left temporal lobe epilepsy, RTLE = right temporal lobe epilepsy, BTLE = 
bilateral temporal lobe epilepsy. 
 
 
4.4.4 Subjective experience 
 
The novel adaptation of the repetition lag procedure adopted in the present study was to ask 
participants to provide subjective experience ratings for any item accepted as old. The IRK 
estimates are presented in Table 4.36. Recollection estimates are higher in controls compared 
to patients in both conditions7, and scores across conditions appear to be relatively balanced 
in both groups. Separate 2 (group) x 2 (condition) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted 
on all four of the estimates, with group as a between subjects factor. There were significant 
group differences for the R hit-FP and R IRK estimates, F(1, 39) = 5.69, p = .02, ηp
2 = .13; F(1, 
                                                          
6
 Data for guess responses are not presented as they were low in both groups: Collapsed across 
inclusion and exclusion conditions controls mean = .02, sd = .04 and patients mean = .03, sd = .07.  
7
 The R IRK estimate for controls in the inclusion condition represents the mean and SD after removing 
one outlying control participant whose remember FP rate was much larger than remember hit rate, 
resulting in an IRK estimate of -9.00. With this score included, the mean of the control group was .25 (SD 
= 2.26). In the repeated measures analysis of this estimate, this participant’s score was substituted with 
the new group mean of .76 and used with their original exclusion R IRK score so as not to lose a data 
point. 
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39) = 4.77, p = .04, ηp
2 = .11. No effect of condition, or interaction between group and 
condition was found in these analyses (Fs < .32, ps > .58). Therefore, control participants were 
more likely than patients to subjectively remember old study items and the differing demands 
of each the conditions did not affect the likelihood of participants assigning these items 
Remember judgments. For the F IRK and F corrected familiarity estimate analyses, no 
significant difference was found between groups or condition, and no interactions were found 
between condition and group (Fs < 1.48, ps > .23).  
Finally, ANOVA analyses were used to assess differences in laterality. For R hits-FPs, the 
subgroup factor only approached significance, F(3, 37) = 2.67, p = .06, ηp
2 = .18,  but for the R 
IRK estimate a reliable effect was found, F(3, 37) = 3.02, p = .04, ηp
2 = .20. However, Bonferroni 
post-hoc comparisons following both analyses revealed no significant differences between 
patient subgroups and controls (ps > .14). The same analysis for both familiarity estimates 
revealed no evidence of difference in subgroups. Therefore, similar to the above findings for 
objective recollection estimates, it appears that the significant reduction in subjective 
remembering in the TLE sample is not a result of a preferential impairment in one particular 
laterality group.  
Table 4.3 Mean (SD) Independence Remember-Know estimates of recollection and 
familiarity associated with old and new responses in Experiment 4.1. 
Test R Hit-FP R IRK F IRK F Corrected 
Inclusion     
Control .67 (.36) .76 (.30) .77 (.36) .67 (.37) 
TLE .46 (.24) .52 (.48) .69 (.26) .52 (.33) 
 
LTLE (N=11) 
RTLE (N=7) 
BTLE (N=4) 
 
 
.43 (.27) 
.47 (.28) 
.53 (.31) 
 
.41 (.63) 
.62 (.24) 
.62 (.34) 
 
.66 (.28) 
.72 (.27) 
.75 (.23) 
 
.54 (.31) 
.52 (.40) 
.52 (.40) 
Exclusion     
Control .65 (.29) .73 (.30) .70 (.33) .62 (.37) 
TLE 
 
LTLE (N=11) 
RTLE (N=7) 
BTLE (N=4) 
.52 (.33) 
 
.48 (.31) 
.59 (.41) 
.52 (.34) 
.57 (.43) 
 
.55 (.26) 
.51 (.71) 
.73 (.18) 
.73 (.29) 
 
.76 (.25) 
.72 (.35) 
.68 (.35) 
.58 (.37) 
 
.66 (.32) 
.54 (.44) 
.45 (.41) 
Note: TLE = temporal lobe epilepsy, LTLE = left temporal lobe epilepsy, RTLE = right temporal lobe epilepsy, BTLE = 
bilateral temporal lobe epilepsy, R = remember, FP = false positive, IRK = independence remember-know, F = 
familiarity. 
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The analysis presented above of PDP derived recollection and familiarity estimates was able to 
provide information regarding the relative contribution of these two processes to completing 
the task as a whole at each lag interval. Taking into account both inclusion hits and exclusion 
FPs, this revealed that familiarity was used progressively more as lag intervals increased, 
whereas the contribution of recollection remained more stable (with controls’ score being 
significantly higher). By obtaining subjective experience ratings for repeated items in the 
inclusion condition, a different assessment was possible; instead of estimating the contribution 
of the cognitive processes used to solve the task as a whole based on recognition 
performance, the phenomenology with which participant’s recognised items as the interval 
between initial presentation and repeat increased was directly measurable. These data are 
presented in Table 4. These were submitted to a 2 (group) x 2 (subjective experience) x 4 (lag 
interval) repeated measures ANOVA, with group as a between subjects factor. There was no 
effect of group8, F(1, 39) = 0.86, p = .36, ηp
2 = .02, nor any effect of lag, F(3, 117) = 0.86, p = .46, 
ηp
2 = .02. As would be expected from the means, a significant effect of subjective experience 
was found, F(1, 39) = 209.86, p = .001, ηp
2 = .84, with Remember responses assigned to 
significantly more repeated inclusion items. Further, a significant interaction was found 
between group and subjective experience, F(1, 39) = 9.57, p = .004, ηp
2 = .20, confirming that 
control participants gave significantly more Remember responses than patients. Subjective 
experience also interacted significantly with lag, F(3, 117) = 7.88, p = .001, ηp
2 = .17, which 
resulted from the overall decrease in Remember responses and increase in Familiar responses 
as lag intervals increased. This result therefore provides support for the PDP data that 
suggested familiarity processes are utilised to a greater degree with longer lag intervals. No 
interaction was found between lag interval and group, F(3, 117) = 0.86, p = .46, ηp
2 = .02. 
However, the three-way interaction between group, subjective experience and lag reached 
significance, F(3, 117) = 3.36, p = .02, ηp
2 = .08. As we can see from Table 4.4, this appears to be 
in line with the objective process estimation data: Controls’ recognition responses are 
consistently judged to be remembered more than familiar, whereas patients show a highly 
uniform linear decrease and increase in Remember and Familiar judgments over lag intervals, 
respectively. The strength of this pattern is evidenced by the fact that the overall subjective 
experience x lag interaction reported above was still significant, despite controls not showing 
the same profile.  
 
                                                          
8
 Guess responses are again not presented here due to low numbers; control participants did not make 
any guess judgments and the mean patient proportion was just .01 (SD = .02). The group effect was thus 
expected to be non-significant as the proportions in each both add to 1. 
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Table 4.4 Mean (SD) proportion of subjective Remember and Familiar judgments assigned to 
repeated inclusion lag items at each interval in Experiment 4.1. 
 Remember   Familiar 
 Lag 2 Lag 4 Lag 8 Lag 16   Lag 2 Lag 4 Lag 8 Lag 16 
Control  .99 (.04) .93 (.11) .96 (.12) .94 (.13)   .01 (.04) .07 (.11) .04 (.12) .06 (.13) 
TLE 
 
.88 (.19) .81 (.22) .78 (.26) .69 (.28)   .12 (.19) .18 (.22) .22 (.26) .30 (.29) 
LTLE (N=11) .83 (.25) .77 (.26) .70 (.32) .63 (.30)   .17 (.25) .21 (.25) .30 (.32) .34 (.32) 
RTLE(N=17) .93 (.09) .82 (.20) .83 (.19) .68 (.30)   .07 (.09) .18 (.20) .17 (.19) .32 (.30) 
BTLE(N=4) .96 (.09) .91 (.11) .91 (.10) .86 (.19)   .04 (.09) .09 (.11) .09 (.10) .14 (.20) 
Note: TLE = temporal lobe epilepsy, LTLE = left temporal lobe epilepsy, RTLE = right temporal lobe epilepsy, BTLE = 
bilateral temporal lobe epilepsy. 
 
 
These analyses were repeated on laterality subgroup data and the three-way interaction 
reported above was no longer significant (F = 1.18, p = .31). However, the subgroup x 
subjective experience interaction was again significant, F(3, 37) = 5.94, p = .002, ηp
2 = .33. A 
follow up one-way ANOVA was conducted on the marginal means for proportion of Remember 
responses for LTLE (Marginal mean = .78, SD = .16), RTLE (Marginal mean = .89, SD = .10), BTLE 
(Marginal mean = .63, SD = .41) and the control group (Marginal mean = .95, SD = .07). Using 
the Bonferroni correction method, only the difference between BTLE and controls was 
significant (p = .004). However, the LTLE group showed evidence trending toward a significant 
difference with controls, also (p = .04). The finding that the BTLE group had the lowest level of 
Remember responses is surprising given this group showed no evidence of lower performance 
on any of the other measures reported above.  
 
4.4.5 Experiment 4.1 Summary 
 
The results from Experiment 4.1 provide consistent evidence that the recognition impairment 
seen in the TLE group is a direct result of an inability to use recollection in a comparable way to 
healthy controls. This was displayed through three complementary strands of analysis. In the 
exclusion condition - a behavioural measure of recollection – patients made more FPs to 
repeated items. At longer intervals, these FPs are expected to increase in all participants, as 
the longer time interval and additional intervening information being processed mean that 
more demands are put on recollection to retrieve the source of the recognised information 
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and correctly reject the item. In line with predictions, TLE patients committed more of these 
errors, with the left temporal group performing worst. The second line of evidence came from 
the objective PDP estimates, which took into account performance in both conditions of the 
task. These data suggested that the TLE group, as a whole, used recollection significantly less 
than controls to complete the repeated item lag component of the experiment. Critically, 
there was a corresponding increase in familiarity estimates with longer lag intervals in both 
groups, suggesting that this process is intact and engaged in the task in the same way as 
healthy adults. The comparable performance on repeated inclusion items adds further support 
to this, as this part of the test is solvable by familiarity alone. The final supporting evidence 
came from the assessment of subjective experience ratings following recognition. For study 
items, the IRK measures displayed a clear reduction in subjective remembering in patients; for 
inclusion lag items, patients’ responses mirrored those of the PDP estimates as recollection 
decreased and familiarity increased over intervals. Controls, on the other hand, consistently 
reported remembering these items. These group differences in subjective experience ratings 
were not however driven by significantly worse performance in the left temporal group, as was 
predicted.  
The main finding presented in Experiment 4.1 then is that recollection impairments are 
detectable in this TLE patient group when using multiple measures within a single task. The 
inconsistent findings with regard to the left temporal group shed further light on the 
conditions under which this reduction in recollection is observable, and for which type of 
material. The left temporal group showed significantly impaired performance on exclusion FPs 
and a tendency to provide fewer Remember responses for recognised inclusion repeated 
items; they did not however, show worse overall recognition performance on study items or 
provide significantly fewer Remember responses for these items. These results are in line with 
those of the previous chapter, which suggest more of a disorder in recollection, rather than a 
complete absence. Interestingly, Moscovitch and McAndrews’ (2002) classic study with this 
patient group suggested that patients with left or right TLE were unable to benefit  from 
conceptually based encoding (in terms of increase in Remember responses) for verbal and 
visual material, respectively. Although a comparison was not made here between different 
encoding conditions, the fact that the LTLE group showed equivalent performance and 
subjective experience profile to the other subgroups for study items suggests that they may 
have benefited from the encoding manipulation. Repeated lag items, on the other hand, are 
presented quickly, and encoding of these is incidental in the sense that participants are not 
directed towards trying to remember new items. Taken together then, the results confirm 
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Yonelinas and Jacoby’s (2012) position that the PDP may be a sensitive tool for the 
measurement of recollection impairments.  
 
4.5 Experiment 4.2: Faces 
 
The same task was conducted with participants using facial stimuli to explore the contribution 
of subjective and objective recollection further with alternative testing materials. To reiterate, 
the hypotheses for this task were identical to that of Experiment 4.1: significant reductions 
were predicted in all measures of recollection in patients, whilst familiarity was expected to be 
intact. A reduction in measures of recollection was expected to be more salient in the RTLE 
group however, due to the findings of similar neuropsychological research. 
 
4.5.1 Participants 
 
All participants described in Section 4.2.1 completed the task; participant 23’s data was 
included also. 
 
4.6 Method 
 
4.6.1 Materials 
 
The stimuli consisted of 100 black and white facial photographs of male and female faces 
drawn from Minear & Park (2004). All faces were frontal view, with neutral expressions and 
aged between 18 and 55 years of age. The original colour photos from this database were 
converted to greyscale and cropped to a resolution of 350 x 400 pixels. Photos of people 
wearing glasses, or unusually distinctive facial hair were not included. Distinguishable 
jewellery, predominantly ear rings, were removed using Corel Paint Shop Pro software 
(example of a face can be found in APPENDIX E). The photographs were split in the same way 
as items in Experiment 4.1, whereby two lists were created that were matched for number of 
males and females and had comparable numbers of black, white and Asian faces within them. 
Moreover, the six-item lag groupings were matched as far as possible in this way also.  
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4.6.2 Design and Procedure 
 
The design was identical to Experiment 4.1, as was the procedure, with the exception that the 
delay between study and test was filled by the completion of basic numerical problems.  
 
4.7 Results and Discussion 
 
As the tasks were identical except for the type of stimuli, the results follow the same structure 
as Experiment 4.1. Comparisons between the two tasks will be addressed in the Discussion 
below, and in more detail in Chapter 7, where a correlational analysis of participants’ scores 
across all tasks within this thesis is presented. 
 
4.7.1 Recognition performance 
 
The proportion of items that were assigned a Yes response in the face task are presented in 
Table 4.5. A 2 (group) x 2 (hit vs. FP 1st) x 2 (condition) repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted with group as a between subjects factor. There was no effect of group or condition, 
F(1, 40) = 1.49, p = .23, ηp
2 = .04; F(1, 40) = 1.22, p = .28, ηp
2 = .03. Hits to old items were 
significantly higher than FPs to new items, as expected, F(1, 40) = 306.80, p = .001, ηp
2 = .89. 
Condition did not interact significantly with the other two variables (Fs < 1.84, ps > .18), 
implying performance on study items was not influenced by the differing task instructions 
between conditions for lag items. The item type x group interaction was significant, F(1, 40) 
=17.58, p = .001, ηp
2 = .31, such that overall recognition performance was better in controls. 
This repeated measures analysis was conducted again in order to assess laterality. There was 
no effect of subgroup or condition (Fs < 1.21, ps > .32). An effect of item type was found as 
expected, F(1, 38) = 175.49, p = .001, ηp
2 = .82. The item type x subgroup interaction reached 
significance, F(3, 38) =6.17, p = .002, ηp
2 = .33. Follow up one-way ANOVAs were conducted on 
the marginal means of the two conditions and no statistical difference was found between 
subgroups for FP rates to new items, F(3, 41) = 1.15, p = .34, η2 = .08. An effect of hit rate was 
found, however, F(3, 41) = 4.84, p = .006, η2 = .28. Bonferroni post-hocs were conducted and 
although the left and right patient groups showed evidence of statistically lower hit rates to 
controls (LTLE, p = .03; RTLE, p = .02), these values did not reach the p < .01 criteria for multiple 
comparisons. All other main effects and interactions were non-significant (Fs < 1.21, ps > .32). 
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In sum, analysis of subgroups in the face task suggests FPs to new items were not different to 
controls, but hit rates to study items were lowered in left and right sided patients, with BTLE 
performing the best. 
 
 
Table 4.5 Mean (SD) probability of responding ‘yes’ to Old, New and repeated items at each 
lag interval in Experiment 4.2. 
                                                                   Lag interval 
Test Old FP 1st  2 4 8 16 
Inclusion 
Control 
TLE  
 
LTLE (N =12) 
RTLE (N =7) 
BTLE (N = 4) 
 
.68 (.18) 
.51 (.20) 
 
.53 (.18) 
.51 (.17) 
.61 (.19) 
 
.14 (.09) 
.21 (.14) 
 
.21 (.14) 
.21 (.10) 
.24 (.20) 
 
.78 (.16) 
.65 (.15) 
 
.64 (.16) 
.65 (.06) 
.71 (.25) 
 
.92 (.16) 
.88 (.16) 
 
.82 (.18) 
.93 (.13) 
.96 (.09) 
 
.92 (.14) 
.83 (.18) 
 
.82 (.18) 
.83 (.19) 
.86 (.19) 
 
.93 (.16) 
.86 (.19) 
 
.79 (.23) 
.90 (.09) 
1.00 (.00) 
       
Exclusion 
Control 
TLE  
 
LTLE (N =12) 
RTLE (N =7) 
BTLE (N = 4) 
 
 
.62 (.16) 
.50 (.15) 
 
.49 (.15) 
.45 (.14) 
.62 (.10) 
 
.15 (.12) 
.21 (.13) 
 
.19 (.10) 
.21 (.15) 
.24 (.19) 
 
.09 (.17) 
.16 (.14) 
 
.17 (.16) 
.14 (.11) 
.17 (.13) 
 
.22 (.23) 
.30 (.22) 
 
.35 (.25) 
.26 (.19) 
.21 (.21) 
 
.26 (.28) 
.26 (.16) 
 
.29 (.19) 
.24 (.09) 
.21 (.16) 
 
.26 (.24) 
.38 (.23) 
 
.38 (.19) 
.45 (.30) 
.29 (.21) 
Note: TLE = temporal lobe epilepsy, LTLE = left temporal lobe epilepsy, RTLE = right temporal lobe epilepsy, BTLE = 
bilateral temporal lobe epilepsy, FP 1
st
 = false positives to first presentation of new items 
 
 
4.7.2 Repeated lag item performance 
 
Performance on repeated lag items in the inclusion condition was assessed via a 2 (group) x 4 
(lag interval) repeated measures ANOVA with group as between subjects factor. Controls were 
found to have significantly better performance on these items compared to patients, F(1, 40) 
=5.80, p = .02, ηp
2 = .13. A significant effect of lag was also found, F(3, 120) =16.52, p = .001, ηp
2 
= .29, with Bonferroni post-hocs displaying that performance on lag 2 was significantly 
different to all other lags (p = .001), whereas these did not differ from one another (ps > .46). 
No interaction was found between group and lag (F < 1). Therefore, as with the word version 
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of the task, participants were less accurate in accepting the shortest interval repeated lag item 
as previously seen. The effect of group suggests that despite the ability to use familiarity alone 
to solve this part of the task, patients had difficulty in recognising faces they had recently seen. 
Another ANOVA was performed to assess laterality on these data. The effect of lag remained, 
and an effect of subgroup was also found, F(3, 114) =16.00, p = .001, ηp
2 = .30; F(1, 38) =3.24, p 
= .03, ηp
2 = .20. Bonferroni post-hoc comparison revealed unexpectedly that only the LTLE 
group differed significantly from controls (p = .005).  
The same 2 (group) x 4 (lag interval) repeated measure ANOVA was conducted on the 
proportion of FPs to exclusion lag items. No difference was found between groups in overall FP 
rates to these items, F(1, 40) = 2.14, p = .15, ηp
2 =.05. The lag effect was again significant, F(3, 
120) = 10.00, p = .001, ηp
2 =.20, with the reverse pattern of the above analysis, as this time lag 
2 repeated items had significantly lower FP rates compared to all other items (ps < .001), which 
did not differ from each other. Combined with the results above, this is indicative of a highly 
conservative response bias at the shortest lag. Group and lag did not interact with each other 
(F < 1). Analysis of laterality did not reveal an effect of subgroup or interaction with lag (Fs < 
1).Taken together then, these results show that whereas controls are more accurate in their 
recognition of repeated faces in the inclusion task, both groups made a similar amount of FPs 
in the exclusion task. As this component of the experiment is heavily reliant on recollection, 
the lack of difference between groups is interesting and suggests controls found the task 
challenging. Below we present a formal analysis of the contribution of objective and subjective 
recollection to performance. 
 
4.7.3 Objective process estimations 
 
Objective estimates of the contribution of recollection and familiarity to performance on the 
face task were computed in the same way as Experiment 4.1. These data are presented in 
Table 4.6. A 2 (group) x 2 (process) x 4 (lag interval) repeated measures ANOVA was carried out 
with group as a between subjects factor. The lag effect and lag x process interaction were 
statistically reliable, F(3, 120) = 18.14, p = .001, ηp
2 =.31; F(3, 120) = 15.17, p = .001, ηp
2 =.28, 
with all other main effects and interactions failing to reach significance (Fs < 3.44, ps > .08). 
Therefore, these process estimations are supportive of the exclusion FP data in that TLE 
patients did not show evidence of reduced recollection. The effect of lag and interaction with 
process can be explained by the relatively consistent recollection scores across intervals, whilst 
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familiarity was significantly lower in lag 2 compared to longer lags. Theoretically, this makes 
sense, as items that have just been viewed will presumably have much more chance of being 
recollected, with familiarity contributing less to the recognition process. 
Laterality subgroup analysis on the data provided the same pattern of results as above, but the 
subgroup effect reached significance, F(1, 38) = 2.99, p = .04, ηp
2 =.19. Bonferroni post-hoc did 
not display any significant differences between groups, although notably, the LTLE group 
showed the lowest overall combined recollection and familiarity estimates, with p = .05.  
 
 
 
Table 4.6 Mean (SD) recollection and familiarity process estimations from performance on 
inclusion and exclusion lag items in Experiment 4.2. 
 Recollection  Familiarity 
 Lag 2 Lag 4 Lag 8 Lag 16  Lag 2 Lag 4 Lag 8 Lag 16 
Control  .68 (.24) .68 (.30) .64 (.28) .65 (.25)  .27 (.24) .67 (.24) .63 (.33) .73 (.29) 
TLE 
 
.49 (.18) .56 (.28) .56 (.27) .47 (.23)  .30 (.20) .70 (.31) .64 (.25) .72 (.29) 
LTLE (N=12) .47 (.18) .46 (.28) .52 (.31) .41 (.19)  .30 (.22) .60 (.33) .64 (.26) .68 (.30) 
RTLE (N=7) .49 (.13) .65 (.28) .59 (.21) .44 (.25)  .27 (.16) .84 (.15) .64 (.30) .71 (.32) 
BTLE (N=4) .54 (.28) .73 (.17) .64 (.31) .69 (.20)  .37 (.26) .71 (.40) .63 (.20) .84 (.22) 
Note: TLE = temporal lobe epilepsy, LTLE = left temporal lobe epilepsy, RTLE = right temporal lobe epilepsy, BTLE = 
bilateral temporal lobe epilepsy. 
  
4.7.4 Subjective experience 
 
Data for IRK estimates of the contribution of subjective recollection and familiarity to old items 
are presented in Table 4.7. 9 Individual 2 (group) x 2 (condition) repeated measures ANOVAs 
were carried out on all four estimates. A significant effect of group was found for R hit-FP, F(1, 
40) = 6.68, p = .01, ηp
2 =.14  but no effect of condition, or interaction between condition and 
group was found, F(1, 40) = 1.93, p = .17, ηp
2 =.05; F(1, 40) = 0.01, p = .93, ηp
2 =.001.  For R IRK 
estimates, a significant effect of group was again revealed, F(1, 40) = 4.75, p = .04, ηp
2 =.11.  In 
both estimations, controls provided significantly more Remember responses than patients. In 
                                                          
9
 As with the word task, there were instances where participants’ IRK recollection estimates were 
extremely negative, skewing the initial results. Therefore, the scores represent the mean after removal 
of one control participant’s inclusion R IRK estimate and two separate patient’s R IRK scores for inclusion 
and exclusion conditions, respectively. As before, these scores were substituted with the group mean in 
ANOVA analyses in order to maximise the N in these calculations. 
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this analysis however, R IRK estimates were found to be significantly higher across all 
participants in the inclusion condition, F(1, 40) = 4.40, p = .04, ηp
2 =.10. There was no 
interaction between condition and group, however (F < 1).10  
 For the F IRK estimate, there was a trend for controls to have higher scores, but this did not 
reach significance, F(1, 40) = 3.57, p = .07, ηp
2 =.08. There was no effect of condition or 
interaction between group and condition (Fs < 1). The results for the corrected Familiar score 
were similar, except the group effect was now significant, F(1, 40) = 5.29, p = .03, ηp
2 =.12. This 
measure takes into account base rate FPs to new items, which as presented in 4.7, were 
numerically higher in patients. 
In the laterality analysis, the effect of subgroup for R hit-FPs approached significance, F(1, 38) = 
2.64, p = .06, ηp
2 =.17. Post-hocs were carried out to explore this and the LTLE group was found 
to have the lowest value compared to controls, at p = .02. No other effect or interaction was 
found (F < 1). For the R IRK, F IRK and F corrected measures, no effects or interactions were 
found (Fs < 2.21, ps > .10).  
In summary, the subjective experience data for study items presents a mixed picture. 
Recollection estimates were reliably lower in TLE patients, but familiarity estimates also 
displayed evidence of a reduction. Differences in task difficulty likely explain the disparity in 
results between them. For example, the average hit rate was considerably higher in the word 
task (TLE Mean =.79, SD =.16; Control Mean = .84, SD = .17) as compared to the face task (TLE 
Mean =.52, SD =.17; Control Mean = .65, SD = .13). The finding that the R IRK estimate was 
increased in the inclusion test despite any difference in performance between conditions, or 
reliable effect of test order, is difficult to reconcile. One potential explanation of this could be 
to do with participants’ response bias and interpretation of the contextual information they 
retrieve in recognition. In this condition, participants are making many more ‘Yes’ responses, 
which can be based on recollection or familiarity. Faces, unlike words, are complex arrays of 
features which may have a high degree of overlap. Therefore, participants in the inclusion 
condition may initially recognise a study item based on familiarity, but similarity in features 
with items just presented may lead to a feeling of recollection, subsequently followed by a 
Remember response. In the exclusion condition, where participants know they must truly 
recollect the source of the item, this interaction between familiarity for features is presumably 
                                                          
10
 Because this result may have been due to testing order, another repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted on the IRK scores with a 2 (condition) x 2 (group) x 2 (test order) structure, with group and 
test order as between subjects factors. Although R IRK estimates in the inclusion condition were 
numerically higher in both groups who completed this first, there were no significant effects or 
interactions with test order.  
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relied upon less. Although this is just a hypothesis, if it were true it would be interesting as it 
provides further suggestion that despite lower levels of subjective remembering in TLE, the 
cognitive processes driving this phenomenological experience act in a similar way to healthy 
adults. 
 
Table 4.7 Mean (SD) independence Remember-Know estimates of recollection and 
familiarity associated with old and new responses in Experiment 4.2. 
Test R Hit-FP R IRK F IRK F Corrected 
Inclusion     
Control .42 (.37) .53 (.28) .76 (.26) .62 (.30) 
TLE 
 
LTLE (N = 12) 
RTLE (N = 7) 
BTLE (N = 4) 
.23 (.30) 
 
.21 (.37) 
.23 (.24) 
.28 (.18) 
.28 (.36) 
 
.28 (.44) 
.25 (.28) 
.32 (.15) 
.67 (.25) 
 
.64 (.34) 
.72 (.20) 
.54 (.20) 
.45 (.29) 
 
.44 (.33) 
.51 (.25) 
.30 (.34) 
     
Exclusion     
Control .34 (.26) .36 (.33) .79 (.19) .64 (.28) 
TLE 
 
LTLE (N = 12) 
RTLE (N = 7) 
BTLE (N = 4) 
.16 (.28) 
 
.10 (.31) 
.14 (.23) 
.35 (.22) 
.21 (.40) 
 
.22 (.45) 
.10 (.37) 
.38 (.19) 
.68 (.22) 
 
.56 (.27) 
.77 (.28) 
.79 (.19) 
.47 (.30) 
 
.37 (.29) 
.56 (.35) 
.64 (.28) 
Note: TLE = temporal lobe epilepsy, LTLE = left temporal lobe epilepsy, RTLE = right temporal lobe epilepsy, BTLE = 
bilateral temporal lobe epilepsy, R = remember, FP = false positive, IRK = independence remember-know, F = 
familiarity. 
 
 The objective scoring methods have suggested that the TLE group utilise recollection in a 
comparable way to controls in this task. Above, there was some evidence of reduced levels of 
subjective remembering for old study items in patients. The final analysis, as with Experiment 
4.1, looked at the subjective experience associated with recognition of repeated lag items in 
the inclusion task (see Table 4.8). A 2 (group) x 2 (subjective experience) x 4 (lag interval) 
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the data. A significant group effect was found, 
F(1, 40) = 7.20, p = .01, ηp
2 =.15, resulting from the fact that patients made more guess 
responses across lags (Mean = .03, SD = .01) compared to controls, who made a negligible 
amount of these judgments (Mean < .01). Remember responses were significantly more likely 
than familiar responses, F(1, 40) = 54.57, p = .001, ηp
2 =.58 and as with the other analyses for 
the face task, there was no evidence of a statistically reliable pattern over lag intervals, as no 
effect of lag was observed (F < 1). A reliable subjective experience x group interaction was 
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found, F(1, 40) = 6.59, p = .01, ηp
2 =.14, providing supporting evidence to the IRK analysis that 
patients’ recognition of faces was accompanied by significantly lower levels of subjective 
remembering than controls. No other interactions from this analysis reached significance (Fs < 
1).  
A repeated measures ANOVA assessing laterality found a significant effect of subgroup, F(1, 
38) = 3.63, p = .02, ηp
2 =.22. Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons found no significant differences 
between groups (ps > .09), suggesting all subgroups made comparable levels of guess 
responses. The large effect of subjective experience remained, F(1, 38) = 25.50, p = .001, ηp
2 
=.40, but the interaction with group was no longer significant, F(3, 38) = 2.11, p = .12, ηp
2 =.14. 
The fact that LTLE had the lowest Remember score for one of the IRK measures for study 
items, and no difference found here, most likely reflects the increased difficulty with 
recollecting faces that were encoded before the delay in the experiment.  
 
 
 
Table 4.8 Mean (SD) proportion of subjective Remember and Familiar judgments assigned to 
repeated inclusion lag items at each interval in Experiment 4.2. 
 Remember   Familiar 
 Lag 2 Lag 4 Lag 8 Lag 16   Lag 2 Lag 4 Lag 8 Lag 16 
Control  .87 (.24) .84 (.25) .82 (.25) .86 (.20)   .13 (.24) .16 (.25) .17 (.25) .14 (.20) 
TLE 
 
.66 (.32) .60 (.31) .67 (.31) .70 (.26)   .32 (.28) .36 (.28) .31 (.31) .28 (.25) 
LTLE (N=12) .68 (.35) .62 (.30) .64 (.31) .68 (.29)   .30 (.31) .36 (.29) .33 (.32) .31 (.29) 
RTLE (N=7) .60 (.28) .68 (.30) .68 (.39) .72 (.28)   .37 (.24) .27 (.27) .29 (.38) .25 (.22) 
BTLE (N=4) .71 (.34) .39 (.34) .71 (.21) .71 (.16)   .29 (.34) .52 (.23) .29 (.20) .21 (.16) 
Note: TLE = temporal lobe epilepsy, LTLE = left temporal lobe epilepsy, RTLE = right temporal lobe epilepsy, BTLE = 
bilateral temporal lobe epilepsy. 
  
 
4.7.5 Experiment 4.2. Summary 
 
The results from the face task are much more varied than the word version of the experiment, 
and overall, provide an interesting insight into how recollection and familiarity processes may 
be utilised in different ways depending on the difficulty of a task and the materials being 
tested on. For the behavioural measures, neither hypothesis relating to performance on 
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inclusion and exclusion repeated items were supported: Controls performed significantly 
better on inclusion items and no difference was found for exclusion FPs. Moreover, the left, 
not right, temporal group performed the worst on inclusion items, but objective PDP estimates 
revealed equivalence between all groups. The results of the lag component to the task are thus 
difficult to reconcile. The significant reduction in Remember responses along with lower 
performance to inclusion items in the patient group suggests that in this variation of the task, 
recollection was required to a greater extent simply to distinguish new faces from any 
previously seen item. Whereas Jennings and Jacoby’s (1997) original formulation of how 
different patterns of processing are necessary to complete each condition may hold true for 
the verbal material, it would appear that in a task where there is a great degree of similarity or 
overlap in contextual features of items, successful inclusion performance relies more heavily 
on effortful, controlled retrieval. It is still unclear why the left temporal group performed the 
worst on these items, but did not show a corresponding impairment in Remember responses. 
Further, it is unclear why a recollection impairment would manifest in inclusion items, but 
performance would be equivalent between patients and controls on repeated exclusion items, 
which can only be rejected if one recollects the source of prior occurrence. However, these 
errors were numerically higher overall in the TLE group, and the standard deviations were 
quite large, so perhaps with a larger sample size and less heterogeneous neuropsychological 
profile in the patient group, significant differences would be found on this measure. This 
variation in performance is also likely to be the reason that no difference was found in 
objective PDP estimates. Moreover, the overall difficulty of the task may account for the fact 
that the expected increase in FPs and familiarity judgments/estimations for longer lag intervals 
were not found. 
Some concrete evidence for reduced recollection in the TLE group was borne out of the 
subjective experience process estimations for study items, however. Again, rather 
unexpectedly, the LTLE group displayed the lowest score on one of these measures. One 
suggestion for this is that the LTLE subgroup in this sample have poorer overall memory 
capacity in general than the smaller group of right temporal patients. In support of this, the 
LTLE group’s neuropsychological profile (as described in Chapter 2) did suggest these patients 
had more pervasive memory impairments, and even displayed significant impairments in one 
non-verbal measure (figure recall). Although the RTLE group showed the worst performance 
on the face version of the WRMT, the lack of lateralised impairment seen in the current 
experiment may be due to the fact the task requires the recruitment of additional brain 
structures not damaged by TLE. Nevertheless, different findings may have emerged If the 
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number of these patients was increased, and careful matching was ensured between pre- and 
post-operative subjects.  
For study items, there was also some evidence to suggest that patients had decreases in 
familiarity also. Although the hippocampus is primarily the site of pathology in MTL epilepsy, 
atrophy has been evidenced in surrounding rhinal and parahippocampal cortices in this patient 
group (e.g. Bernasconi, 2003) and resection of these extra-hippocampal areas has been 
associated with selective impairments in familiarity based processing (Bowles et al., 2007). 
Given that this task comprises recognition of multiple complex, unfamiliar facial stimuli, it is 
entirely possible that even subtle damage to these areas has caused this reduction in 
subjective familiarity. As mentioned earlier, there was no reduction found in PDP estimates of 
familiarity – however, the IRK estimates are based on responses to the items that were 
studied, and then recognised after a delay with increasing amounts of interfering information, 
whereas PDP estimates are based on performance of inclusion and exclusion items within the 
test phase. Therefore, if there were only a very subtle impairment in familiarity, one might 
predict that the IRK measure would highlight this as the subjective experience is based on an 
increasingly degraded memory trace.  
Although the results here are rather mixed and did not support all predictions, they still 
contribute to the overall aim of this chapter in its pursuit of comparing subjective and 
objective measures of recollection. For study items at least, the lower performance in the 
patient group is characterised by a consistent recollection deficit, as well as evidence of a 
reduction in familiarity. This difference in phenomenology was also apparent for repeated 
inclusion items; therefore, whenever patients were asked about their subjective experience, 
they consistently reported lower levels of remembering. Although this result did not 
necessarily correspond to the recollective behavioural measure and PDP estimates, it suggests 
that even in the face of subtle memory impairment, patients are aware of, and consciously 
experience this alteration in underlying cognitive processing.   
 
4.8 Discussion 
 
The present study set out with two broad aims. The first objective was to deploy an 
inclusion/exclusion paradigm that had not been previously conducted in TLE, to provide 
further evidence that the PDP is a viable means of detecting potentially subtle forms of 
memory impairment in this group. By incorporating the R/K procedure into this paradigm, a 
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comparison of objective process estimates and subjective experience was possible. Second, 
based on the finding in the previous chapter that the subgroup of LTLE patients in the sample 
displayed evidence of a material specific impairment, I wanted to expand my range of testing 
materials and complete another task that measured recollection with visual stimuli. This, it was 
hoped, would shed further light on any laterality differences between the groups. The findings 
related to these are outlined below, with some final concluding remarks relating to the more 
clinical aspects of the present study. 
The results of Experiment 4.1 are supportive of the four previous TLE papers that have used 
inclusion and exclusion tasks to highlight recollection deficits in this patient group (Cohn et al., 
2009; Del Vecchio et al., 2004; Hudson et al., 2009; Martin et al., 2012). Similar to these verbal 
tasks, the repetition lag procedure devised by Jennings and Jacoby (1997) was used here and 
displayed that TLE patients are more likely to use familiarity processing as a basis for 
responding. As well as confirming that this clinical sample had difficulty in drawing on 
recollection to complete the lag component of the task, it was displayed that their subjective 
experience for both study and test items were reflective of this. There was also evidence 
suggesting the LTLE group had worse performance on the behavioural measure of recollection, 
and correspondingly reduced subjective remembering. This finding is in line with the material 
specific impairments found by Hudson et al. (2009) in their PDP task, and as discussed earlier, 
provides some support for Moscovitch and McAndrews’ (2002) study that used the R/K 
paradigm in this patient group.  
Whereas the previous chapter was concerned with the assessment of the contextual detail 
available to participants during subjective remembering, the present study had more of a focus 
on participants’ awareness of the two competing processes that operate during this complex 
task. Experiment 4.1 suggests that the R/K paradigm is a useful way of accurately measuring 
participant’s conscious access to their cognitive operations; the correspondence between 
experiential states and strategic regulation in both groups implies that TLE patients are 
metacognitively aware of their reliance on familiarity during recognition of this verbal material. 
This can therefore be taken as indirect evidence to support previous work outlined in Section 
1.11.3 that has displayed intact metacognitive processing in TLE.  
Although the present results are useful theoretically, there are several important clinical 
considerations also. The opposition procedure adopted here was originally used to display age 
related differences in the contribution of these two processes; later, Jennings, Webster, 
Klaykamp, & Dagenbach (2005) drew on these findings and hypothesised that it may be 
possible to specifically target recollection in a training paradigm that encourages participants 
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to use this process. By gradually increasing the lag intervals in this task, they showed that older 
adults were increasingly able to draw on recollection to reject repeated items. Moreover, 
these benefits in recollection transferred to other memory tasks. As covered in Section 1.5.1, 
verbal memory decline is the hallmark of dominant LTLE, and post-operative function is often 
reduced further following temporal lobectomy in this group (Alpherts et al., 2006; Baxendale, 
Thompson, Harkness, & Duncan, 2006). Some attempts at cognitive rehabilitation following 
surgery have provided promising results in terms of a reduction in the manifestation of verbal 
memory decline (Helmstaedter et al., 2008) but the field of memory rehabilitation is still 
lacking in good empirical research. Therefore, there is potential value in attempting to target 
recollective processes, which are known to be reduced in TLE. The finding that subjective 
experience judgments follow the same pattern as the objective measures in this task suggests 
that the R/K paradigm may have good use in any clinical application of this procedure also.  
In terms of the diagnostic uses of this type of task, it has been shown by Tse et al. (2010) that 
exclusion errors provided greater predictive power than psychometric tests in distinguishing 
early stage Alzheimer’s disease from healthy aging. Further, as Yonelinas and Jacoby (2012) 
state in their PDP review, “Further experiments done to examine the utility for diagnosis of 
specifying qualitative differences in the bases for responding would be useful” (p. 674). 
Although the aim here was not to develop a task that was intended for diagnosis of memory 
impairment, the results certainly address these authors’ point as they go to show that there 
are measurable qualitative differences in the experiential state associated with these bases for 
responding. This appears more obvious for word stimuli, however. The relationship between 
standardised neuropsychological test performance and the various measures of recollection 
collected within the tasks in this thesis are discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
The reasons for not finding such consistent effects in Experiment 4.2 were touched upon 
above, but there are further explanations for the lack of laterality effect in RTLE, and the poor 
performance in LTLE. Although the neuroscience literature has been able to quite consistently 
display that the right temporal lobe is preferentially responsible for face processing (e.g. Kelley 
et al., 1998; Coleshill et al.,2004), the neuropsychological literature has been more mixed, with 
a number of studies failing to find significant differences between left and right TLE groups on 
face memory tasks (Carvajal, Rubio, Martín, Serrano, & García-Sola, 2009; Glogau, Ellgring, 
Elger, & Helmstaedter, 2004; Testa, Schefft, Privatera, & Yeh, 2004). Like the present study, 
Glogau et al. (2004) found similarly unexpected results, with their LTLE group performing 
worse than RTLE on one of their measures. These authors included a measure of facial 
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expression perception, and concluded that a deficit at the perception level most likely 
hindered the left temporal groups’ initial encoding and storage. Although there was not a 
uniform impairment found in the current left temporal group, the above account at least 
offers one possible explanation for the results. An alternative position is that the occasional 
poorer performance in the left temporal group is a result of functional reorganisation of the 
contralateral epileptic hemisphere; studies have shown that verbal memory can be 
preferentially ‘saved’ over more typical right hemispheric functions (Ogden, 1989; Strauss, 
Satz, & Wada, 1990).  
Other factors that may influence face memory performance are the presence of right 
hemispheric language dominance in the LTLE patients (Helmstaedter et al., 1994) and the 
presence or absence of hippocampal sclerosis in both right and left temporal groups (Bengner 
et al., 2006). Testing these explanations is much beyond the scope of this thesis, and it seems 
best to accept that on this occasion, with this task, predictions were not met. Because of the 
complexity of facial stimuli and the cited inconsistencies within the literature, the design 
employed in the present study may not be the most useful in assessing this form of memory in 
TLE. Nevertheless, there was some evidence of reduced recollection in the patient group, 
which still lies central to the overriding objective of this thesis.   
In conclusion, the present study has provided evidence of both theoretical and 
neuropsychological value. The R/K paradigm was found to be sensitive in highlighting 
impairments in objective recollection found using a repetition-lag opposition procedure in TLE. 
Patients’ experiential state therefore paralleled the underlying cognitive processing carried out 
during the task, for word stimuli at least. The results of Experiment 4.2 did not support 
hypotheses relating to laterality, but raised similar questions to other studies in the literature 
regarding the strict separation of left and right temporal lobe functions. Still, good evidence 
was found suggesting general recognition impairments were accompanied by the expected 
corresponding states of awareness. This theme is explored further in the following chapter. 
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5 Associative memory and subjective 
confidence  
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous two chapters, the relative contribution of subjectively experienced and 
objectively measured recollection and familiarity to single item recognition has been examined 
in TLE. The aim of the current chapter was to extend this in two ways. First, although the 
contextual source memory task presented in Chapter 2 touched on the importance of the 
medial temporal lobes’ importance for the binding and integrating of information, this kind of 
measurement is constrained by participants’ willingness to use the additional contextual 
information during encoding. In other words, in a person with memory impairment, the task 
load may affect the extent to which they strategically encode source information, such as the 
colour or location of an item. Another more commonly employed method of assessing 
relational forms of memory is through the use of associative recognition paradigms, as 
described in Section 1.9.2.1. 
Whereas the previous chapters incorporated the R/K procedure to make a metacognitive 
evaluation based on subjective experience, this procedure does not directly assess the 
perceived veracity, or confidence associated with a recognition response. As noted in the main 
Introduction, the difference between dual-process accounts of recognition memory and single 
trace theories is that the latter assume recognition arises from a single memory process, with 
remembering and knowing (or familiarity) arising due to differing levels of memory strength 
along a continuum (e.g. Donaldson, 1996). It is not the aim of this chapter to attempt to 
resolve any broader theoretical issues regarding the validity of either account; as discussed, I 
specifically take a dual-process approach in this thesis. However, confidence in recognition 
memory can also be examined outside of the complexities of this long-standing debate and 
contextualised within a metacognitive framework. Therefore, given the expected impairments 
in the TLE sample presented in this thesis, the primary aim of the current experiment was to 
assess monitoring, or awareness of memory through subjective confidence judgments. This 
was achieved by using the associative recognition developed by Cohn et al. (2007, 2008, 2009).  
By integrating a more typical metacognitive measure such as confidence ratings within a task 
able to delineate recollection and familiarity processes, I hoped to provide a novel theoretical 
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contribution to the TLE literature. A secondary aim was to replicate the results provided by 
Cohn et al. (2009) in their study with TLE patients. Below I present a summary of the relevant 
research before moving onto specific hypotheses and the experiment 
As covered in Section 1.8.5.1, a number of recent dual-process models use a comparison of 
evidence from single item and associative memory studies in their conceptualisation of the 
role of the MTL in the integration of different sources of information. Along these lines, Cohn 
and Moscovitch (2007) and Cohn et al. (2008)  compared single item recognition with different 
types of associative memory in an effort to delineate the extent to which performance relied 
on processes occurring during binding at encoding or strategic retrieval. Associative 
identification, which is the typical measure assessed in similar studies, reflects a participant’s 
discrimination ability in rejecting rearranged study words in a pair and endorsing intact studied 
pairs; familiarity with the two previously studied items will not offer enough information to 
differentiate intact from rearranged pairs. To do this, mental time travel is needed, which 
permits retrieval of the association between items. In this sense, the use of recollection to 
overcome familiar items to retrieve specifics from encoding parallels the processes needed in 
resolving targets from repeating foils in the Experiment presented in Chapter 3. Conversely, 
associative reinstatement is measured in a separate pair recognition test that simply requires 
an ‘old’ response to any combination of old studied items (therefore, familiarity is sufficient to 
correctly accept any pair). The reinstatement measure is expressed as the increase in 
performance associated with recognition of intact pairs, as compared to rearranged pairs. It 
therefore provides a measure of binding ability. Item memory is also calculated from this task 
using hits and base rate FPs. As discussed in the Method section below, recollection and 
familiarity estimates can be computed by using recognition scores from both tasks in a variant 
of the PDP. 
 Cohn et al’s first paper displayed that associative identification and associative reinstatement 
are dissociable from item memory and also from one another, and suggested that whereas 
associative identification relies heavily on recollection based strategic recall-to-reject 
processes, associative reinstatement is characterised more by associative familiarity (Cohn & 
Moscovitch, 2007). Their second paper demonstrated that older adults were impaired on 
associative identification and recall-to-reject measures, but not on associative reinstatement. 
Thus, associative memory impairments in this population were described as arising from 
retrieval processes where recollection was necessary, and not due to problems in initial 
associative binding (Cohn et al., 2008). Pertinent to the current experiment however, is the 
third paper using this task with a group of post-operative temporal lobectomy patients (Cohn 
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et al., 2009). In this paper, the authors found pervasive impairments in all associative 
measures, and found item familiarity to be deficient in their dominant TLE group, providing 
evidence of a material specific impairment in this verbal material. The main conclusion drawn 
from these findings was that the impairment in associative reinstatement provides evidence 
that the MTL is bilaterally involved in the relational binding of information, whereas 
recognition that does not involve relational binding involves unilateral MTL areas. Moreover, 
associative identification, which is dependent on strategic retrieval operations, relies not just 
on the MTL, but a network also involving the prefrontal cortex. These data were obtained with 
a group of patients who had undergone almost complete resection of the MTL, thus adding to 
this literature which has already examined healthy adults, amnesic individuals and older 
adults. One of the aims of the present experiment was therefore to examine these relational 
and item memory measures in a more presumably representative sample of TLE patients. As 
discussed below, this was achieved by using an almost identical task to that of Cohn et al. 
(2009). 
The main motivation for the present experiment was to provide a novel contribution to the TLE 
literature by assessing metacognitive monitoring of recognition memory in this patient group. 
As covered in Section 1.11.3, the handful of recent studies that have assessed metacognition in 
a laboratory setting in TLE have found no evidence for impairments in experimental tasks 
(Andres et al., 2010; Howard et al., 2010). Moreover, these studies found intact monitoring 
and control in patients despite clear evidence of impaired verbal episodic recall and 
recognition memory. Hence, although patients had poor memory, they were aware of this, and 
appropriately updated memory predictions. However, the two studies by Andres et al. (2010) 
and Howard et al. (2010) used only JOL and FOK ratings for short single item word lists. 
Subjective confidence has not been assessed as a metacognitive measure in TLE. Although 
previous evidence thus far suggests that TLE patients have marked memory impairments but 
intact metacognitive accuracy, it would be useful to assess confidence in the context of a more 
demanding relational memory paradigm that requires monitoring the output of a number of 
cognitive processes.  
More precisely, the main interest here was to compare recognition confidence between item 
types that relied more, or less, on recollection and familiarity. For example, correct recognition 
of intact pairs in pair and associative identification tasks is reliant on the contribution of 
recollection and familiarity, whilst in the associative identification task, correct responses to 
rearranged items require the more strategic recall-to-reject recollective like process, whereas 
familiarity alone is sufficient for correct recognition of these in the pair task. I was interested 
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to explore this from a metacognitive perspective; perhaps errors are made on this pair type 
because the increased familiarity for two previously studied items leads to a corresponding 
increase in subjective confidence, which the participant then acts on and subsequently makes 
an incorrect response. If this were true, we might expect people with TLE to have higher 
confidence judgments than controls for errors to rearranged pairs in an associative 
identification task. Although this pair type seemed critical to test a metacognitive account, a 
more general interest was in patients’ sensitivity to task demands and how accurate their 
confidence was; i.e. whether their confidence would show a normal pattern whereby incorrect 
responses are assigned lower confidence than correct responses. 
 
5.2 Method 
 
5.2.1 Participants 
 
Patients 7 and 27 did not complete the experiment. All other patients described in Chapter 2 
participated but data for patient 12 was removed due to a system failure during testing. 
Additionally, data was also removed for one control participant as close inspection of his data 
revealed a lack of understanding of task instructions – this was evident as he consistently 
made false alarms to rearranged pairs in the associative identification task but his base rate 
level of false alarms to new items was comparable to the group average. Thus, data below are 
presented for 23 TLE patients and 18 healthy controls. 
 
5.2.2 Materials 
 
The experiment was based on the procedure used by Cohn et al. (2009). Two lists of 96 word 
pairs were created; one using 7 letter nouns, the other 6 letter nouns. These were then divided 
into 16 lists of 12 semantically unrelated word pairs, with the 7 letter words always forming 
the cue of the pair. Word frequency was obtained by using SUBTlex (Brysbaert & New, 2009) 
and imageability values were obtained from the MRC psycholinguistic database (Coltheart, 
1981b). Cue frequency did not differ significantly between lists F(15,165) = .04, p = 1.00; nor 
did target frequency, F(15,165) = .08, p = .994. Frequency values ranged from 0.22 – 240.94 
words per million, with a mean value of 26.26 for cue words (SD = 44.34) and 27.06 (SD = 
35.14) for targets. Cue imageability was also matched well across lists, F(15,165) = 1.48, p = 
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.19, as was target imageability, F(15,165) = 1.34, p = .25. Imageability values ranged from 258-
639, with a mean value of 489.32 (SD = 91.18) for cue words and 510.96 (SD = 90.33) for 
targets. A paired samples t-test found this difference to be significant, t(191) = 2.27, p = .03, 
hence targets were more imageable than cues. 
The lists were rotated to create 8 versions of the experiment which were counterbalanced 
across participants, as were the two different test types (pair and associative recognition task, 
explained below). Participants studied 120 word pairs (10 lists), as well as three buffer pairs at 
the beginning and end of presentation. At test they viewed four different types of word pairs: 
24 were intact pairs, consisting of the old studied pairs; 24 were rearranged pairs, consisting of 
studied pairs rearranged to form new pairs with cues always being a 7 letter word and targets 
6 letters; 24 were half-old pairs, consisting of the cue from 12 old studied pairs being joined 
with 12 new targets and 12 old studied targets being paired with 12 new cues; the final 24 
pairs were new pairs, consisting of completely new cue-target pairings. Therefore, participants 
viewed 96 critical test pairs, which were presented in a randomised order. E-prime software 
was used for stimuli presentation and data collection. Table 5.1 provides examples of study 
items and the different pairings described above. 
 
 
Table 5.1 Example of stimuli presentation/construction in the associative recognition tasks. 
 Cue Target 
Study pair 1 Holiday Flower 
Study pair 2 Fortune Record 
 
Test 
  
Intact Holiday Flower 
Rearranged Fortune Flower 
Half-old Holiday Saucer 
New Mineral  Letter 
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5.2.3 Procedure 
 
During the study phase, participants were instructed that they were about to be presented 
with a large number of word pairs, and will be given 5 seconds to study each one, before 
having to generate a sentence using the two words. They were instructed that there were two 
rules they should try and follow when creating each sentence. Firstly, they must always use the 
two words in the order that they appeared; second, they should try their best to use the word 
in the form it appeared in. The experimenter explained that for example, if one of the words 
was ‘bank’, they should avoid using words such as ‘banked’ or ‘banking’. However, participants 
were told that if they could only think of a sentence using an alternative ending then they 
should still provide this as an answer as the aim of the sentence generation was to aid 
encoding. In this respect, the study procedure was slightly different to that used by Cohn et al. 
(2009), who required the maintenance of the singular form of each word at all times. Each 
participant completed two practice sentences and the experimenter clarified understanding of 
the procedure. Participants then viewed the word pairs at a rate of one every 5 seconds, with a 
fixation cross appearing subsequently. Participants were free to generate a sentence whilst 
words were onscreen if they wished. Whilst the fixation was onscreen, the experimenter keyed 
a response to indicate whether the participant successfully generated a sentence. If a 
reasonable delay had elapsed indicating difficulty with the sentence, or if the participant 
stated they could not make a sentence, a key was pressed to move onto the next pair. One-
way ANOVA revealed that the mean proportion of pairs successfully formed into sentences did 
not differ between patients (M = .79, SD = 0.17) and controls (M = .80, SD = 0.15); F (1, 40) = 
0.09, p = .76. The average length of the study phase trended toward significance between 
patients (M = 25.13 minutes, SD = 7.80) and controls (M = 21.00 minutes, SD = 5.51); F (1, 40) = 
3.62, p = .06. In Cohn et al.’s (2009) original article, there were clear significant differences in 
encoding time between patients and controls; therefore, whilst it is acknowledged that on 
average there was more of a delay between patients initial encoding and test, this was 
generally better matched in the present study. 
The test phase followed immediately after encoding and participants were instructed that they 
were about to be tested for the word pairs in two different ways. Thus, each participant was 
given the pair and associative recognition tests in counterbalanced order. Examples of both 
tests were explained using the practice items from the study phase. In the pair recognition 
task, they were told that they were to respond ‘yes’ to pairs of words that contained any two 
study items (old and rearranged pairs), regardless of whether they were paired together 
originally. Alternatively, they were told to respond ‘no’ whenever a pair was comprised of at 
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least one new word (new and half-old pairs). In the associative identification test, participants 
were told to only respond ‘yes’ when the two words on screen formed the original studied 
pairing (old pairs) and respond ‘no’ to any other pair (half-old, rearranged and new pairs)11. 
Yes/No responses were recorded using the ‘v’ and ‘m’ keys, with the participant choosing the 
most comfortable way of depressing these. The keys were counterbalanced across 
participants, however. The novel addition to this paradigm was to ask participants how 
confident they were in their given answer. Therefore, during the instructions, participants 
were told that following their Yes/No decision, a screen would appear asking them “How 
confident are you that your answer is correct?” Confidence responses were on a five point 
scale of 0, 20, 40, 60, 80 and 100%. Keys d-k were used for these responses, with d always 
being 0% and k always 100%.  
 
5.3 Results 
 
The results for the recognition measures derived from each task are presented first, followed 
by an assessment of the confidence judgments assigned to each item type. As discussed 
earlier, the main focus was to assess overall group differences between the TLE and control 
groups; therefore, analyses of the laterality subgroups are presented at the end of each 
section. Alpha was set at p < .05 two-tailed unless otherwise stated. 
 
5.3.1 Objective memory performance 
 
The proportion of “old” responses to the four pair types (new, half-old, rearranged and intact) 
for the pair and associative identification tasks are presented in Table 5.2. In the pair task, 
“old” responses to rearranged pairs represent hits; in the associative identification task they 
represent FPs. These scores were used to calculate d’ values, correcting FPs of 0 to 0.02 and hit 
rates of 1 to 0.98.  Item memory was calculated using hits to rearranged pairs and FPs to new 
pairs in the pair recognition task; associative reinstatement was calculated for the pair task by 
                                                          
11
 As discussed in Section 1.7.3.1, PDP estimations are confounded when participants fail to respond as 
instructed under different test conditions. There were some occasions where participants did not 
initially understand the instructions and in these cases, the experimenter repeatedly went through them 
until satisfied they understood. Additionally, the experimenter asked participants to justify why they had 
made recognition decisions for the first few items of each test to be fully sure this was the case. A 
qualitative look over all the data revealed that, as mentioned in Section 5.1.1, only one control clearly 
appeared to have misunderstood. 
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subtracting the item memory d’-score from the d’-score derived from the proportion of old 
responses to intact and new pairs; associative identification was calculated using hits to intact 
pairs and FPs to rearranged pairs in the associative identification task. Estimates of recollection 
and familiarity were computed following Cohn et al. (2009), using a variant of the PDP (Jacoby, 
1991; Yonelinas et al., 1995). 
 
 
Table 5.2 Mean (SD) Proportion of ‘Old’ responses to each Item type in pair and associative 
identification tasks. 
 Pair recognition task  Associative recognition task 
Group New Half-Old Rearranged Intact  New Half-Old Rearranged Intact 
Control .07(.09) .23(.15) .60(.20) .82(.18)  .01(.02) .06(.10) .14(.12) .76(.19) 
TLE  .15(.17) .39(.19) .59(.19) .75(.21)  .10(.20) .16(.21) .30(.22) .72(.20) 
          
LTLE  .19(.23) .43(.19) .57(.19) .73(.25)  .17(.29) .18(.22) .37(.19) .71(.20) 
RTLE .17(.12) .45(.19) .67(.18) .81(.16)  .08(.08) .22(.26) .36(.25) .77(.21) 
BTLE .08(.09) .23(.06) .53(.18) .68(.22)  .03(.04) .06(.05) .13(.12) .63(.21) 
Note: TLE = temporal lobe epilepsy, LTLE = left temporal lobe epilepsy, RTLE = right temporal lobe epilepsy, BTLE = 
bilateral temporal lobe epilepsy. N = 10 for LTLE, 8 for RTLE, 5 for BTLE; control N = 18. 
 
As Figure 5.1 shows, the TLE group as a whole scored lower than controls on all of the above 
measures. This difference was however, not reliable for item memory, t(39) = 1.58, p = .12, d = 
0.50  but differed significantly for associative identification, t(39) =3.13, p = .003, d = 1.00 and 
associative reinstatement, t(39) = 2.09, p = .04, d = 0.67. The control group was compared to 
LTLE, RTLE and BTLE with one-way ANOVAs. A main effect was not found for the item memory 
or associative reinstatement measures, F(3, 41) = 0.87, p = .46, η2 = .06; F(3, 41) = 1.78, p = .17, 
η2 = .12, respectively. Associative identification differed significantly across the groups, F(3, 41) 
= 2.90, p = .05, η2 = .19; Bonferroni post-hoc (corrected to p < .012 for multiple comparisons) 
failed to display a significant difference between the LTLE group and controls’ scores (M 
difference = 1.01, p = .06).  
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Figure 5.1 Mean item memory, associative identification and associative reinstatement in 
patient and control group with standard error. 
 
The recollection estimate, displayed in Panel A of Figure 5.2, revealed a trend toward 
significance between the TLE group and controls, t(39) = 1.82, p = .08, d = 0.58. There was no 
difference found when comparing controls and the three TLE subgroups, F(3, 40) = 1.58, p = 
.21, η2 = .11. Item familiarity, as expressed as d’ (Panel B; Figure 5.2) was entirely comparable 
between TLE and controls, t(39) = 0.55, p = .59, d = 0.18.  
To examine relational binding further, hit rates to intact pairs (recall-to-accept) and FPs to 
rearranged pairs (recall-to-reject) were analysed on the associative identification task, as in 
Table 5.2. The TLE group as a whole were found to have significantly higher FPs to rearranged 
pairs compared to controls, t(36.11) = 3.34, p = .002, d = 1.11 but did not differ in hit rates to 
intact pairs, t(39) =0.84, p = .83, d = 0.27. Therefore, patients appear to be able to successfully 
utilise recall-to-accept retrieval strategies, and have an impaired ability to recall-to-reject. 
Moreover, a laterality analysis revealed a group difference, F(3, 41) = 4.45, p = .009, η2 = .26, 
with Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons displaying no difference between the three patient 
groups (ps > .16), but the means suggested the greatest difference lay between the LTLE and 
control group (M difference = 0.21, p = .04).  
Therefore, at the group level, TLE patients did not display difficulty in single item recognition, 
but on the measures assessing relational binding operations there was evidence of 
impairments. These results are generally in line with Cohn et al. (2009), who found 
impairments in relational binding in their TLE group. They also found clearer evidence of 
recollection impairments, but notably, the sample included post-operative patients who would 
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have had more widespread hippocampal pathology. Unlike them, however, the current sample 
was not impaired in item memory, or familiarity (where dominant TLE patients were impaired 
relative to controls). This again is likely due to differences in patient samples. Nevertheless, the 
convergent results provide further evidence for the role of the MTL in relational binding.  
 
 
         Figure 5.2 Mean recollection (Panel A) and familiarity (Panel B) estimates. 
  
 
5.3.2 Confidence 
 
The novel contribution of the present experiment was to measure subjective confidence 
associated with the different response types across the pair and associative recognition tasks. 
Table 5.3 is segregated into the mean confidence with which people believed their answers 
were correct for each pair type overall (metacognitive accuracy) and for correct answers (CRs 
and hits) and incorrect answers (FPs and misses) (metacognitive sensitivity). In the pair task, 
‘rearranged correct’ corresponds to pairs that were correctly responded as “old”, whereas in 
the associative identification task this refers to pairs that were correctly rejected. Similarly, 
‘incorrect’ in the pair task refers to pairs that were not recognised, and in the associative 
identification task refers to pairs that were incorrectly endorsed as being intact.
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Table 5.3 Mean (SD) percentage confidence assigned to answers for each pair and response type overall (Sensitivity) and by correct/incorrect (Accuracy). 
                               
Note: CR = correct rejection, FP = false positive, AI = associative identification, TLE = temporal lobe epilepsy. Shaded columns represent confidence assigned to items critical for calculation of 
objective relational memory measures. 
 Metacognitive Sensitivity  Metacognitive Accuracy 
Group New 
Overall 
Half-Old 
Overall 
Rearranged  
Overall 
Intact 
Overall 
 New CR New FP Half-Old 
CR 
Half-Old 
FP 
Rearranged 
Correct 
Rearranged 
Incorrect 
Intact 
Hits 
Intact 
Misses 
Pair task              
Control 
M 
SD 
 
83.01 
13.31 
 
77.04 
15.03 
 
80.79 
13.97 
 
88.66 
9.47 
  
84.00 
13.07 
 
63.63 
23.09 
 
77.09 
15.05 
 
75.39 
17.43 
 
82.03 
14.60 
 
74.53 
17.36 
 
91.59 
8.84 
 
72.12 
20.73 
TLE 
M 
SD 
 
71.12 
18.24 
 
69.78 
14.14 
 
70.94 
14.51 
 
80.04 
13.81 
  
71.21 
19.02 
 
62.09 
24.26 
 
68.99 
14.87 
 
68.86 
16.10 
 
74.37 
16.28 
 
61.05 
17.02 
 
82.41 
14.97 
 
61.40 
21.67 
              
AI task              
Control 
M 
SD 
 
90.69 
10.71 
 
89.49 
11.57 
 
84.44 
12.38 
 
89.12 
9.02 
  
90.91 
10.75 
 
70.00 
25.82 
 
89.49 
11.27 
 
80.76 
23.94 
 
85.66 
11.82 
 
75.16 
22.06 
 
92.49 
7.59 
 
73.47 
16.82 
TLE 
M 
SD 
 
74.27 
19.01 
 
73.58 
18.37 
 
72.81 
16.76 
 
79.93 
14.67 
  
74.30 
19.67 
 
60.13 
24.82 
 
74.24 
18.72 
 
60.42 
18.76 
 
72.67 
17.44 
 
69.03 
19.69 
 
82.59 
15.07 
 
65.60 
21.75 
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5.3.2.1 Sensitivity – does confidence shift according to materials and task? 
 
The first point of interest was to assess overall confidence to see if this measure was sensitive 
to the difficulty of the different pair types across the two tasks. Thus, a 2 (group) x 4 (pair type) 
x 2 (task) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with group as a between-subjects factor 
and task and pair type as within-subjects factors. Confidence was reliably higher overall in the 
control group, F(1, 39) = 6.25, p = .02, ηp
2 =.14, and there was a main effect of pair type, F(3, 
117) = 13.82, p = .001, ηp
2 =.26 with post-hoc comparisons confirming this was in the expected 
direction such that intact items were assigned significantly higher confident responses (ps < 
.02) than the other pair types, which did not differ from each other (ps > .36). There was no 
interaction between group and pair type, F(3, 117) = 0.81, p = .49, ηp
2 =.02. There was no main 
effect of task, F(1, 39) = 1.28, p = .26, ηp
2 =.03.  Given that the instructions were identical for 
the two tasks for three of the pair types, this is not surprising.   However, pair type did 
significantly interact with task, F(3, 117) = 6.11, p = .001, ηp
2 =.14. The means suggest this is 
predominantly a result of confidence being much higher for half-old pairs in the associative 
identification task and to a lesser extent new pairs , where as confidence for rearranged and 
intact pairs appears more comparable between the two tasks. Given that the associative 
identification task only requires an ‘old’ response when the initial bound relationship is 
retrieved between two words, it is unsurprising that confidence is higher for half-old pairs. 
There was no interaction between group and task, F(1, 39) = 0.001, p = .99, ηp
2 =.001, or 
between group, pair type and task, F(3, 117) = 1.33, p = .27, ηp
2 =.03. The same analysis was 
rerun looking at laterality and following a significant group effect, post-hocs showed no 
difference between the TLE subgroups (ps >.08), but a highly significant difference between 
LTLE and controls (p = .003). There was no interaction between subgroup and other variables 
(Fs < 1.06) suggesting a uniform decrease in confidence in the LTLE patients. 
In sum, the ANOVA shows that the TLE group are significantly less confident overall, which is 
best explained by low confidence in the subgroup of LTLE patients. The fact that there are no 
significant interactions with group suggests that patients respond no differently in their 
judgements for the different tasks and materials than controls.  In short, their judgements are 
sensitive to the difficulty of the task they have been presented and moreover, the group effect 
suggests they are sensitive to their own memory difficulties.  
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5.3.2.2 Metacognitive accuracy – is confidence different for incorrect and correct answers? 
 
Metacognitive accuracy within the current experiment is viewed as a participant’s ability to 
adjust their confidence levels according to response types (i.e. correct and incorrect answers). 
Metacognitive accuracy was first assessed with a 2 (group) x 2 (task) x 4 (pair type) x 2 
(response type) repeated measures ANOVA. However, due to a number of participants not 
making any FPs on certain pair types, this left a data set with only one control participant and 
14 TLE patients. Therefore, the analyses were conducted separately on the pair types critical 
for calculating the recognition scores above; the rearranged and intact pairings (shaded box in 
Table 5.3). Hence, there were 21 TLE patients and 11 low performing controls12 in a 2 (group) x 
2 (task) x 2 (pair type) x 2 (response type) repeated measures ANOVA, with group as a 
between subjects factor. With this sub-sample, no significant effect of group was found, F(1, 
30) = 2.01, p = .17, ηp
2 = .06. This may simply be due to the fact that lower confidence is 
assigned to FPs.  Indeed, t-tests displayed there to be no significant difference in confidence to 
correct pairs across tasks between the better, and worse, performing controls (ps > .11). As 
expected, there was a highly significant main effect of response type, F(1, 29) = 37.39, p = .001, 
ηp
2 = .55, such that correct rearranged and intact pairs were assigned higher confidence than 
incorrect pairs. This suggests that even the worse performing participants on both tasks are 
metacognitively competent – they are able to accurately assign higher confidence to correct 
answers and significantly shift their confidence downward to incorrect answers.  There was no 
effect of task, F(1, 30) = 1.87, p = .18, ηp
2 = .06,indicating that the different instructions did not 
influence the way confidence was assigned to these critical pair types. There was also no main 
effect of pair type in this analysis, F(1, 30) = 3.26, p = .08, ηp
2 = .10, compared to above where 
overall confidence was higher for intact pairs as compared to rearranged pairs.  
Critically, no significant interaction was found between group and any of the variables (Fs < 
2.18, ps < .15), suggesting that TLE patients and this group of controls’ pattern of confidence 
responses were highly comparable across tasks, materials and for both correct and incorrect 
                                                          
12
Because this subgroup comprised participants making FPs to both pair types, performance on the critical memory 
measures was checked. In contrast to the whole sample analysis, no significant group differences were found 
between patients and control subgroups, therefore they were the worst performing control participants. As the 
LTLE patients appeared to perform worse overall, I also compared these 10 patients with the 11 controls. A 
significant difference was found in associative identification (t=2.24, p=.04) but no other measures – the LTLE group 
performed worse than the lowest performing controls. Additionally, t-tests were conducted between these 11 low 
performing controls and the other 7 higher performing controls on the memory measures and significant 
differences were found in the proportion of rearranged FPs in the AI task, associative identification and recollection, 
but not in proportion of intact hits in the AI task, associative reinstatement, item memory or familiarity. There were 
no significant differences found in confidence levels between these control subgroups for correct items on the 
critical pairings. 
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answers. The only significant interaction found was between pair type and response type, F(1, 
30) = 14.84, p = .001, ηp
2 = .33. This result is interesting because even though there was no 
main effect of pair type, the interaction suggests that the decrease in confidence between 
correct and incorrect items for the rearranged pairs (marginal means: correct = 77.19; 
incorrect = 67.81) was less than that for intact pairs (marginal means; correct = 86.31; 
incorrect = 67.16), with incorrect items being assigned almost equivalent confidence levels. 
This is in spite of the fact that incorrect responses in the pair task represent misses and in the 
associative recognition task represent FPs. The interaction is in line with performance: 
confidence is higher for correct answers in intact pairs than rearranged pairs13. 
The experiment set out with the aim of examining whether a metacognitive failure might be 
behind the false positive errors in the associative identification task which characterise the 
poor performance in the TLE group (Cohn et al., 2009).  This study has replicated the same 
associative deficit in TLE patients, and has found that they are overall less confident than 
controls (although have a similar level of confidence to poorly performing controls).  
Nonetheless, the TLE group assign confidence in line with different types of task and materials 
in the same way as controls and have significantly higher confidence for correct answers than 
incorrect answers.  The acid test of the main hypothesis comes in looking at the errors on the 
rearranged pairs on the associative identification task.  Errors on this task characterise the TLE 
associative deficit, where the participants need to recall-to-reject.  A metacognitive account of 
this error would be that the participants are over confident for these particular items, given 
that they are endorsed as old when they are not (in keeping with highly familiar items being 
mis-recognised as an old item from a particular context).  To examine this I looked specifically 
at the confidence level for these errors.  The mean confidence level for control FPs in this task 
(75.16%, SD = 22.06) and for TLE patients (69.03%, SD = 19.69) did not differ significantly, t(35) 
= 0.89, p = .38, d = 0.30 and no difference was found in an analysis of laterality subgroups 
either, F(3, 36) = 0.29, p = .84.  In sum, there is no evidence for metacognitive failure in this TLE 
group, even on a task which pinpoints their memory difficulties and even on the particular 
errors which characterise their deficit. 
  
 
 
                                                          
13
 Confidence was also assessed for correct and incorrect rearranged and intact items from the associative 
recognition task (as these are the measures used to calculate associative identification) - no difference was found 
between LTLE and the control subgroup. Hence, performance was impaired but confidence was still assigned in a 
comparable way.  
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5.4 Discussion 
 
There were two main aims of the present experiment. First, the novel contribution was to 
assess associative memory and recollection impairments in TLE from a metacognitive 
perspective; it was found that despite impaired associative and relational memory abilities, 
confidence is assigned in a highly comparable manner between patients and controls for 
recognition responses that require differing use of recollection and familiarity. The second aim 
was to replicate previous findings by Cohn et al. (2009); using an identical task, associative 
identification and reinstatement were impaired in a more representative sample of TLE 
patients not comprised solely of individuals with extensive medial temporal resections.  
Results from the present study and those from similar research discussed in Section 1.10.3 
undoubtedly suggest that the processes of recollection and familiarity are used during 
associative recognition. However, by following this line of enquiry, it is all too easy to forget 
that participants are not simply passive learners of information, with these underlying 
cognitive mechanisms acting without one’s own volition. Instead, when completing the 
present experiment, or any other recognition task, a participant is using a variety of 
metacognitive processes and strategies. Although the studies discussed in 1.9.3 have 
suggested that TLE patients are able to accurately use memory monitoring in experimental 
tasks, and subsequently control further study, to date no studies have assessed confidence in 
recognition decisions. Subjective confidence is a potent metacognitive variable in learning, and 
I wished to explore whether differences in memory ability would be accompanied by any 
changes in confidence to answers in TLE. Furthermore, although memory performance, 
subjective states of awareness and confidence have been shown not to be isomorphic with 
one another (Rajaram, Hamilton, & Bolton, 2002; Wells, Olson, & Charman, 2002), the fact that 
subjective confidence associated with recognition has been linked to target familiarity 
(Yonelinas, 1994) and the vividness of recollected details (Robinson, Johnson, & Robertson, 
2000) suggested this was a useful line of enquiry for the literature given the known 
impairments in these processes in TLE. Essentially, the present findings suggested that the TLE 
group were metacognitively intact. The measure of metacognitive sensitivity displayed that 
patients were overall less confident in their recognition responses, and this was more so for 
the LTLE group, hence paralleling the recognition memory scores. Furthermore, the 
comparison of confidence for correct and incorrect answers yielded a consistent pattern 
suggesting that despite their memory impairments, TLE patients accurately assign lower 
5-127 
 
 
 
confidence to incorrect items, and increase confidence accordingly for intact items. Therefore, 
the critical error driving their low performance (i.e. making FPs after failing to recall-to-reject) 
is not a result of making an erroneous highly confident recognition response following 
subjective familiarity of two old items. Instead, as discussed above and as Cohn et al. (2009) 
suggest, these errors are driven by an impairment in the ability to use recollective based 
strategic retrieval to recall the initial sentence that was encoded. The results are therefore 
supportive that this clinical group are able to accurately monitor the contents of their memory. 
The current data are compatible with the two most recent empirical studies assessing 
metacognition in TLE. Howard et al. (2010) and Andres et al. (2010) demonstrated intact 
metacognitive accuracy in this group through equivalent gamma correlations in JOL and FOK 
predictions, and intact monitoring and control through comparable adjustment in judgments 
and study time according to item difficulty. My results build on these findings well, as patients 
were displayed to be metacognitively sensitive to different task instructions and difficulty of 
items within a paradigm that is arguably much more taxing than single item recall and 
recognition. Whereas the results provide evidence in support of the argument that fronto-
temporal memory retrieval is impaired in this group, the accurate monitoring displayed 
suggests that any frontally mediated executive component to metacognition is left intact.   
 
An influential model of how people make predictions about their memory was proposed by 
Koriat (1997) that bares relevance here. He suggests that metacognitive judgments are made 
on the assessment of intrinsic cues (e.g. assessment of item difficulty), extrinsic cues (e.g. 
assessment of encoding conditions) and mnemonic cues (e.g. subjective experience associated 
with ease-of-processing). In the present task, it would seem that patients are reliant on the 
same kind of cues to make metacognitive assessments about accuracy as controls in spite of 
memory difficulties; they are accurate in judging which items are more difficult (an intrinsic 
cue), which items were encoded more successfully as sentences (an extrinsic cue) and make 
confidence judgments based on their current subjective experience of the qualitative 
information available in a comparable way to controls (a mnemonic cue). 
 
Certain inconsistencies still remain within the TLE metacognitive literature, however. For 
example, Prevey et al. (1988) found some evidence for overestimation in memory ability in 
TLE, and Andres et al. (2010) found a tendency for patients to actually have more accurate 
post-study global JOLs than controls. Additionally, other questionnaire based studies have 
typically revealed underestimations in memory ability in TLE (Banõs et al., 2004; Elixhauser et 
al., 1999; Gallassi et al., 1988; Giovagnoli et al., 1997; O’Shea et al., 1996; Vermeulen et al., 
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1993). Therefore, it would seem that methodological differences in the literature provide 
contrasting results. As Andres et al. (2010) discuss, the real problem in this area appears not to 
be that patients have difficulty in the ‘online’ monitoring and control of their performance on 
laboratory episodic memory tasks. Rather, as discussed in Section 1.6, the real issue is the 
discrepancy found between patients self-perceived level of day-to-day memory functioning 
and their performance on standardised neuropsychological tests, which are used for diagnostic 
purposes. It is more likely that these kinds of discrepancies are what have led to the suggestion 
that metacognitive failures may drive memory impairments in this clinical group. These clinical 
issues are covered in the following two chapters, where I present the data from a self-report 
everyday metamemory questionnaire in this patient sample and examine the results in the 
context of a more ‘real world’ memory task. I then go on to comprehensively investigate the 
factors that may influence self-perceived memory function, by looking to see if there is any 
relationship between this, and the impairments in recollective ability displayed across the 
tasks already presented in this thesis.  
 
These results thus provide an important theoretical contribution to the TLE literature. 
However, there are some limitations. For example, it has been concluded that the 
metacognitive accuracy of patients is comparable to controls due to the observation of a 
trajectory where low confidence is associated with incorrect answers and subsequently 
increases for item types that achieved greater recognition performance. There is an extant 
literature on the confidence accuracy (CA) relationship, and a more typical measure is to 
assess the correlation between differing levels of confidence and accuracy using the non-
parametric gamma statistic (see Mengelkamp & Bannert, 2010, for a discussion). This type of 
analysis is able to provide a within, as well as between-subjects CA relationship measure, 
which would be useful in further exploring metacognitive monitoring in TLE. This was in fact 
attempted, but there were an insufficient number of data points for the six confidence levels 
for certain item types (for example, intact pairs were characterised by extremely high levels of 
confidence in both groups). A future study may wish to examine this in a more simplified 
paradigm. Additionally, although the measure of sensitivity suggested participants were 
accurate in adjusting confidence to the difficulty of each item type within and between tasks, 
another useful extension of this would be to investigate exactly how patients and controls use 
subjective confidence. For example, Hines, Touron, and Hertzog (2009) displayed subjective 
confidence judgments to be an important heuristic for guiding subsequent study time 
allocation – a measure of metacognitive control. Another interesting avenue to explore would 
be to see whether feedback regarding the relationship between people’s confidence and 
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accuracy would influence subsequent recognition decisions. Specifically, if participants are 
informed that low confidence associated with answers in this paradigm are indicative of an 
incorrect response, would this subsequently aid their sensitivity and lead to reassessments of 
their memory? Although the present results have effectively dispatched the idea that memory 
errors are a result of a metacognitive failure in TLE, it is evident that metacognitive influences 
to recognition memory are still a useful line of enquiry. Indeed, a recent paper by Lloyd (2007) 
advocated consideration of the metacognitive ‘distinctiveness heuristic’, as well as recollection 
and familiarity, when assessing people’s recall-to-reject strategies. 
 
Overall, the results of the recognition memory measures provided replication of those by Cohn 
et al. (2009). However, there were several points of divergence, which are likely due to 
differences in the samples used. First, the above authors displayed uniform impairments in 
associative identification, associative reinstatement, recollection estimates and item memory 
in dominant and non-dominant post-operative TLE patients compared to controls. Moreover, 
they found intact item-familiarity estimates in their non-dominant group, but impairments in 
the dominant group. The present study, on the other hand, found intact familiarity and item 
memory, impaired associative identification and reinstatement and some evidence for an 
impairment in process-dissociation derived recollection estimates. Additionally, it was 
displayed that the low performance of the LTLE participants was driving group differences 
between patients and controls on the associative identification measure, as well as in recall-to-
reject recollective abilities in the associative recognition task. Because language dominance 
was not assessed in the current sample, and I included patients with bilateral epileptic foci, a 
comprehensive analysis of laterality was not the focus of the present investigation. However, 
given that the task primarily requires the use of verbally mediated encoding and retrieval 
processes, the finding of a preferential impairment in patients with left sided lesions provides 
at least some support for the material specificity principle (Jones-Gotman, 1997; Milner, 1974), 
which was also inferred to a certain extent by Cohn et al. (2009).  
The fact that this preferential impairment in the LTLE group only manifested in the associative 
identification and recall-to-reject ability can be accounted for by current conceptualisations of 
the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying associative reinstatement and associative 
identification. Specifically, associative reinstatement is viewed as a process that involves 
relational binding in medial temporal areas during encoding, whereas associative identification 
is thought to rely on recollection dependent strategic retrieval operations involving the MTL 
and prefrontal cortex (Castel & Craik, 2003; Cohn et al., 2008; Cohn et al., 2009). This evidence 
comes from studies suggesting associative reinstatement is reduced when strong links are 
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prevented from being made during encoding (Castel & Craik, 2003; Cohn & Moscovitch, 2007); 
it is less affected, and hence dissociable from associative identification under conditions that 
interfere with retrieval processes (Cohn & Moscovitch, 2007); and it is unaffected by normal 
aging, where associative memory deficits have been shown to be the result of impaired 
strategic retrieval (Cohn et al., 2008). Thus, the lack of statistical difference in laterality 
subgroups, but overall impairment in associative reinstatement in the present study confirms 
Cohn et al.’s (2009) suggestion that this kind of binding during encoding requires bilateral 
involvement of the MTL. Conversely, the finding of a marked impairment in LTLE for the 
processes involving strategic retrieval of information (associative identification and recall-to-
reject) suggest that these processes, which involve a more widespread network of MTL and 
prefrontal areas, may be supported in a more unilateral fashion. Further, it is believed that the 
reason why the same consistent pervasive deficits in the measures as Cohn et al. (2009) were 
not found is due to the fact their sample of patients had all undergone extensive resections of 
both hippocampal and perirhinal medial temporal areas. The present sample did include three 
left and three right resected patients, but the majority had varying diagnoses of localisation 
related TLE, not necessarily confined to mesial temporal sclerosis. This accounts for the fact 
that a clear cut impairment in recollection was not found, or item memory, which as Cohn et 
al. (2008) suggest, is more dependent on recollection in a paired task such as this as compared 
to single item paradigms. Nevertheless, the finding that associative reinstatement was 
impaired in the sample as a whole suggests that even subtle MTL damage is sufficient to cause 
impairments in associative binding at encoding.  
It is also important again to highlight the differences that were found in performance within 
the control group. After returning to the analyses to assess false alarm rates in greater depth, a 
clear division was discovered between higher and lower performing controls. Although the 
results indicated that most of the group differences between patients and controls were 
eliminated when only comparing the low performing controls with patients, the associative 
identification measure was still found to be impaired, and again this was driven by 
performance of the LTLE subgroup. Taken together then, the recognition results suggest that 
despite variability in performance in the general population in associative memory ability, 
relational binding and strategic retrieval are overall more affected following MTL damage, and 
this is likely to have a material specific basis. A good follow up study to the current experiment 
then would be to assess differences in visual and verbal encoding/retrieval in well 
circumscribed left and right sided patients. Indeed, the assessment of within (word-word) and 
between (e.g. word-face) item associative recognition has already received attention in the 
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amnesic literature (Mayes et al., 2004; Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997) and has contributed 
primarily to our understanding of familiarity in associative memory. 
In summary, the experiment in this chapter has provided a replication of Cohn et al.’s (2009) 
study and shown that impairments in the ability to bind information at encoding and 
strategically retrieve associations are detectable in a more representative group of TLE 
patients. These impairments are most striking for paired word recognition involving effortful 
retrieval strategies that rely on recollection, and likely have a material specific basis. Despite 
this, novel evidence is provided that this patient group use subjective confidence in a 
comparable way to controls, and hence further supporting the notion that metamemory is 
intact in TLE. 
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6 Self-perceived memory function, awareness 
and the role of episodic memory in dating 
public news events 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The previous empirical chapters have examined recollection and familiarity in the context of 
anterograde recognition memory. However, in recent years, empirical investigations into the 
cognitive sequalae of temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) have drawn attention to a number of other 
memory impairments arising from degraded consolidation processes, including accelerated 
long-term forgetting and autobiographical memory (AM) impairments (Butler & Zeman, 2008). 
Of these, the study of AM has been the most prominent and as mentioned in the main 
Introduction, a number of recent innovative studies have sought to delineate the impairments 
found in specific episodic and semantic components of this memory system (Herfurth, Kasper, 
Schwarz, Stefan, & Pauli, 2010; Manning, Chassagnon, Hirsch, Kehrli, & Maitrot, 2005; 
Noulhiane et al., 2007; Viskontas, McAndrews, & Moscovitch, 2000; Voltzenlogel et al., 2006). 
To reiterate, episodic AMs are associated with contextual retrieval of a time-limited event in 
one’s past, and produce a mental reliving of the personal experience, often bringing about the 
same sensory-perceptual-cognitive-affective details as that at the time of encoding; semantic 
memory can either be personal, representing information about one’s life experienced as 
knowledge in the absence of contextual details or public, representing the knowledge we 
acquire about the world and events around us in which we are not actively involved (Conway, 
2001; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Tulving, 1985; Tulving, Schacter, McLachlan, & 
Moscovitch, 1988). Although personal episodic and semantic memory are critical to sustain a 
sense of self in time, as Brown (1990) states, “Though most news events are rapidly forgotten, 
the few important facts that remain shape our stored public events memory, which affects an 
important part of our awareness of the surrounding world and allows us to share cultural 
community interests” (p.45). Thus, memory for publicly shared knowledge regarding the 
events occurring around us is also a critical part of our experience.  
Previous studies assessing public semantic memory in TLE have utilised a wide variety of tasks, 
finding impairments in recognition and naming of famous faces (Barr, Goldberg, Wasserstein, 
& Novelly, 1990; Lah et al., 2004; Lah, Lee et al., 2008; Seidenberg et al., 2002; Viskontas, 
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McAndrews, & Moscovitch, 2002), recognition of past television programmes (Barr et al., 
1990),  fluency tasks (Lah et al., 2004, 2006) and most commonly, interviews about public 
news events comprising recall and recognition components (Barr et al., 1990; Bergin, 
Thompson, Baxendale, Fish, & Shorvon, 2000; Haag et al., 2010; Lah et al., 2004, 2006; 
Leeman, Macklin, Schomer, & O’Connor, 2009).  
The more questionnaire-oriented tasks above provide objective assessments of participants’ 
knowledge of public news events over different time periods, but one method that appears 
not to have been examined in TLE is the ability to correctly date public news events. This 
potentially arises from theoretical orientation, whereby researchers subsume memory for 
public news events as distinctly separate from episodic autobiographical memories. However, 
the ‘mental time travel’ that is the hallmark of episodic memory necessarily involves an 
assessment of temporal-spatial relations (Tulving, 2002). Comparing younger and older adults, 
Fradera and Ward (2006) sought to tease apart the potential sources of information used to 
place memories in time. Their results suggested that dating accuracy was not related to 
knowledge of the event per se, but relied more on the ability to contextualise the event within 
a personally experienced autobiographical period. Their finding that contextual information 
surrounding the event aided dating accuracy is consistent with a location based theory, which 
suggests time estimation is dependent upon the information people store about their 
environment and own internal state during the event (e.g. Friedman, 1993). Because there is a 
wealth of literature suggesting people with TLE have both deficits in episodic and semantic 
memory, the first aim of the present study was to explore whether such impairments would 
critically affect patients’ ability to accurately estimate the date of recent news events occurring 
within the past ten years. 
As Fradera and Ward (2006) argued, the ability to correctly date previous news events is 
partially dependent on retrieval of contextual periods of life, but presumably people’s 
memories for news events are still encoded with contextual elements regarding their source of 
acquisition, such as where they were when they learnt about the event. Although there is a 
large literature on ‘flashbulb memories’ of particularly striking and important events, those 
that are less salient still evoke some degree of recollective detail, and this has also not yet 
been explored in TLE.  
A useful way to examine this, as has been done in the previous chapters, is to use the R/K 
paradigm (Tulving, 1985). Previous studies applying the R/K paradigm to AMs in TLE have 
found reduced levels of subjective remembering for events across the lifespan (Noulhiane et 
al., 2007) and an impaired ability to subjectively remember memories from self-defining 
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periods of life (Illman, Rathbone, Kemp, & Moulin, 2011). Although the current experiment 
aimed only to assess public, and not personal events, a key motivation was to incorporate a 
number of subjective measures that are thought to reflect recollective processing. To this end, 
participants were asked if they could recall the specific context in which they learned of salient 
public events happening, and were asked for ratings of vividness during retrieval. Therefore, 
participants were assessed on the extent to which subjectively experienced qualitative 
information during retrieval impacted on their ability to correctly date past public events.  
The present study also extended upon those in Chapters 2-5 and attempted to address the 
clinical issue outlined in Section 1.6 – that is, the commonly observed discrepancy between 
subjective report of memory problems and objective measurement. So far, the empirical work 
on this topic has operationalised subjectivity with self-report during memory tasks. Therefore, 
it is possible that a questionnaire that encompasses a wide variety of beliefs and feelings about 
memory ability may address the complaints made by TLE patients. 
There have also been no attempts to assess the link between subjective reports of everyday 
memory function and retrograde memory in TLE. To examine whether perception of day-to-
day memory function is related to subjective and objective measures of AM, the Multifactorial 
Memory Questionnaire (MMQ; Troyer & Rich, 2002), a previously validated and reliable 
metamemory measure, was administered as well as the public events test.  
As discussed in the main Introduction, TLE patients have been found to be unimpaired on 
standard laboratory tasks of metacognition. The results thus far in this thesis have shown 
patients’ subjective experiences to appropriately reflect their underlying memory impairment; 
this was through the correspondence of subjective states of awareness and objective memory 
measures and the appropriate assignment of confidence judgments to accuracy. The results of 
the experiment in Chapter 5 refuted the idea that the associative memory deficit in TLE is a 
result of an impairment in metamemory. However, a metacognitive account of AM impairment 
has not been examined in TLE. Therefore, a metacognitive monitoring based question was 
included in the public events task. Participants were asked to state whether they believed they 
knew they year of the event (Yes/No response) before giving the option to provide a year. This 
allowed an examination of both accuracy and subjective indexes of memory according to 
participants’ metacognitive evaluations. 
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6.2 Methods 
 
6.2.1 Participants 
 
Because the public events test and MMQ are self-administered tasks, it afforded the collection 
of data from a large sample on the Internet, as well as collecting data from the participants 
described in Chapter 2.  
The online version of the questionnaire was advertised primarily through a UK based epilepsy 
charity’s website and bimonthly publication (EA). The TLE sample consisted of 82 responders; 
67 completing the online version of the task and 15 of the patients presented in Chapter 2, 
who completed an identical paper copy. The initial healthy adult control (HAC) sample 
included 139 participants (10 of which were control participants presented in Chapter 2). Four 
of these were excluded due to incompletion of any of the public events task. The two groups 
were systematically matched case by case, on age and years of education; the mean years of 
education value was substituted for four control participants who failed to complete this 
question. Hence, the final sample presented in subsequent analyses consists of 82 participants 
in each group. Summary demographic data for both groups, and epilepsy related variables for 
the TLE group are presented in Table 6.1. 
6.2.2 Sample characteristics 
 
To check for differences between groups one-way ANOVAs and chi-square tests were 
conducted. Alpha was set at p<.05 for all analyses unless otherwise stated. A one-way ANOVA 
displayed the groups to be well matched on age, F(1,163)= .004, p = .95, and years of 
education, F(1,163)= .04, p = .85. No specific predictions were made regarding these variables.  
A marginally significant difference in gender distribution was found between groups: χ² (1) = 
3.02, p = .08, such that there were more males in the HAC group than the TLE group. Overall, 
however, the groups were primarily comprised of female participants14.  
All participants were asked before beginning the public events task what their average weekly 
exposure was to news programmes on television, and how often they read newspapers or 
                                                          
14
 Previous literature has suggested that there are differences between males and females in various 
measures of autobiographical memory. Therefore, supplementary ANCOVA analyses looking at gender 
differences can be found in APPENDIX G. In short, when used as a covariate, gender did not remove any 
of the important main effects or interactions between group and the variables of interest presented 
below. 
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viewed online news material. These were asked separately, and participants were given 
arbitrary options of ‘0-2 times per week’, ‘2-4 times per week’, ‘4-6 times per week’, ‘6-8 times 
per week’ and ‘8 or more times per week’. One control participant failed to complete these 
questions, hence the remaining proportion of participants responding to each option are 
presented in Table 6.1. To ensure that any subsequent memory effects were not confounded 
simply by either groups’ exposure to world news events, a chi-square analysis was conducted 
on these data. A significant value was obtained for exposure to television news, χ² (5) = 13.58, 
p = .02. As Table 6.1 shows, this difference lies in the fact that the TLE group actually report 
higher levels of habitually watching television news programmes. Because previous research 
unequivocally suggests that this group is impaired on measures of public semantic memory, 
this is not discussed further because any increase found in memory for the control group 
cannot simply be attributed to increased exposure to media. Moreover, for exposure to 
newspapers and online content, no significant difference was found between the groups, χ² (5) 
= 2.30, p = .81.  
 
6.2.3 Epilepsy related variables 
 
Participants were asked if they knew the aetiology of their illness from recent MRI scans or 
neurophysiological (EEG) investigations. They were asked to record this in a text box, and were 
next asked to select from a drop-down box, if known, the hemispheric localisation of their TLE. 
They were given the options of left, right, both sides (bilateral) and ‘don’t know’. In some 
cases, participants selected an option from the drop down box that was inconsistent with the 
text description they provided beforehand. For example, one participant wrote ‘left 
hippocampal sclerosis’, but selected ‘right’ for lateralisation. In this case, ‘left’ was used to 
group the participant as information in an open text box was more reliable than one requiring 
a mouse click, where mistakes are more easily made. Similarly, if someone selected ‘right’ but 
had written that there was ‘no cause found’, the participants was grouped as ‘no cause found’. 
Therefore, the numbers presented in Table 6.1 represent best efforts to accurately estimate 
the number of patients in each laterality group whilst taking all information into account.  
TLE participants were also asked about their surgical status, and were given the options of 
‘already had surgery’, being considered for surgery’, ‘considered unsuitable for surgery’ and 
‘surgery has not been mentioned’.  They were then given the option to provide information 
about their surgery, and indicated how long ago the procedure was carried out. Because the 
focus of the investigation was not to specifically assess lateralised impairments in TLE, or 
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compare pre- and post-surgical groups, for ease the left and right resected patients were 
added into each general hemispheric group. One-way ANOVAs were computed to explore any 
differences in the demographic and clinical variables between these subgroups. There was no 
significant difference in age between the left, right, bilateral and ‘unknown’ groups, F(3, 81) = 
1.16, p = .33. Nor was there a difference in years of education, F(3, 81) = 0.17, p = .92, meaning 
all subgroups were well matched with each other, and the HAC group. We also found age of 
onset; F(3, 80) = 1.63, p = .19 and illness duration; F(3, 80) = 0.83, p = .48 to be matched 
between the four subgroups. Therefore, in the following analyses it is assumed that these 
epilepsy related variables have little impact on any differences between scores in these 
hemispheric groups. As above, the main focus was on comparison of the HAC group and TLE 
sample as a whole; therefore, analysis of lateralised groups is presented at the end of each 
section purely for exploratory purposes. 
 Participants were also asked if they currently suffered from any neurological or psychological 
disorders other than TLE, for example, anxiety and depression. If they answered Yes to this 
question, they were asked to provide brief details. The data in Table 6.1 reflect the number of 
participants that both answered Yes to this question and provided enough information to 
extrapolate whether they were currently experiencing anxiety or depressive disorders, or 
other psychological or neurological problems. ‘Other’ in the TLE group includes participants 
with bi-polar, interictal psychosis, panic attacks, multiple sclerosis, migraine and a previous 
transient ischemic attack. In the HAC group this includes one person with migraine. 
Additionally, participants were asked to note the name of any other medications they were 
taking that they believed may affect their current cognitive function.  
Citalopram was by far the most common medication used to treat self-reported anxiety and 
depression, and in the ‘Other’ responses for the TLE group, one participant reported taking 
venlafaxine, one was taking quetiapine alongside citalopram, one taking risperidone and 
another amyltriptyline for severe headaches. This information was not requested from the 
HAC group. These scores are consistent with previous research suggesting higher levels of 
psychiatric disorders in TLE than in the healthy population (Marsh & Rao, 2002). Once again, 
because this was not the focus of this study, and because a validated measure of current 
symptom levels was not obtained, these variables are not considered in further analyses. 
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Table 6.1 Demographic data, self-reported news exposure and clinical data for TLE and controls. 
Note: TLE = temporal lobe epilepsy, HAC = healthy adult control. 
 TLE (N=82) HAC (N=82) 
Age 
Mean 
SD 
 
46.95 
13.24 
 
46.82 
13.90 
Male/Female % 22/78 34/68 
 
Education 
Mean number years 
SD 
 
 
14.32 
2.96 
 
 
14.40 
2.86 
   
Average weekly news exposure 
Television (%) 
0-2 x p/week 
2-4 x p/week 
4-6 x p/week 
6-8 x p/week 
8 or more 
 
Newspaper and online (%) 
0-2 x p/week 
2-4 x p/week 
4-6 x p/week 
6-8 x p/week 
8 or more 
 
 
17.40 
8.80 
23.80 
25.00 
25.00 
 
 
35.00 
17.50 
15.00 
13.80 
18.80 
 
 
26.80 
24.40 
18.30 
13.40 
15.90 
 
 
36.60 
20.70 
17.10 
11.00 
13.40 
   
Age diagnosed 
Mean 
SD 
 
24.37 
16.81 
 
n.a. 
 
   
Illness duration 
Mean 
SD 
 
25.06 
16.77 
 
n.a. 
   
Lobe of origin 
Left 
Right 
Bilateral 
No cause found 
 
23 
17 
8 
34 
 
n.a. 
   
Surgical status 
Post surgical 
Pre surgical 
Surgery unsuitable 
Not mentioned 
Unanswered 
 
14 (7left, 7 right) 
5 
11 
50 
4 
 
n.a. 
   
AED therapy 
Monotherapy 
Polytherapy  
Unanswered 
 
38 
37 
7 
 
n.a. 
   
Psychological/Neurological status 
Anxiety 
Depression 
Other 
 
14 
18 
6 
 
5 
5 
1 
   
Other medications 
Anti-depressants/anxiolytics 
Other 
 
15 
2 
 
n.a 
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6.3 Materials and Procedure 
 
The first page of the online study contained detailed information and clearly stated that 
completion of the questionnaires would be taken to indicate informed consent. Following 
completion of background demographic information and clinical data for the TLE group, 
participants first completed an unrelated questionnaire that is not reported here.  
 
6.3.1 The Multifactorial Memory Questionnaire (MMQ) 
 
To assess subjective perception of daily memory functioning, the Multifactorial Memory 
Questionnaire (MMQ; Troyer & Rich, 2002) was deployed. The original MMQ is a 57 item self-
report questionnaire consisting of three subscales; Contentment (18 items), Ability (20 items) 
and Strategy (19 items). MMQ-Contentment items assess positive and negative emotions 
associated with memory and subjective ratings of current memory ability (e.g. I am generally 
pleased with my memory ability). Level of agreement with various statements is indicated on a 
5 point scale (strongly agree, agree, undecided, disagree and strongly disagree) based on 
reflection of the past two weeks. One item was omitted from the original subscale - “When I 
forget something, I fear that I may have a serious memory problem, like Alzheimer’s disease”. 
It was felt this item was more specific to the older adult population in which the MMQ was 
validated on, and would not be useful in an age diverse sample of people with TLE. Scores for 
responses range from 0-4, with higher scores indicating greater contentment. MMQ-Ability 
items assess everyday memory situations such as remembering to pass on a message, and are 
phrased as memory failures (i.e. How often do you forget to pass on a message?). The 
frequency with which these errors have occurred over the past two weeks are recorded by 
participants on a 5 point scale (all the time, often, sometimes, rarely, never). These are then 
also scored from 0-4 with higher scores indicating better subjective memory ability. Finally, 
MMQ-Strategy items measure the extent to which participants have used memory aids in daily 
life over the past couple of weeks (e.g. How often do you write down in a notebook things that 
you want to remember?). This is also scored from 0-4, with higher scores indicating less 
frequent use of such strategies. 
A small proportion of items were missed by participants, and following Troyer and Rich (2002), 
the scores for these scales were prorated based on the completed items.  
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6.3.2 Public events task 
 
The public events task was designed as having two public news events for each year 2001-2010 
(20 events in total) covering stories from around the world on topics such as natural/other 
disasters, political events, crimes/terrorism, entertainment, sporting events and other 
prominent news stories (see APPENDIX F for a list of events used). Each event was written in a 
sentence that provided sufficient detail to be identified but omitting the year; for example, 
‘Queen Elizabeth II of England marks 50 years as monarch with the Golden Jubilee’. Items were 
presented in a fixed random order for all participants and they were told that they would be 
asked to make various ratings regarding their memory of them. They were then provided with 
a list of instructions about the memory ratings required for each public event.  They were first 
asked, ‘Do you recall the event happening?’ giving a dichotomous Yes/No option and described 
as ‘We simply want you to think back and see if you can recall the event happening’. The next 
question was ‘Specific context’ and participants were told:  
‘You should answer YES if you can think back to the specific time and place when 
you learned of the event happening. For instance, you might recall being at a 
friend’s house being told by them one evening. In other words, you have a memory 
of learning of the event which lasts less than a few hours. Alternatively, you should 
answer NO if you cannot recall such a memory.’ 
 
This question was specifically designed such that each memory/event could be defined as 
having recollection accompanied with it.   Following these subjective assessments of memory, 
participants were asked if they believed they knew the year the event had occurred (Yes/No) – 
this was the metacognitive measure designed to allow an assessment of objective accuracy of 
dating contingent upon participants monitoring of their memory. They were then asked to 
select a year from a dropdown box for all events, even if they did not think they knew the year. 
Next,  for each event, participants were asked to rate the personal significance of the event (1 
= No personal significance – 7 = Highly personally significant), and were told ‘ For instance, if 
you were involved in the event or knew someone who was, the event is likely to be more 
personally significant.’ Finally, participants were asked to rate the vividness of their mental 
images whilst thinking of their experience of the event (1= No mental images – 7= Highly vivid 
mental images). Participants then moved onto the actual questionnaire, during which the 
above ratings were presented in the same order for each item. 
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6.4 Results 
 
Based on the previous literature suggesting lowered levels of perceived day-to-day memory 
functioning in TLE, the first part of the analyses focused on the MMQ in order to assess 
whether these same memory complaints would be evident in the current sample. The analysis 
then continues to assess the results of the public events task. Consistent with the rest of the 
work in this thesis, the analyses focus on subjective memory measures, objective memory 
scores and ends with a comparison of subjective/objective measures. 
 
6.4.1 MMQ 
 
The MMQ was included to provide an assessment of participants’ subjective perception of day-
to-day memory functioning. The mean scores for each subscale in the TLE, HAC and 
lateralisation subgroups are presented in Table 6.2. A repeated measures ANOVA (with group 
as the between subjects factor) showed a highly significant main effect of group, F(1, 162) = 
121.90, p = .001, ηp
2 = .43, such that the HAC group had higher scores overall. There was also a 
significant main effect of subscale, F(1, 162) = 50.70, p = .001, ηp
2 = .2415 and a significant 
interaction between subscale and group, F(1, 162) = 23.79, p = .001, ηp
2 = .13. Follow-up one-
way ANOVA revealed the TLE group to have significantly lower scores on each subscale (Fs > 
53.68). The critical finding is that people with TLE have a significantly lowered subjective 
perception of their memory and utilise memory aid strategies less than healthy controls. 
To explore any differences between hemispheric subgroups, one-way ANOVAs were 
conducted on the three subscale scores excluding the control data due to the large differences 
found between the combined TLE group and HACs. No main effects were found for any 
subscale (ps > .89), suggesting that left, right, bilateral and people with TLE who did not know 
their hemispheric localisation did not differ in any of the metamemory domains from the 
MMQ. Additionally, no significant association (Pearson’s r) was found between illness duration 
or onset and each subscale, and one-way ANOVAs found no significant difference between TLE 
participants on AED monotherapy, polytherapy or unspecified regimes (ps > .16). 
                                                          
15
 Because the values from each subscale represent arbitrary values unique to that scale, no further 
comparison was made between them. Instead, it is the interaction term that is of interest. 
6-142 
 
 
 
In summary, the results from the MMQ are supportive of previous research suggesting 
perceived lower levels of subjective memory functioning in TLE. This was found to be unrelated 
to any of the epilepsy related variables recorded. This is in contrast to other research (e.g. 
Hendriks et al., 2002) where an association was found between perceived function and illness 
duration. This may, however, be due to differences in methodology as these authors only 
measured perceived forgetting, where as the MMQ comprises multiple domains of 
metamemory.  
 
 
Table 6.2 Scores obtained on the Multifactorial Memory Questionnaire subscales. 
Measure Contentment (Max = 68) 
M (SD): Range 
Ability (Max = 80) 
M (SD): Range 
Strategy (Max = 76) 
M (SD): Range 
TLE (N = 82) 22.11 (11.84): 3 - 52 34.62 (11.02): 11 - 61 31.39 (12.82): 4 - 70 
HAC (N = 82) 45.05 (11.07): 7 - 62 48.47 (10.82): 15 - 72 44.53 (9.98): 24 - 74 
    
LTLE (N = 23) 20.61 (11.15): 3 - 48 34.71 (10.49): 17 - 61 30.75 (13.44): 4 - 68 
RTLE (N = 17) 23.00 (15.05): 3 - 52 33.88 (11.94): 17 - 57 32.39 (15.44): 13 - 70 
BTLE (N = 8) 21.15 (7.18): 12 - 32 36.19 (10.36): 19 – 51 28.65 (10.38): 14 - 42 
Note: TLE = temporal lobe epilepsy; HAC = healthy adult control; LTLE = left temporal lobe epilepsy; RTLE = right 
temporal lobe epilepsy, BTLE = bilateral temporal lobe epilepsy. 
 
6.4.2 Public news events task 
 
The questioning format of this task yielded several subjective and objective measures of 
memory; means and standard deviations for these are presented in Table 6.3. 
 
6.4.2.1 Subjective measures 
 
The ‘Proportion of events subjectively recalled’ refers simply to whether participants said they 
could recall the event happening or not (Yes/No response). One-way ANOVA found a 
significant difference between the two groups on this measure, F(1, 163) = 31.05, p = .001, η2= 
.16 , such that the HAC group reported higher levels of subjective recall than the TLE group. 
The ‘Proportion of events with encoding context recalled’ refers to events where the 
participant could essentially recollect the specific time and place when they acquired the 
memory of the event happening. There was also a significant difference found between the 
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groups for this, F(1, 163) = 4.16, p = .04, η2= .03, again with the HAC group reporting a higher 
instance of retrieving the encoding context.   
Vividness and personal significance ratings were both scored out of seven, with higher scores 
representing more vivid imagery of the event and greater personal significance, respectively. A 
significant difference was found between vividness scores, F(1, 163) = 9.34, p = .003, η2= .05, 
suggesting on average across all events, people without TLE more vividly recalled memories. 
No significant difference was found between personal significance however (F < 1). This finding  
is helpful because it shows that the differences in memory cannot simply be attributed to 
varying levels of personal significance. Further, it shows that there is no systematic bias in 
under confidence or overly conservative use of the rating scales. 
 The ‘Proportion of years responded Yes’ was a metacognitive measure as this is the 
participant’s subjective assessment of the veracity of their memory for which date (year) 
certain events occurred. There was a significant difference between the groups, F(1, 163) = 
10.24, p = .002, η2= .06, such that controls indicated they could correctly label the year of each 
event more than people with TLE.  
Differences between hemispheric subgroups were then explored using one-way ANOVAs and 
Bonferroni post-hocs. For proportion of events subjectively recalled, a main effect of group 
was found, F(4, 163) = 8.35, p = .001, η2 = .17, with the right, bilateral and ‘don’t know’ groups 
performing significantly worse than controls (ps < .03) but not the LTLE group (p = .12). There 
was no evidence of a difference between TLE subgroups. For the proportion of events where 
the encoding context was recalled, no main effect was found, F(4, 163) = 1.44, p = .22, η2 = 
.001. A main effect of vividness was found, F(4, 163) = 2.65, p = .04, η2 = .06, with post-hoc 
analyses suggesting that the difference lay between the ‘don’t know’ group and controls’ 
scores. This result is unsurprising given the larger number of participants in this TLE subgroup 
group, and is uninteresting from a theoretical viewpoint. 
Overall, the results of these subjective measures suggest that controls feel like they recall 
more events than the TLE group, which is associated with a higher number of events in which 
they believed they could select the correct year. They also report remembering the encoding 
context to a greater extent, and overall, show higher levels of vividness. Attention must be 
paid to the relatively small effect sizes, however. Moreover, these differences arise in the 
context of relatively equal ratings of personal significance across all events.  
There is also a consistency between the low memory self-efficacy and assessment of 
functioning seen on the MMQ in TLE, and the reduction in subjective measures on the public 
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events task. To assess any potential relationship between these measures, Pearson 
correlations were computed between scores on the MMQ subscales and each subjective 
measure for the TLE and HAC groups separately16. The only subjective measure to correlate 
with any of these was the proportion of events subjectively recalled; small positive correlations 
were found in the TLE group between this measure and MMQ-Ability (r = .26, p = .02) and 
MMQ-Contentment (r = .27, p = .02), suggesting that higher perceived levels of current 
memory functioning and contentment with memory were associated (albeit to a small degree) 
with the number of events subjectively recalled. No significant correlations were found in the 
HAC group.  
 
6.4.2.2 Objective measures 
 
The objective measure in the task related to participants’ ability to correctly select the year 
that corresponded with the public event happening. There were a number of participants in 
each group who failed to select any dates for events, but still answered the subjective 
measures. Thus, when analysing the overall proportion of years correctly dated (correct 
number of years/20), there were 74 participants in the TLE group and 79 HACs. There was a 
trend such that the number of years attempted by the HAC group (Mean =12.54, SD = 6.80) 
was higher than the TLE group (Mean = 10.50, SD = 7.78); t(159.17) = 1.79, p = .08. However, A 
one-way ANOVA showed no significant difference between the groups in the proportion of 
events correctly dated, F(1, 152) = 2.16, p = .14, η2 = .01. 
A further assessment was of participants’ relative accuracy when dating was incorrect. This 
provides a measure of how close participants were in their estimation of the year events 
happened. Table 6.3 displays the means for the unsigned absolute difference, which reflects 
the average distance, in years, participants were from correctly dating the event. The mean 
difference on the other hand, takes into account both positive and negative values. For 
example, if a participant selected the year 2002 for an event which actually occurred in 2005, 
their score would be -3. The mean difference score presented in Table 6.3 reflects the average 
of these scores across all participants and events. The resulting positive score for both groups 
reflects an overall tendency to date years as more recently than they actually occurred, which 
                                                          
16
A full correlational analysis of demographic and experimental variables can be found in APPENDIX H.  It was 
decided not to include this in the Results section because a) the more important assessment was of differences 
between the two groups’ scores and b) a comprehensive correlational analysis of various measures is presented in 
Chapter 7.  Notably, several interesting correlations emerged between the subjective and objective measures, all 
essentially suggesting that greater awareness, better objective memory ability and increases in subjective measures 
are positively related to a certain degree. 
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has previously been coined forward telescoping in the literature (Janssen, Chessa, & Murre, 
2006; Rubin & Baddeley, 1989). One-way ANOVAs were conducted on these data and revealed 
no significant differences between the TLE and HAC group and between all TLE subgroups on 
these measures (Fs < 2.08). 
Table 6.3 Mean (SD) for subjective and objective memory measures in the public events 
questionnaire. 
Note: Prop = proportion; TLE = temporal lobe epilepsy; HAC = Healthy adult controls. 
Measure TLE HAC 
 
Subjective 
 
Prop events subjectively recalled 
M (SD) 
 
 
 
 
.67 (.18) 
 
 
 
 
.79 (.10) 
Prop events with encoding context recalled 
M (SD) 
 
.31 (.23) 
 
.38 (.23) 
Vividness rating  
M (SD) 
 
3.03 (1.11) 
 
3.56 (1.10) 
Personal significance 
M (SD) 
 
1.99 (0.94) 
 
2.03 (0.84) 
Prop of years responded ‘Yes’ 
M (SD) 
 
.20 (.17) 
 
.30 (.21) 
   
Objective 
 
Accuracy for all years attempted 
M (SD) 
 
Unsigned absolute difference (in years)  
M (SD) 
Mean difference (in years) 
M (SD) 
 
 
.38 (.28) 
 
 
 
1.70 (1.16) 
 
0.57 (1.24) 
 
 
.44 (.23) 
 
 
 
1.46 (1.06) 
 
0.68 (1.19) 
 
 
Subjective-Objective 
 
Accuracy when said ‘Yes’ to year 
M (SD) 
 
Accuracy when said ‘No’ to year 
M (SD) 
 
Prop encoding context recalled and correct year 
M (SD) 
Prop encoding context not recalled but correct 
year 
M (SD) 
 
Mean vividness for correct items 
M (SD) 
Mean vividness for incorrect/unanswered items 
M (SD) 
 
 
 
 
 
.55 (.33) 
 
 
.08 (.12) 
 
 
.33 (.28) 
 
.09 (.12) 
 
 
 
4.47 (1.69) 
 
2.83 (1.04) 
 
 
 
 
.60(.28) 
 
 
.10 (.13) 
 
 
.45 (.28) 
 
.14 (.13) 
 
 
 
4.74 (1.36) 
 
3.26 (1.00) 
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After conducting the same analyses to compare the left, right, bilateral and ‘don’t know’ TLE 
subgroups and controls, no significant main effects were found (Fs < 1.93), suggesting that 
these objective measures of performance were not affected by lateralisation of epileptic focus. 
There were also no significant correlations between any of the objective measures and the 
MMQ subscales in either group. 
In summary, people with TLE were as accurate as controls at correctly dating the public events, 
and show the same level of dispersion when providing the incorrect date.  
 
6.4.2.3 Subjective-Objective comparisons 
 
As mentioned above, before selecting the year, participants were given the option to say ‘Yes’ 
or ‘No’ to whether they could correctly recall it. If participants are metacognitively intact, we 
would expect that there would be significant differences in dating ability between those items 
that participants reported as knowing the year for versus those that they stated they did not. 
The scores for these measures are shown in Table 6.3. The score for “Accuracy when said ‘Yes’ 
to year” was calculated by dividing the number of correctly dated years that had been assigned 
a Yes response to the question by the total number of items assigned a Yes response. For the 
‘Accuracy when said ‘No’ to year’ measure, the number of years correctly dated following a No 
responses was divided by the total number of years assigned a No response. Notably, a 
number of participants in each group failed to select an option for the metacognitive question 
in certain instances, or in some cases selected the No option for every event, meaning a score 
could not be computed for accuracy after responding Yes. Hence, the analysis was run with 69 
people in the TLE group and 78 controls. These data were submitted to a repeated measures 
ANOVA with group as a between subjects factor. No significant effect of group was found, F(1, 
146) = 1.27, p = .26, η2 =.01. However, a highly significant main effect of accuracy type based 
on Yes/No prediction was found, F(1 ,146) = 375.71, p = .001, η2 = .72, such that participants as 
a whole were more accurate in their dating of events when they previously stated they did 
know the year. No interaction was found between group and the two accuracy types, F(1, 146) 
= 0.40, p = .53, η2 =.003. Therefore, the groups did not differ in the accuracy with which they 
reported events. 
The final analysis focused on an assessment of the degree to which the subjective measures of 
recollective quality of participants’ memory would vary according to the accuracy with which 
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they could date the public events. The ability to retrieve contextual information regarding the 
source of acquisition of a memory, and to experience vivid mental images during recall, are 
hallmarks of the mental time travel associated with episodic autobiographical memory 
retrieval (Tulving, 2002). In the present task participants were not asked to rate the vividness 
of their memory of the encoding context, but to rate the extent to which they could generally 
form vivid mental images of the event in their past. Correlational analyses evidenced no 
association between vividness and the proportion of events where the encoding context was 
recalled, suggesting they were carried out as instructed. 
 As in Table 6.3, a probability value was calculated for when participants correctly dated the 
year of the event as well as responding that they could recall the encoding context (number of 
events assigned a Yes response to encoding question and also correct year/total number of 
events assigned Yes to encoding question), and their accuracy when they could not recall the 
encoding context (number of events assigned a No response to encoding question but selected 
the correct year/total number of events assigned No to encoding question). A 2 (accuracy for 
recalled context vs unrecalled context) x 2 (TLE vs HAC) repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted, with group as the between subjects factor. Taking into account missing data, the 
sample sizes were N=72 for TLE and N=81 for controls. This revealed a significant main effect 
of group, F(1, 150) = 10.07, p = .002, ηp
2 = .06, with the HAC group obtaining greater accuracy 
overall under these parameters. There was also a significant effect of accuracy type, F(1, 150) = 
158.35, p = .001, ηp
2 = .51, suggesting that participants were more accurate in dating events 
when they were able to retrieve the encoding context. The interaction also approached 
significance, F(1, 150) = 3.64, p = .06, ηp
2 = .02 and as the means display, this appears to be due 
to the controls’ increase in accuracy over the TLE group being larger for events where they 
were able to retrieve the encoding context compared to when they could not. The same 
analyses assessing the TLE subgroups found no effect or interaction. Thus, it appears that both 
groups benefit in dating accuracy when they are able to recollect contextual information about 
their original encoding of the event memory, but there is a trend such that this is more so for 
healthy adults.  
Similarly, a value was calculated for the mean vividness rating for correctly dated items, and 
incorrectly dated items or those that were not assigned a date (assuming participants did not 
know the year for these). Another 2 (vividness for correct items vs. vividness for other items) x 
2 (TLE vs. HAC) ANOVA was conducted with group as a between subjects factor. This analysis 
included  N = 68 for TLE and N = 78 for controls. In the above analysis comparing the two 
groups overall, a significant difference was found in vividness ratings across all events. Under 
this 2 x 2 analysis, only a marginal effect of group was found, F(1, 144) = 3.43, p = .07, ηp
2 = .02. 
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However, a significant main effect of vividness item type was revealed, F(1, 144) = 223.89, p = 
.001, ηp
2 = .61, suggesting that vividness was higher for correctly dated events. There was no 
interaction between vividness item type and group (F < 1).  
Correlational analyses were conducted between the MMQ subscales and the subjective-
objective measures described above. No significant correlations emerged in the HAC group. In 
the TLE group, significant positive associations were found between all MMQ subscales and 
the proportion of events correctly dated where the context was not recalled (Ability scale: r = 
.27, p = .02; Contentment scale: r = .23, p = .04; Strategy scale: r = .35, p = .001). No other 
correlations were found. This result is hard to reconcile as it is difficult to explain why 
subjective perception of memory would only correlate with this one measure of 
conditionalised accuracy.  
Overall, this analysis reveals that increases in subjective experiences associated with episodic 
memory are somewhat diagnostic of the ability to correctly date previous public events; this 
was particularly evident for recollection of the unique encoding context, where healthy adults 
were more likely to retrieve this episode, which in turn elevated performance on these items.  
 
6.5 Discussion 
 
The present study diverged slightly from the rest of the work in this thesis by assessing 
memory in TLE with more naturalistic measures. The aims were similar, however, as the study 
explored the link between subjective and objective measures of memory, with the recollection 
aspect coming from assessment of AM in a novel public events task.  
The results of the MMQ suggested that people with TLE are significantly less content, and have 
lower perceptions of their current memory ability than healthy adults, and also appear to 
utilise memory aid strategies to a lesser extent. These findings build on the well established 
evidence that a large proportion of patients with TLE subjectively report everyday memory 
difficulties (Corcoran & Thompson, 1992; Hall et al., 2009; Hendriks et al., 2002; Salas-Puig et 
al., 2009; Thompson & Corcoran, 1992). In line with this perceived impairment in subjective 
functioning, the TLE group were found to be impaired in the subjective measures of the task 
assessing memory for salient international public news events from the past decade; people 
with TLE reported lower levels of recalling the events, had a significantly lower instance of 
remembering the encoding context of such events, and lower levels of mental imagery. These 
results are in line with the recollection impairments in TLE already evidenced in this thesis. The 
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relationship between retrograde and anterograde recollection is explored in the following 
chapter.  
Despite these impairments, there was no difference in dating accuracy between groups, even 
for incorrect answers. Moreover, just like healthy adults, people with TLE showed evidence of 
intact metacognitive evaluations of their knowledge for dates. It was also revealed that an 
increase in measures of subjective experience (recalling the encoding context and more vivid 
mental imagery) was associated with better dating accuracy in both groups; for recall of the 
encoding context, this was found more so for controls. 
To my knowledge, there has been no other study that has specifically looked at current 
perceptions of day-to-day memory alongside measures of retrograde memory in TLE. The 
present examination of the relationship between the MMQ and measures from the public 
events task only revealed an association between the Ability and Contentment scales and the 
number of events subjectively recalled in the TLE group. Although this correlation was weak, 
this result keeps in line with the rest of the results suggesting intact metacognitive awareness 
in this group; the more the TLE group were happy with their memory, and judged their 
memory ability to be better, the more events they subjectively recalled. This was not found in 
the HAC group however, suggesting there may be subtle differences in the interaction 
between antero-retrograde memory evaluation and subjective experience between TLE and 
those without epilepsy. The relationship between subjective perception of everyday memory 
and anterograde recognition is explored further in the following chapter as this is likely to aid 
understanding of the common discrepancy between perceived and objectively measured 
memory function in this group. 
Previous group studies utilising public events tasks in TLE have typically aimed to assess the 
impact of epilepsy-related variables or the effect of excisions on this type of memory (Barr et 
al., 1990; Bergin et al., 2000; Lah et al., 2004; 2006) and more recently, Haag et al. (2010) 
sought to examine the influence of long-term consolidation processes by assessing temporal 
gradients. Although some of these studies concurrently assessed episodic components of 
personal AM, they did not provide any measure of the influence this memory system had on 
the encoding and retrieval of public semantic knowledge. This is in spite of the 
acknowledgment that although there is functional and neuroanatomical independence of the 
episodic and semantic systems, they still work in a synergistic fashion to provide a complete 
memorial experience (e.g. Greve, van Rossum, & Donaldson, 2007). In the present study, 
participants were asked if they could specifically recall where, when and in what circumstances 
they learned of the event; therefore assessing the extent to which they could recollect it. This 
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kind of task is usually associated with the ‘flashbulb’ memory literature, which focuses on 
particularly striking and memorable news events; this study was mostly interested in less 
salient public events that must also go through a process of contextually-bound encoding. The 
‘context’ question was thus comparable to a Remember response in the R/K paradigm, which 
reflects a subjective state of awareness during retrieval imbued with contextual information 
about a prior event (Tulving, 2002). A recent study by Petrican et al. (2010) did in fact utilise 
the R/K paradigm on a public events task with two groups of older adults and two patients; 
one of which had medial temporal damage, the other with anterior and lateral temporal 
damage and sparing of medial temporal areas. They found evidence that like personal AMs, 
the subjective experience associated with public events follows a similar decay trajectory over 
time and varies according to the degree of medial temporal damage. For young-older 
participants (58-69 years), recollection peaked for recent time periods and sharply declined 
thereafter, whilst familiarity followed a linear decay path; for old-older participants (74-85 
years), recollection was more impaired for recent, compared to remote time periods, due to 
impairments in encoding associated with age-related structural changes in the MTL. 
Additionally, their patient with circumscribed MTL damage displayed a global impairment in 
recollection with preserved familiarity, whilst the patient with lateral/anterior damage 
displayed good overall performance on the basis of very well preserved recollective 
processing.  
Therefore, their results provided evidence that the retrieval of memories for culturally shared 
events is characterised by both episodic (subjective remembering) and semantic (subjective 
knowledge) processes. In the present study, although the relative decay of these memory 
processes over long time periods was not assessed, the findings mirror those of Petrican et 
al.’s (2010) old-older adult group, suggesting that people with damage to the MTL have a 
significantly reduced ability to consciously retrieve the contextual information associated with 
recent public events. This was also characterised by significantly lower levels of vivid mental 
imagery compared to healthy adults. Moreover, this was found in the absence of a difference 
in perceived personal significance of events in the two groups, suggesting the effect is not due 
to an asymmetry in the emotional content of participants’ memory. Taken together, the 
findings from the present study and those of Petrican et al. (2010) demonstrate that assessing 
subjective and objective indices of public semantic memory is a fruitful endeavour. 
The finding that people with TLE subjectively recalled fewer events is consistent with previous 
studies that have found impairments in recognition or recall of public events in TLE. However, 
no evidence was found to suggest people with TLE were more inaccurate at dating events 
compared to controls, nor were they more likely to over or under-estimate the years elapsed 
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when they incorrectly labelled the date. Taken with the findings of impaired subjective 
episodic measures, one may be persuaded by an argument that the ability to correctly retrieve 
temporal information required for dating events is more reliant on the semantic memory 
system, which is presumably better preserved in the TLE group. However, both groups were 
significantly more likely to date events correctly when they were able to retrieve the encoding 
context of the event and experience the memory vividly.  
The better dating performance associated with the subjective measures is indicative of a 
reconstructive process involving more personally relevant episodic autobiographical 
information, consistent with location based theories of event dating (e.g. Friedman, 1993). 
These findings support Fradera and Ward (2006), who showed that events were more likely to 
be dated accurately when participants could assign a more specific personal context period to 
them and Brown (1990), who found personal autobiographical material was commonly 
verbally reported in temporal estimation tasks. In previous studies, the kinds of temporal 
information people report to determine dates are also supportive of distance-based theories 
(e.g. Brown, Rips, & Shevell, 1985). Distance based theories suggest that the strength or 
accessibility of qualitative characteristics of a memory trace influences dating accuracy, with 
the more information subjectively known, the more recent the event will seem. Although the 
vividness measure in the present study could be assumed to reflect a form of qualitative 
accessibility of a memory, it was not my aim to directly test this account. It is most likely, as 
Janssen et al. (2006) describe in their model, that different types of temporal information are 
employed under different conditions to date events. Future research with TLE, or other 
memory impaired populations could inform this literature by measuring the level of knowledge 
participants have for events, and assess chronological ordering over long periods of time. To 
further examine the contribution of episodic memory, it would also be interesting to evaluate 
exactly how people provided the date information; for example, assess any differences in the 
extent to which people with TLE and healthy adults attempted to locate the public event 
within the context of a more personally experienced time point or life period. Studies such as 
this would no doubt add to ongoing neuroscientific debate about the consolidation of episodic 
and semantic memory in AM. 
One of the merits of studying public events knowledge in TLE and other neuropsychological 
populations is that results are objective, as recall and recognition rates correspond to pre-
selected verifiable historical event information. Such tasks thus overcome the subjective 
nature of other personal AM tools that rely on introspective reports and can only be validated 
by a family member or close friend or relative. However, past studies have not assessed 
patients’ evaluation and monitoring of their objective memory performance during such tasks. 
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The use of dating ability in the present task afforded the opportunity to incorporate such a 
measure as I was able to ask participants if they thought they knew the correct year before 
they selected one. By using the MMQ, I was able to see if negative perception of day-to-day 
memory functioning would be associated with disturbances in the monitoring of memory for 
other types of information. This was found not be the case. Only a handful of studies have 
assessed metacognitive ability in TLE, of which the most recent have incorporated standard 
anterograde metamemory tasks and found no impairments (Andrés et al.,2010; Howard et 
al.,2010). Admittedly, the metacognitive assessment here was a comparatively rudimentary 
measure to assess awareness of participants’ knowledge; nevertheless, the results are 
supportive of a lack of any impairment in TLE. Drawing on all of the results discussed above, it 
is possible that although people with TLE may have a greater reliance on semantic rather than 
episodic information to chronologically order events, this may provide a sufficient heuristic on 
which to judge the veracity of their memory (i.e. the year the event occurred), and is hence 
qualitatively indistinguishable in terms of metacognitive performance.  
Whilst the present study provides a useful contribution to the epilepsy and memory literature, 
there are also several limitations. For example, whilst the use of an online questionnaire was 
effective in collecting a relatively large data set, there are obvious problems associated with 
this kind of cross-sectional methodology. For example, whereas accurate diagnostic 
information was able to be obtained from the smaller sample tested throughout the rest of 
this thesis, there is a reliance on participants’ own accurate reporting of epilepsy-related 
variables.  Administering the task in person with patients in a clinical environment would thus 
be beneficial, and would ensure full completion of the task. 
Given that previous evidence is inconsistent regarding the effect of epilepsy related variables 
on public events memory, what may be useful is a comparison of the subjective, objective and 
metacognitive measures used presently in different localisation related epilepsies. For 
example, although frontal lobe epilepsy has been associated with similar neuropsychological 
impairments to TLE (Exner et al., 2002), it may be interesting to see if this group displayed a 
different profile of performance on tasks such as the one here, as the prefrontal cortex is 
known to be critical for metacognitive processing (Maril, Simons, Mitchell, Schwartz, & 
Schacter, 2003; Souchay, Isingrini, & Espagnet, 2000) and play an important role in the 
controlled retrieval of autobiographical information (Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007).  
From a clinical perspective, although the results of the present study are useful for 
understanding AM impairment in TLE, group level analyses such as these are unlikely to 
supplement routine neuropsychological assessments unless a standardised instrument with 
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normative values is created that can be easily administered to an individual in a clinical setting. 
Moreover, an inherent problem in assessing public events knowledge is that any instrument 
would need to have memory items updated on a regular basis, which poses a potentially large 
obstacle.  
In summary, the present study provides confirmatory evidence to the well-documented 
observation that people with TLE have a negative perception of their day-to-day memory 
ability; this seems quite unrelated to retrograde memory performance, however. I have also 
provided novel evidence to suggest that although people with TLE may be impaired in 
subjective mnestic experiences associated with the retrieval of public event information, they 
showed no identifiable deficit in the ability to correctly date events. This intact objective 
performance was also mirrored by intact awareness of the veracity of temporal information 
and thus supports other findings in this thesis. The results provide evidence that at least under 
certain conditions, contextual and associative information from the episodic memory system 
may be used to support the retrieval of public semantic memory. In TLE, it appears that the 
integrity of the semantic memory system is relatively better preserved, and is sufficient to 
produce accurate temporal estimations of dates, at least over a recent ten year period.  
Having now assessed a variety of different memory functions from a dual-process perspective, 
the following chapter presents a correlational analysis of these measures in an attempt to 
draw together all of the findings. 
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7 Exploring the comparability of different 
forms and uses of recollection: a 
correlational analysis 
 
7.1 Overview 
 
Four key findings have emerged from the work presented in this thesis. 1) the TLE sample 
show identifiable impairments in standardised neuropsychological tests associated with medial 
temporal lobe functioning; 2) consistent evidence suggests their ability to subjectively 
remember both newly learned and previously encoded autobiographical information is 
significantly reduced; 3) objectively measured performance that requires the use of 
recollection is impaired and 4) despite these impairments, patients still show evidence of 
intact metacognitive awareness, shown primarily through the above convergence of findings 
from subjective and objective recollection, and an appropriate assignment of confidence in 
accuracy. The aim of the current chapter was to synthesise some of these findings in order to 
address some broader theoretical and clinical questions.  
As discussed in Section 1.8, recollection is conceptualised differently between dual-process 
theories. To recapitulate, in Jacoby’s (1991) PDP framework, recollection is defined relatively 
strictly as a controlled process, or basis for responding, that allows one to accurately 
determine the source of information (i.e. which list did this come from? Or, which item was 
this studied with?). It is therefore measured, or estimated objectively, through task 
performance. On the other hand, the first-person approach as advocated by Tulving (1985) and 
Gardiner (2001) sees recollection as a state of consciousness that arises from the retrieval of a 
variety of contextual and associative information. Despite these differences, previous evidence 
(e.g. Yonelinas, 2001a) and that provided here, suggests that there is convergence between 
methods used to assess them. Therefore the subjective state of remembering is at least to a 
certain extent a reflection of the underlying process used in more objective based tasks. 
However, an interesting addition to this theoretical issue is to explore the relationship 
between different measures of recollection across tasks. The overriding question here is, does 
recollective ability, or the propensity to subjectively experience recollection in one task relate 
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to other tasks? The first part of this chapter thus presents an exploratory correlational analysis 
of some key summary measures from each experimental chapter. 
Examining the relationship between different familiarity measures may also provide a useful 
addition to the dual-process literature. However, because the focus of this thesis was primarily 
to better understand the nature of recollective processes and subjective experience in TLE, it 
was decided not to include such analyses in the present chapter. Importantly, it is 
acknowledged that the existence of correlations between recollection and familiarity 
measures has, in the past, been argued to provide evidence refuting the critical independence 
assumption adopted within dual-process theories (Curran & Hintzman, 1995;1997; see Jacoby, 
Begg & Toth, 1997 and Jacoby & Shrout, 1997, for a rebuttal to these claims). Although this 
kind of analysis is evidently important for the interpretation of dual-process data more 
broadly, it was beyond the scope of the present work to add to this debate. Hence, only 
recollection measures were included. 
 A further question – of clinical relevance - is to what extent is neuropsychological test 
performance related to different indices of recollection? As discussed in Section 1.11.2, this 
kind of question has received empirical attention in the older adult literature to test the 
hypothesis that aging is associated with decrements in recollection due to both MTL and 
frontal lobe dysfunction (e.g. Bugaiska et al., 2007; Clarys, Bugaiska, Tapia, & Baudouin, 2009; 
Davidson & Glisky, 2002; Prull et al., 2006).  
A common observation in the TLE literature is that patients subjectively complain of poor 
memory, but their standardised test scores do not corroborate this. One possible explanation 
which has had little attention is that standardised neuropsychological assessments may lack 
specificity and do not cover a broad enough range of memory functions to highlight what may 
be subtle impairments. The sample presented here subjectively complained of poor memory 
but were also impaired compared to controls on a number of neuropsychological tests 
associated with MTL function. However, it is still of interest to explore whether there is a 
relationship between such scores, and measures of recollection. The second part of this 
chapter thus presents a correlational analysis between various neuropsychological test scores 
and the summary recollection measures taken from the experimental tasks in this thesis. 
Because these tests are classically used to assess integrity of MTL function, we would expect at 
least some correlations to emerge between measures due to the fact that recollective binding 
is dependent on this brain area. Because the neuropsychological assessment included several 
measures associated with executive function, this also allowed the opportunity to add to the 
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findings gleaned from the older adult literature regarding the role of recollection in frontal 
functioning.  
Finally, the potential influence of anxiety and depression on experimental measures is 
examined. Whilst the control and TLE groups were well matched on HAD scale scores, mood 
disorders are more common in TLE than the general population (Marsh & Rao, 2002) and it 
was deemed important to assess the possibility that recollective ability may be mediated by 
these variables.  
In summary, the main focus in the present chapter was on assessing the relationship between 
recollection and the above measures in the memory-impaired epileptic sample with the aim of 
contributing to the TLE and dual-process literatures.  As such, just the epileptic group are 
presented.  The sample sizes included in each analysis varied depending on the measures 
included – although the exact N is only reported for individually reported correlations, the 
range of participants is noted for the larger analyses.  Separating the sample into LTLE, RTLE 
and BTLE groups would have resulted in too small numbers for this correlational approach, and 
so the analysis disregarded laterality subsamples. Full correlation matrices are presented for 
analyses that yielded a number of significant Pearson coefficients at the p < .05 level; for 
others, only individual significant correlations are reported.  
 
7.2 Correlational analysis of experimental recognition measures 
 
Due to the large number of measures derived from each experimental task, a certain degree of 
selectivity was necessary, so each analysis was limited to a few key variables. Firstly, the 
overall aim was to assess the relationship between measures of recollection; therefore, 
standard recognition memory performance measures (e.g. A’ or item memory scores) were 
not included. Further, although the presentation of all the varieties of subjective IRK estimates 
allowed for a comprehensive approach within each experiment, they were not included here. 
Instead, only the standard Remember IRK calculation was used, as there is a precedent in the 
dual-process literature to report this. The objective measure of recollection used for the 
contextual source memory task (Chapter 3) was the overall probability of correctly recalling 
contextual features of successfully recognised items (i.e. the average proportional accuracy for 
location, order and colour). Measures from the word and face repetition-lag PDP tasks 
(Chapter 4) include the collapsed mean objective process estimations of recollection for 
repeated lag-items. For the associative recognition task (Chapter 5), objective measures 
7-157 
 
 
 
included associative reinstatement and associative identification d’ estimates and PDP derived 
recollection estimates. Correlations between all of these measures are presented in Table 7.1 
but for clarity these are discussed in three different sections; 1) correlations between 
subjective recollection measures, 2) correlations between objective recollection measures, 3) 
correlations between subjective and objective measures, The N ranged between 20-24 
patients for all correlations. 
 
7.2.1 Correlations between subjective recollection measures 
 
The three subjective measures of recollection in Table 7.1 include Remember judgments in the 
source memory experiment (1), word repetition-lag Remember judgments (4) and the face 
repetition-lag Remember judgments (6) assigned to correctly recognised study items. Word 
and face repetition-lag Remember judgments significantly correlated with one another, but 
neither did with Remember judgments in the source memory task. The correlation between 
these two subjective measures may be due to commonalities in task demands. Despite the 
differences in type of information being processed, it may be that subjective recollection 
operates in a similar way under these task parameters, meaning patients who have a better 
ability to subjectively remember items in one task are also able to in the other. 
 
7.2.2 Correlations between objective recollection measures 
 
The objective measures were the proportion of correctly recalled contextual features in the 
source memory paradigm (2); the PDP estimates of recollection for repeated item 
performance in the word (3) and face (5) repetition-lag tasks; associative reinstatement (7); 
associative identification (8) and the associative recognition PDP estimate of recollection (9). A 
number of significant positive correlations emerged between these measures.  
 
The proportion of contextual features recalled on the source memory task and face and word 
PDP recollection estimates all correlated significantly with associative identification; the word 
and face PDP task recollection estimates correlated with each other; and the proportion of 
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contextual features in the source memory task correlated with the face PDP recollection 
estimate.17 
The correlation between the word and face PDP recollection estimates is perhaps the one that 
would be most expected due to the fact that recollection is strategically applied in the same 
way in these tasks despite differences in the material being processed. That is, recollection can 
be used with familiarity to accept repeated inclusion items, but it alone is necessary to 
overcome familiarity and reject repeated items in the exclusion test.  
Whereas the repetition-lag estimate provides a strict measure of the extent to which one can 
use recollection to discriminate between items from different lists, associative identification 
and the retrieval of contextual features in the source memory task are similar in that they 
provide a measure of recollective binding ability. For the source memory task, this is a 
measure of the binding of various perceptual and temporal information, and associative 
identification is a measure of the extent to which recollection is successfully used to restore 
bound representations of two words that were initially encoded. Despite differences in the 
way each measure conceptualises recollection, the fact that moderate significant correlations 
exist between them suggests that it is a common underlying process. Notably, however, the 
measures did not all correlate with each other, suggesting there are other contributing factors. 
 
7.2.3 Correlations between subjective and objective measures of recollection 
 
One of the critical aims of this thesis was to explore the extent to which objective recollective 
processes are related to the subjective experience of remembering. Evidence in support of this 
has already been displayed by the fact that patients are impaired on both types of measure. 
Positive correlations between subjective and objective measures provide complementary 
evidence, as they suggest that better recollective ability in performing a task has a relationship 
with the probability of engaging in subjective remembering. Some support for this is borne out 
of the data in Table 7.1 (analysis of which includes a total of 36 comparisons between 
                                                          
17
There were also significant correlations between the objective measures in the associative recognition task; the 
recollection estimate correlated positively with associative identification and negatively with rearranged item FPs. 
Associative identification was also negatively correlated with this FP rate. Because these measures use similar item 
performance within their calculations, these correlations are unsurprising – I therefore discuss them no further. 
Moreover, the reader will notice that the confidence ratings from the associative recognition experiment are not 
included in Table 7.1; analyses showed there to be no significant correlation between some key confidence 
measures associated with the items that are more or less dependent on recollective processes and the measures 
from other tasks. Instead, as above, correlations only existed between these confidence ratings and the other 
measures within the task (i.e. associative identification and recollection estimates), which is again unsurprising and 
is also covered in Chapter 5 where the overall level of confidence is discussed in relation to the magnitude of the 
measures they are related to in both groups. 
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measures). The proportion of subjective Remember responses in the source memory task 
correlated with the total amount of contextual features retrieved, the word repetition-lag PDP 
recollection estimate and also with associative identification; the word repetition-lag PDP 
subjective Remember proportion correlated with both word and face PDP objective estimates 
and associative reinstatement.  
The correlations that have been observed so far between the two repetition-lag tasks are 
perhaps the most interesting. As Kelley and Jacoby (1998) discuss, recollection and familiarity 
estimates derived from the PDP are context dependent. So, different material types will 
provide a different context in which to support automatic and controlled uses of memory. 
Because of this, they suggest, the estimates will be isolating different things between tasks and 
not necessarily comparable. However, the significant correlations found between subjective 
and objective measures of recollection between the word and face tasks is suggestive that the 
cognitive and subjective basis of recollection is similar between the two, despite the fact that 
participants are using this process to discriminate between two qualitatively different types of 
information. 
Taken as a whole; the very existence of the above correlations provides evidence in a memory 
impaired population that subjective and objective measures of recollection are correlated 
within and between tasks. This suggests that even in spite of impairments caused by damage 
to critical MTL brain areas, the conscious experience of remembering has a relationship with 
an identifiable cognitive process.  
However, when making such a large scale comparison of different measures, the risk of making 
a Type I error is increased; in the context of the results above, this means that not correcting 
for such error may result in falsely accepting that there are true relationships between the 
measures. A typical method to overcome this is the Bonferroni correction, where a modified 
significant criterion is used (α/k, where k is the number of different comparisons or statistical 
tests). Using the appropriate Bonferroni correction, α would be set at .001 (.05/36). For some 
of the other analyses presented in this chapter (such as recollection measures with 
neuropsychological tests), this value would decrease even more as an even larger number of 
comparisons are made. In short, very few of the correlations stand up to this strict criterion. 
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Table 7.1 Correlation matrix for key measures of recollection across experimental tasks in the TLE group. 
Note: R = recollection, Prop = proportion, Word PDP = word version of the repetition-lag process-dissociation procedure, Face PDP = 
face version of the repetition-lag process-dissociation procedure, AR = associative recognition task, AI = associative identification. 
Pearson correlation coefficient values underlined are significant at the p < .05 level; values underlined in solid line  are significant at 
the p < .01 level. 
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
1. Source Memory R  -         
2. Source Memory Total Context Prop .46 -        
3. Word PDP Combined Lag R .53 .36 -       
4. Word PDP Hit Subjective R .12 .34 .45 -      
5. Face PDP Combined Lag R .34 .51 .42 .45 -     
6. Face PDP Hit Subjective R .14 .18 .27 .45 .25 -    
7. AR Associative Reinstatement d’ .20 .42 .29 .48 .20 .23 -   
8. AR Associative Identification d’ .45 .20 .66 .43 .55 .24 .19 -  
9. AR R estimate .15 -.08 .34 .17 .31 .05 -.25 .68 - 
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Whilst the potential problems of inflated Type I error rates are fully acknowledged, the 
Bonferroni correction was not applied here. As Perneger (1998) describes, the Bonferroni 
method leads to a substantial reduction in the statistical power of rejecting the null 
hypothesis. That is, as Type I error is reduced, Type II error increases. One way of reducing the 
probability of making a Type I error is not to include irrelevant variables in analyses; as was 
described earlier, some key measures of recollection were chosen, and a number of variables 
were not included for the very reason that they were likely to create added noise to the 
analysis. As Pernenger (1998) states, simply describing what tests of significance have been 
performed and why, is generally the best way of dealing with multiple comparisons. 
Correlations were examined between subjective and objective recollection because there is 
good theoretical reason (derived both behaviourally and neuroanatomically) to believe a 
relationship would exist between them. 
Further, there is no agreed upon consensus as to when Bonferroni corrections should be 
used18 (Nakagawa, 2004; Perneger, 1998). As these authors discuss, the correction method has 
been removed from the context of its original framework, where it was advocated as a means 
to aid decision making in repetitive situations (Neyman & Pearson, 1928). In contrast, the 
purpose of the present investigation was to explore the co variation between similar memory 
processes. Although strict Bonferroni corrections were not applied here, I return to this issue 
later on with reference to other comparisons. 
 
7.3  Correlations between recognition measures and naturalistic measures 
 
The sections above focused exclusively on the measures of recollection derived from the 
anterograde recognition memory tasks presented in Chapters 3-5. It was seen in Chapter 6 
that there was little relationship between any of the three subscales from the MMQ 
(Contentment, Ability and Strategy) and the objective and subjective autobiographical 
measures from the public events task. However, the relationship between subjective 
perception of memory, autobiographical measures, and anterograde measure of recollection 
has not been previously examined in TLE.  
 
                                                          
18
 As the reader will have noted, Bonferroni corrections have been used in other statistical analyses dealing with 
laterality effects throughout this thesis, where the number of comparisons is smaller. This was primarily because of 
the smaller numbers in each group and much variability within scores; hence, the likelihood of making Type I error 
was high. In any case, the direction and meaning of the results has always been discussed even if the correction led 
to non-significant findings. 
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7.3.1 Subjective perception of memory and anterograde recognition 
 
The interesting theoretical and clinical question outlined in the Introduction is to what extent 
patients’ subjective perception of their memory is related to measures of recollection derived 
from recognition performance. It has already been shown in this thesis that patients’ 
subjective reports of memory can be valid assessments of the underlying cognitive process 
engaged during recognition. Therefore, I next investigated the extent to which scores on the 
MMQ would relate to recognition based recollection measures (see APPENDIX I) This included 
the nine subjective and objective measures included in Table 7.1 and the three individual 
subscales of the MMQ (resulting in 27 comparisons). In summary, only one significant 
correlation emerged – this was between the Ability subscale and the proportion of subjective 
Remember responses assigned to study items in the face repetition-lag PDP task (r = -.46, p = 
.04, N = 20). The evidence presented here therefore suggests that patients’ perception of their 
day-to-day memory ability, contentment or affect related to their memory dysfunction, or use 
of compensatory strategies is not related to recollection measures derived from empirical 
tasks.  
When taking into account the content of the questions in the MMQ, this lack of relationship is 
unsurprising. The memory Ability subscale perhaps theoretically shares the most in common 
with performance on a recognition task, as it asks questions related to errors in memory. 
However, although some of these could be compared to failures in recollection (e.g. How often 
do you retell a story or joke to the same person because you forgot that you had already told 
them?, or How often do you have trouble remembering details from a newspaper/magazine 
article you read earlier that day?) many of the questions represent abilities that are dependent 
on other memory processes. For example, “How often do you forget a birthday or anniversary 
that you used to know well?” This question arguably addresses a failure in semantic memory. 
Others deal with prospective memory, for example, “How often do you forget to buy 
something you intended to buy?” Clearly these questions are designed to capture instances of 
memory failure in everyday situations and the MMQ is thus a useful measure of general 
perception of memory. The measurement of recollection in experimental recognition memory 
tasks is rather more specific, and although the evidence above suggests that a common 
subjective and objective recollective process may operate between such tasks, general 
everyday memory questions are perhaps not the best way of measuring this. It may be that a 
more specific questionnaire of everyday memory ability that targets instances of recollective 
failure may show more correspondence to these measures. 
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As mentioned in Chapter 1, previous research that has assessed the relationship between TLE 
patients’ subjective reports of memory and neuropsychological test performance has often 
found little correspondence between the two (see Hall et al., 2009, for a review). A variety of 
subjective report measures have been used in such studies, but the MMQ has not been 
previously deployed. 
The analysis of the MMQ and public events task in Chapter 6 included 15 of the patients 
recruited for my main research project as well as others recruited via the internet solely for 
the purposes of that study. The other patient participants in the current project were all asked 
to complete the MMQ and public events questionnaire, but those who had not completed 
these before a predetermined date were excluded from the analysis in Chapter 6. A further six 
questionnaires were returned after this date (by patients 5, 8, 12, 15, 20 and 25), three of 
which only contained a completed MMQ (patients 8, 20 and 25). Thus, a correlational analysis 
of the MMQ subscales and the raw scores19 from the 12 neuropsychological tests outlined in 
Chapter 2 was carried out with N = 19 and 20, varying due to missing neuropsychological data 
in certain cases (APPENDIX I).  
This analysis showed there to be no significant relationship between the Ability, Contentment 
and Strategy subscales and neuropsychological measures, except for one significant correlation 
between the Strategy subscale and FAS verbal fluency score (r = -.67, p = .001, N = 20). The 
interpretation of this would be that people who reportedly use fewer memory aid strategies 
have poorer verbal fluency. This verbal fluency test measures the number of words 
spontaneously produced beginning with the letters F, A and S over a three minute period. 
Better performance on this task is thus aided by the initiation of some form of strategy. In the 
case of the letter ‘F’, for example, going through words beginning Fa, Fe, Fi and so on, would 
be an example of a strategy likely to benefit performance more than simply generating 
random words beginning with the letter. This initiation of strategies is reliant on intact 
executive function; the items in the Strategy subscale of the MMQ include tasks that similarly 
involve this kind of mental planning and organisation (e.g. “How often do you create a story to 
link together information you want to remember?” Or, “How often do you mentally elaborate 
on something you want to remember?”). The correlation therefore suggests that those who do 
not engage in daily strategic activities to enhance memory perform worse on a task that 
involves a similar strategic component. 
                                                          
19
 Raw scores were used in this analysis and those presented in Section 7.4 because the MMQ and various 
recollection estimates are not standardised for age like the normative values in these neuropsychological tests. 
Therefore, using raw scores helps control for the added variability between the measures. 
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The pattern of results across the current TLE sample differs from the literature mentioned 
above (i.e. Hall et al., 2009) because it was found that patients had both significantly lowered 
perceptions of their memory functioning and were impaired on standard neuropsychological 
measures. Therefore, their subjective complaints can be seen to be validated objectively in 
clinical terms. However, the lack of correlation between these two provides further support for 
the discussion above that self-report measures, due to their focus on specific everyday 
difficulties, may be measuring fundamentally different memory constructs to those captured 
in standardised tests. 
 
 
7.3.2 Comparison of anterograde recollection with autobiographical measures 
 
A correlational analysis was conducted between the same nine recollective measures from the 
anterograde experimental tasks as above and a similar set of public events variables that were 
used in the correlational analysis in Chapter 6 (APPENDIX I). The subjective measures included 
the proportion of events subjectively recalled, the proportion of items where the specific 
context of learning of the event was recalled, the mean vividness rating across all events, and 
the mean vividness only for events that were subjectively recalled. The objective measures 
included the total number of events correctly dated, the proportion of years attempted that 
were correctly dated. Thus, there were 54 comparisons made. Only four significant 
correlations emerged. The proportion of events subjectively recalled correlated positively with 
the objective and subjective recollection estimates from the word repetition-lag PDP task (r = 
.64, p = .01; r = .78, p = .001, N = 16 for both) and the associative identification estimate (r = 
.52, p = .05, N = 15).  The large Pearson values for the correlation with the word repetition-lag 
PDP task are particularly compelling, given the small sample size here. Interestingly, the way 
the ‘recall’ question was phrased to participants in the public events task did not specifically 
orient them toward recollection – it was in fact the ‘context’ question that did this as it probed 
the participant to retrieve a unique episode in which they acquired information regarding the 
public event. Although simply ‘recalling’ an event may to a certain extent be reliant on 
semantic knowledge, the results here provide evidence to suggest that a better ability to 
subjectively and objectively recollect in some anterograde recognition measures is related to a 
greater ability to recall non-personal autobiographical events. Despite this relationship, it is 
unclear why the vividness associated with the recall of these events did not correlate with the 
anterograde recollection measures.  
7-165 
 
 
 
Furthermore, the total number of events correctly dated correlated with the total proportion 
of contextual features recalled in the source memory task (r = .55, p = .02, N = 17). This result 
also makes sense theoretically; better performance in the source memory task is suggestive of 
successful binding of multiple contextual features. Likewise, remembering the year that 
something happened is likely to require the retrieval of information bound to the event at 
encoding.  
This is the first time a comparison of subjective and objective recollective measures between 
retrograde and anterograde tasks has been conducted within the same TLE sample in this way, 
and although little clear-cut evidence emerged, it would be of theoretical interest to explore 
this further. Using AM tasks that assess personal episodic memories may be more likely to 
reveal relationships with anterograde recollection due to their shared neurobiological 
substrates. However, the non-significant correlations are interesting in light of the fact that 
deficits were found in both measures in the TLE group. This suggests that the tasks are 
measuring different things. Unfortunately, the interpretation of such null findings is faced with 
the same problems as the significant correlations; the sample sizes were small, meaning 
reduced power to detect any meaningful relationships. 
Overall, the results provided here suggest there may be some relationship at the group level, 
but precise lesion documentation would be highly instructive in this kind of analysis to 
specifically assess the extent to which selective MTL damage affects antero-retrograde 
recollection. 
 
7.4 Correlational analysis of neuropsychological performance and experimental measures  
 
7.4.1 Correlation with anterograde recollection 
 
As discussed in the Introduction, the relationship between neuropsychological tests and 
measures of recollection has been examined previously, predominantly in the aging literature. 
To my knowledge, this has not been conducted in TLE however, and certainly not with such a 
large comparison of empirical tasks.  
Table 7.2 presents a correlational analysis of the key recollection measures used in the 
sections above, as well as the raw scores from each neuropsychological test (N ranged 
between 20-24 participants). The correlations between each neuropsychological test are not 
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reported as it was not the aim to assess the relationship between these (but see Discussion). 
The analysis included 108 comparisons. 
There are several main points, or questions, to examine within this data: 1) Do measures of 
recollection generally correlate with neuropsychological test performance? 2) Is there a 
difference in the extent to which objective and subjective measures correlate with the 
neuropsychological tests? 3) Are the neuropsychological tests associated with executive, or 
frontal functioning correlated with recollection to the same extent as those reliant on MTL 
functioning? 4) Are there observable differences in the number of correlations between 
recollective measures and neuropsychological tests fractionated further along theoretical 
lines? Rather than state the individual correlations between measures, I will give a summary of 
the findings and how they relate to each question. 
Do measures of recollection correlate with neuropsychological tests? It is clear from Table 7.2 
 that a number of recollective measures correlate significantly with neuropsychological test 
performance. The recollection measures that share the most correlations with these 
neuropsychological tests are the subjective and objective recollection estimates from the word 
repetition-lag PDP task (2 and 5) and the associative identification estimate (8). In contrast, the 
total proportion of contextual features recalled in the source memory task (4), the subjective 
recollection estimate of the face repetition-lag PDP task (3), associative reinstatement (7) and 
the objective recollection estimate from the associative recognition task (9) have the fewest 
correlations between neuropsychological test scores. An obvious question then, is what are 
the differences between the recollection measures that do and do not correlate well with 
neuropsychological tests? Addressing the following issues sheds light on this.  
 
Is there a difference in the extent to which objective and subjective measures correlate with the 
neuropsychological tests? There appear to be no clear differences in the extent to which 
subjective or objective recollective measures correlate with the neuropsychological tests; the 
only notable observation here is that the face PDP subjective recollection measure (6) did not 
correlate with many of the neuropsychological measures, where as the other two verbal based 
subjective recollection measures did. However, it did correlate with another non-verbal test 
(BMIPB figure immediate; 10). Notably, the majority of the neuropsychological tests were 
verbal in nature, meaning a direct verbal/non-verbal comparison is difficult. Differences in 
material type are discussed further below. 
Are the neuropsychological tests associated with executive, or frontal functioning correlated 
with recollection to the same extent as those reliant on MTL functioning? There is some 
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evidence to suggest that recollective measures correlated with neuropsychological tests that 
are more reliant on executive function. This was most evident for the category fluency score 
(19), which correlated with three recollection measures, both subjective and objective. Fluency 
and digit span may not be the most representative measures of executive function. However, 
an influential model proposed by Miyake et al. (2000) suggests that executive function is 
characterised by three interrelated, yet separately operating processes of shifting, updating 
and monitoring and inhibition. To gain a more comprehensive measure of executive function, a 
more complex task that requires the use of all of these, such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Test (WCST; Berg, 1948) may be more suitable. Indeed, in the older adult literature, subjective 
Remember judgments have been found to correlate with measures derived from this task 
(Clarys et al., 2009). Of course, older adults and TLE patients are fundamentally different in 
terms of neuropathology, and other studies have found no such relationship between frontal-
measures and a variety of objective and subjective measures of recollection in aging (Prull et 
al., 2006). Future work with TLE samples would be useful to assess the contribution of frontal-
lobe functioning to recollection. 
From Table 7.2, there is, however, compelling evidence that recollection measures are related 
to neuropsychological tests of MTL functioning. These correlations were found for subjective 
Remember judgments drawn from different paradigms, objective recollection estimates drawn 
from single item inclusion/exclusion performance, and a recollective measure of relational 
binding in associative recognition.  
Returning to the problem with multiple comparisons, a breakdown of these associations 
reveals that the number of significant correlations found exceeds the number that would be 
predicted to occur by chance. As a whole, there were 108 relationships analysed (9 
recollection measures x 12 neuropsychological measures) and 36 significant correlations were 
found.  With α set at .05, approximately 6 correlations would be expected to occur by chance. 
When using a Bonferroni correction that takes into account such a high number of 
comparisons, there are no resulting significant correlations (with α adjusted to a highly strict 
.0005 level). Although some of the correlations may occur due to noise in the data, a number 
of these had Pearson values ≥.60, which is considered to be a moderate-large effect size (2 and 
13; 5 and 10; 5 and 11; 6 and 12; 8 and 14; 8 and 15). It seems unlikely that interpreting this 
data as meaning there is a relationship between recollection and neuropsychological measures 
is simply a systematic Type I error. Moreover, the aim was not to provide conclusive evidence 
that the recollection indices and neuropsychological tests are measuring the exact same 
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construct. Rather, it was a theory driven exploratory analysis looking at the potential 
relationships between them. 
The results provide support for the study cited above by Prull et al. (2006), who found 
objective recollection estimates from inclusion/exclusion performance and proportions of 
subjective Remember judgments were highly correlated with a composite neuropsychological 
measure of MTL function. Additionally, the experiments presented here, although using a 
similar paradigmatic approach to those authors, had varying test instructions and task 
demands. These results are also drawn from a within-participants comparison similar to Prull 
et al. (2006), removing some of the problems associated with comparing correlations between 
measures from different groups of participants and tasks. 
Are there observable differences in the number of correlations between recollective measures 
and neuropsychological tests fractionated further along theoretical lines? Two distinctions can 
be made here – between verbal and non-verbal tasks, and between immediate and delayed 
tasks. The two non-verbal neuropsychological tests used were the BMIPB figure and WRMT 
faces; the former appears to correlate with a number of recollection measures (especially the 
immediate score), where as the WRMT face component shares little relationship with these 
measures. Given that the WRMT involves a 2-AFC format, where participants must simply 
choose which face they recognise from the study phase, this task is solvable by familiarity 
alone. The BMIPB figure however, is arguably more reliant on recollection as a complex, 
unmeaningful, integrated set of geometric shapes must be recalled from memory. Although 
familiarity may be helpful if participants use a ‘generate-recognise’ strategy (where they begin 
drawing part of the figure and use familiarity to add extra features to this), it is most likely that 
a recollective process is more heavily involved. In terms of laterality findings for the non-verbal 
face repetition-lag PDP task, the objective recollection estimate correlated with both verbal 
and non-verbal neuropsychological measures, and the subjective estimate only correlated with 
the immediate BMIPB figure score. Therefore, there appears not to be any special relationship; 
of course, it must be taken into account that this analysis collapsed across patients with both 
left, right and bilateral foci, so it may not be the best suited to drawing conclusion regarding 
laterality. 
The second distinction between the neuropsychological tests is between immediate and 
delayed performance. Delayed verbal memory performance in particular has been related to 
hippocampal integrity (Kalviainen et al., 1997), and as described in the main Introduction, 
recent dual-process neurobiological models of memory ascribe special importance to the 
rhinal cortices in the processing of incoming information (e.g. Montaldi & Mayes, 2010). In 
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short, the results here provide little evidence that delayed neuropsychological tests scores 
correlate more with measures of recollection; in fact, the opposite pattern can be observed.  
In summary, the results suggest that a better ability to subjectively remember both visual and 
verbal material, and a better ability to use recollective processes to solve complex recognition 
memory tasks is positively related to performance on a range of neuropsychological memory 
tests. Despite the small number of tests of executive function, the evidence suggests more of a 
relationship between recollection and MTL functioning. As a final cautionary note, although it 
has been argued that a Bonferroni correction applied to the analyses may artificially increase 
Type II error, one must still interpret the results tentatively as it is difficult to draw firm 
conclusions with this small sample size and large number of comparisons. 
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Table 7.2 Correlation matrix between anterograde recollection measures and neuropsychological tests for the TLE group. 
Note: R = recollection, Prop = proportion, Word PDP = word version of the repetition-lag process-dissociation procedure, Face PDP = face version of the repetition-lag process-dissociation 
procedure, AR = associative recognition task, AI = associative identification, MTL = medial temporal lobe, BMIPB = BIRT Memory and Information Processing Battery (Coughlan et al., 2007), 
WRMT = Warrington Recognition Memory Test (Warrington, 1984).  Pearson correlation coefficient values underlined are significant at the p < .05 level; values underlined in solid line  are 
significant at the p < .01 level. 
 MTL measures Executive measures 
 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 
  BMIPB 
Fig Imm 
BMIPB 
Fig Del 
BMIPB 
List A1-5 
BMIPB 
List 6 
BMIPB 
Story 
Imm 
BMIPB 
Story Del 
WRMT 
Words 
WRMT 
Faces 
FAS 
verbal 
fluency 
Category 
fluency 
Digits 
forward 
Digits 
back-
ward 
Su
b
je
ct
iv
e
 
1.Source Memory R .48 .38 .44 .24 .31 .23 .44 .15 .30 .33 .44 .47 
2.Word PDP Subjective Hit R .56 .58 .53 .68 .40 .38 .45 .47 .33 .55 .24 .19 
3.Face PDP Subjective Hit R  .43 .36 .16 .21 .09 .10 .22 .36 .15 .59 .44 .19 
   
   
   
   
   
O
b
je
ct
iv
e 
4.Source Memory Context Prop                             .22 .16 .28 .31 .08 .13 .56 .18 .29 .18 .20 .00 
5.Word PDP Combined Lag R .60 .62 .53 .55 .50 .48 .51 .31 .13 .46 .09 .30 
6.Face PDP Combined Lag R .44 .41 .63 .52 .38 .41 .52 .13 .38 .40 .34 .37 
7.AR Associative Reinstatement d' .17 .16 .29 .40 .27 .37 .33 .40 .30 .19 -.01 .11 
8.AR Associative Identification d' .52 .49 .53 .42 .70 .65 .45 .10 .50 .35 .22 .33 
9.AR R estimate .29 .35 .42 .19 .42 .45 .37 -.28 .25 .17 .07 .16 
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7.4.2 Correlation with public events measures 
The analyses presented in Section 7.3.2 suggested that the proportion of events subjectively 
recalled from the public events task in Chapter 6 was most related to measures of recollection. 
The analysis above in Section 7.4.1 suggested recollective measures were correlated with a 
number of neuropsychological tests. The next enquiry was to see if neuropsychological test 
scores correlated with the public events test scores. This analysis is presented in Table 7.3 and 
is based on similar participant numbers (between 16 and 17 patients) as that in Section 7.3.2. 
A total of 72 comparisons were made. The results converge with the findings outlined above; 
the proportion of events subjectively recalled (1) correlated with a number of MTL 
neuropsychological tests (7, 8, 10, 11 and 16). This provides even further evidence that this 
measure reflects a form of autobiographical recollective process mediated by MTL functioning. 
In terms of the two objective scores of dating accuracy (3 and 4), almost no relationship was 
found between these and neuropsychological measures. This was except for a positive 
relationship between the total number of events dated correctly (3) and verbal fluency (15). 
The fact this measure displayed consistent positive (but mostly non-significant) correlations 
with neuropsychological measures and proportion of years attempted that were correct 
shared consistent, non-significant correlations perhaps highlights the limitations of making 
comparisons between such qualitatively different forms of memory in a correlational analysis.  
Whereas the vividness measures from the public events task did not correlate with 
recollection, the mean vividness score across all events (5) did in fact correlate with immediate 
(11) and delayed (12) story recall, the WRMT faces (14) and verbal fluency (15). One 
theoretical explanation of this could be that the these two MTL neuropsychological tests may 
share a common visual component to them; face recognition is a typical visual measure, but 
successful story recall has been associated with a better ability to imagine events (e.g. Sadoski, 
Goetz, Olivarez, Lee, & Roberts, 1990). This common visual component may partially explain 
the relationship with perceived vividness in the public events task. 
Similar to Section 7.3.2 however, the mean vividness associated only with subjectively recalled 
events (6) did not show the above pattern; in fact, this measure significantly negatively 
correlated with both digit span measures (17 and 18). Because the overall mean vividness 
measures takes into account many more responses, perhaps this measure is after all more 
sensitive in detecting a wider continuum of the contribution of recollection to recall of public 
events. Future work using different measures of recall for different types of memory is likely to 
clarify this issue. 
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Table 7.3 Correlation matrix between key public events task measures and neuropsychological tests in the TLE group.
Note: Prop = proportion, BMIPB = BIRT Memory and Information Processing Battery (Coughlan et al., 2007), WRMT = Warrington Recognition Memory Test (Warrington, 
1984).  Pearson correlation coefficient values underlined are significant at the p < .05 level; values underlined in solid line are significant at the p < .01 level. 
 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 
  BMIPB Fig 
Imm 
BMIPB Fig 
Del 
BMIPB 
List A1-A5 
BMIPB 
List 6 
BMIPB 
Story Imm 
BMIPB 
Story Del 
WRMT 
Words 
WRMT 
Faces 
FAS 
verbal 
fluency 
Category 
fluency 
Digits 
forward 
Digits 
backward 
1.Prop events subjectively recalled .55 .51 .34 .59 .51 .44 .38 .40 .47 .63 .30 .25 
2.Prop events context recalled .26 .17 .06 .22 .19 .16 .20 .03 .23 .25 .03 -.15 
3.Number of events correctly 
dated 
.16 .12 .17 .34 .28 .22 .27 -.08 .52 .24 .16 .11 
4.Prop years attempted that were 
correct 
     -.38 -.39      -.44    -.36 -.32     -.26 -.09     -.11 -.09 -.02 -.10 -.29 
5.Mean vividness all events .44 .36 .24 .46 .61 .57 .37 .52 .64 .24 -.20 -.29 
6.Mean vividness events 
subjectively recalled 
.07 .02 .02 .06 .34 .37 .28 .15 .41 -.19 -.50 -.53 
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7.5 The role of anxiety and depression levels 
 
As mentioned in the main Introduction, anxiety and depression are common in TLE, and high 
symptom levels of these have been found to inflate patients’ subjective worries about 
memory. The relationship between depression, anxiety and objective memory performance is 
quite variable, however. For example, Burt, Zembar, and Niederehe (1995) found clear 
associations between memory impairment and depressive symptoms in a clinically depressed 
sample, but this varied among different types of memory and throughout different subsets of 
depressed individuals. In TLE, depressive symptoms have been associated with impaired 
auditory memory, but again, the relationship is highly variable, being influenced by factors 
such as laterality of focus and degree of hippocampal integrity (Dulay, Schefft, Fargo, Privitera, 
& Yeh, 2004). Similarly, the deleterious effects of anxiety on memory have been suggested to 
be quite specific, for example, by reducing attentional capacity and hence reducing short-term 
or working memory load (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). It is therefore possible that elevated levels 
of anxiety or depression could contribute to impairments in recollection, as well as other forms 
of memory. 
A correlational analysis was performed for the TLE group between HAD scale (Zigmond & 
Snaith, 1983) anxiety and depression scores and all subjective and objective experimental 
antero-retrograde measures described in the above analyses (Appendix I; a total of 36 
comparisons were made). Anxiety and depression scores had a strong significant positive 
correlation with each other (r = .64, p = .001, N = 23), which is in line with a wealth of research 
suggesting a high degree of comorbidity between these symptoms (see Pollack, 2005, for a 
review). However, anxiety scores did not correlate with any of the anterograde or retrograde 
recollection measures outlined above. This finding is highly encouraging, as it suggests that 
despite the elevated (yet non-significant) levels of anxiety in the TLE group, this was not likely 
to be the reason for their recollection impairments.  
Depression only had one significant negative correlation with the proportion of events where 
the specific encoding context was recalled in the public events task (r = -.50, p = .04, N = 17). 
This is consistent with existing literature that has shown depression is related to over-general 
autobiographical memories that lack specificity of content (e.g. Brewin, Reynolds, & Tata, 
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1999). In general, these findings suggest concomitant mood disturbance was not related to 
recollective memory ability, especially for anterograde recognition tasks. 
Finally, the correlational analysis between the MMQ subscales and anxiety and depression 
revealed only one significant correlation: The MMQ Strategy subscale had a significant 
negative correlation with HADs anxiety (r = -.48, p = .03, N = 20). Because lower scores on the 
Strategy subscale indicate a greater use of memory aid strategies, this correlation suggests 
people who are more anxious engage in more of these activities. This makes intuitive sense; if 
a person is worried about their memory, they are probably more likely do to things that will 
help them remember information. Of course, a causal relationship cannot be concluded from 
this analysis – it could be argued that engaging in these memory aid activities actually results 
in further anxiety about memory.  
 
7.6 Discussion 
 
Having established impairments in subjective and objective recollection in TLE in the rest of 
this thesis, the current chapter had a clear aim of exploring a range of broader theoretical and 
clinical aims. The key findings were that a clear positive relationship exists between 
recollection measures derived from different experimental paradigms; these, and other 
neuropsychological memory scores are largely dissociable from subjective perceptions of 
memory (as measured through questionnaire self-report); recollective ability, both subjective 
and objective, is related to neuropsychological tests of MTL functioning; and finally, non-
clinical anxiety and depression levels have a negligible relationship with measures of 
recollection. 
The observed relationships between different measures of recollection between and within 
tasks provides support for the contention that despite the different conceptualisations of 
recollection embodied in various dual-process led experimental paradigms, each of them are 
measuring a common cognitive process (Yonelinas, 2001).  
However, this analysis was not meant to provide a definitive theoretical account of the 
covariation between different recollection measures. Rather, it was an exploratory analysis 
meant to add to the findings already presented that subjective and objective recollection, 
although impaired in TLE, may be calibrated and hence related to some extent. The data on 
which these correlations are based could of course be broken down and analysed in various 
ways to further explore these relationships. There are also many other measures that were not 
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included in the analyses which may also covary with one another, such as measures of 
familiarity, recognition sensitivity and bias. As mentioned in the Introduction, further 
assessment of the relationship between recollection and familiarity measures is likely to add to 
continuing debate regarding the independence assumption of dual-process theories, and 
would no doubt inform our understanding of the way in which these two processes are used in 
concert to aid memory performance. Unfortunately, such an analysis requires a detailed 
consideration of further statistical concepts that it was felt would detract away from the main 
focus of the current chapter. 
There are also alternative methods for assessing the dependencies between the above 
variables, which could be utilised in further investigations. For example, using path analysis or 
structural equation modelling, comparisons could be made between the data obtained from 
patients and controls. Notably, recent attempts have been made to assess the relationship 
between recollection and familiarity, such as using hierarchical nonlinear regression 
techniques (Pratte & Rouder, 2012). Clearly, this is still a ripe area of research that will 
continue to receive empirical attention.    
From a clinical perspective, appreciating the exact processes, and hence brain areas involved in 
certain neuropsychological tests, is crucial. This is because neuropsychological assessment has 
become fundamental in surgical decision making in TLE. Considerations here include the 
measurement of relative impairments in verbal and non-verbal memory for the purposes of 
lateralisation, and measuring the extent of impairments to determine likely post-operative 
memory decline. Saling (2009) provides a critique of the currently adopted neuropsychological 
approach to epilepsy. Citing inconsistencies in the verbal/non-verbal distinction in the 
literature, he discusses how the simple application of factorially derived measures of left or 
right sided function from a battery of subtests is no longer applicable. This approach, he 
argues, does not take into account task-specificity and the possibility that individual types of 
tests are reliant on more separable cognitive systems that operate in discrete MTL sub regions. 
The main distinction he makes regards LTLE and the role of the hippocampus in arbitrary forms 
of learning (such as unrelated word-pairs), and the role of anterior temporal structures in 
learning of information that is reliant on pre-existing semantic representations (e.g. prose 
recall and list learning). An important criticism he makes is that correlations found between 
neuropsychological measures are typically concluded to mean that these are fundamentally 
measuring the same constructs, therefore, a patient’s score on either are thought to reflect 
the same thing. He goes on to say that, “This approach to validity assigns no particular 
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importance to the nature of the task (such as its cognitive architecture), or to the possibility 
that task-specific factors might be subserved by different causal mechanisms” (p. 571).  
Thus, the conclusions drawn from this chapter about the common underlying nature of 
recollection between tasks must be interpreted with caution. Although the evidence does 
suggest that a common recollective process, most likely hippocampally based, operates 
between the tasks, each paradigm does indeed differ in its requirements and the analysis 
presented is unable to shed light on the influence of pre-established semantic loading of items, 
for example. Because of the heterogeneity of the sample, conclusions about laterality are also 
difficult to establish. Nevertheless, future studies would be useful in bridging the gap between 
the dual-process and neuropsychological assessment literatures in TLE whilst taking into 
account Saling’s (2009) concerns. These kind of theoretical and clinical themes are developed 
further in the following chapter. 
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8 General Discussion 
 
 
8.1 Overview 
 
This thesis set to out to further our understanding about memory impairments and awareness 
in TLE. This was achieved by developing a number of empirical tasks that were all theoretically 
driven by dual-process theories of memory; hence, the objective was to examine the extent to 
which TLE is characterised by reduced recollection. 
Whilst each experiment addressed this central aim, they were also designed in such a way as 
to shed light on some further theoretical and clinical issues. Incorporating a range of subjective 
and objective memory measures afforded the opportunity to examine the different ways 
various dual-process theories conceptualise recollection. Because recollection is assumed to 
rely on the MTL, patients with TLE provide an excellent sample with which to test these 
assumptions. As well as contributing to the dual-process literature, this comparison of 
subjective and objective measures of memory meant a fundamental clinical question could be 
concurrently addressed. That is, what are patients’ qualitative experiences of their memory 
impairment like?   
Table 8.1 presents a summary of the key findings from each chapter, and is subdivided into the 
headings of objective/recognition memory performance; subjective experience/awareness; 
objective recollection and familiarity and; subjective-objective comparisons. This reflects how 
subjective-objective comparisons of memory tied each experiment together. Table 8.2 further 
consolidates the main findings into a simpler format, summarising whether general recognition 
memory impairments were found in the TLE group and whether subjective/objective 
recollection and familiarity were reduced or impaired on each task. In the rest of this chapter I 
extend this summary of findings and provide a general discussion with reference to relevant 
existing literature. The more theoretical and clinical considerations are covered following this 
summary in the context of the findings from Chapter 7. Some limitations of the present 
research and future directions are then outlined at the end of the chapter.  
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Table 8.1 Detailed summary of main experimental findings. 
 Main findings 
Chapter Recognition/objective memory 
performance 
Subjective experience/awareness Objective recollection and familiarity Subjective-Objective comparison 
 
2.Neuropsychological 
Assessment 
 
Impairments in all but one of the 
neuropsychological tests assessing MTL 
functioning. 
 
Patients complained of various memory 
difficulties in daily life. 
 
n/a 
 
Neuropsych assessment provides 
objective validation of subjective 
complaints. 
 
3. Source memory 
 
Impairment in recognition memory with 
LTLE having worst discrimination 
performance. 
 
Significant reductions in R responses in 
TLE with familiarity intact; LTLE had 
lowest level of subjective remembering. 
 
Source memory performance for 
retrieval of location, order and colour 
of items comparable to controls. 
 
In controls, better source memory and 
external associative information for R 
responses. In TLE, contextual retrieval 
did not differentiate between R/F 
responses. 
4.1 Word repetition-lag PDP 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Face repetition-lag PDP 
Old-new discrimination worse in TLE; 
unimpaired for inclusion items; LTLE 
made the most exclusion items FPs. 
 
 
 
TLE/controls were = on FPs to new 
items; controls sig > TLE for hits to old 
items. Impaired on inclusion items with 
LTLE sig < controls. No difference in 
exclusion FPs. 
Same as Ch. 3 for studied items, with no 
clear laterality differences. For repeated 
inclusion items, fewer R responses made 
in TLE overall and as lags increased. BTLE 
sig. < controls, LTLE also low. 
 
R sig < in TLE for study items, with some 
evidence for LTLE having the lowest; 
corrected F score sig < in TLE also. For 
repeated inclusion items, TLE sig < R 
responses than controls. 
Collapsed over lag interval, TLE R 
estimate sig < controls, with F intact. F 
increased as a function of lag interval 
in both groups. 
 
 
No difference in R or F estimates 
between TLE and controls. 
High degree of convergence between 
impaired objective R measures and 
reduced subjective R across old-new 
items and repeated-lag items. 
 
 
Consistency in lower subjective R in TLE 
when probed, but comparable to 
controls in objective R suggesting 
different demands between study/ 
repeated items. 
5. Associative recognition Item memory and hits to intact pairs 
equivalent in TLE/controls. AI, AR sig < in 
TLE; rearranged FPs sig > in TLE. 
 
 
TLE and controls adjust confidence 
accordingly to difficulty of task and 
correct/incorrect items. 
No sig. impairment in TLE for 
recollection estimate; familiarity 
intact.  
TLE show awareness as confidence 
reflects poor objective memory ability. 
6. Naturalistic measures: 
MMQ and public events 
No diff. found in overall public event 
dating accuracy. Groups were also 
comparable in under/overestimation of 
date when incorrect. 
 
 
 
Sig. < levels of perceived memory function 
in TLE (MMQ).  
TLE sig. < controls on all subjective 
measures related to recall of public 
events, except personal sig. Both groups 
judge awareness of knowledge 
appropriately. 
n/a No relationship between MMQ and 
public events measures. Retrieval of 
encoding context led to ↑ in dating 
accuracy, but more so in controls. 
Dating accuracy also related to ↑ 
vividness comparably between groups. 
7. Correlation analysis 
(TLE only) 
Neuropsych test performance related to 
subjective/objective recollection. 
 
 
Sig. correlations found between 
subjective measures of recollection 
between tasks. 
Sig. correlations between R measures. Sig. correlations between a range of 
subjective and objective measures of R. 
Note: PDP = process-dissociation procedure,  MMQ = Multifactorial memory questionnaire (Troyer & Rich, 2002), TLE = temporal lobe epilepsy, MTL = medial temporal lobe,  LTLE = left temporal lobe epilepsy, 
FP = false positive, AI = associative identification, AR = associative reinstatement, R = remember, F = familiar. 
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Table 8.2 Basic summary of main experimental findings. 
 
8.2 Summary of findings 
 
8.2.1 Chapter 2 
 
Chapter 2 presented the results of the detailed neuropsychological assessment conducted with 
both patients and controls. This assessment included standardised measures of immediate and 
delayed visual/verbal recall and recognition memory, as well as some measure of executive 
function.  
The TLE sample was found to be impaired compared to the control group on every memory 
measure except multi-trial list learning. The impairments found are thus consistent with the 
extensive literature documenting the effects of TLE on standardised tests of anterograde 
memory (see Baker & Goldstein, 2004; Goldstein, 1991; McAndrews & Cohn, 2012, for 
reviews). The sample was comprised of patients with complex, chronic TLE, relatively recently 
diagnosed TLE, and those who had had resective surgery; although individual patients’ scores 
were not presented, all of these types of patients have previously been found to show memory 
impairment in standardised measures (Aikiä, Salmenperä, Partanen, & Kälviäinen, 2001; 
Richardson et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2011; Vaz, 2004). Although there was variability in the 
extent of impairments, establishing clear deficits at the group level provided the platform with 
which to further examine the basis of memory problems in this group. Moreover, performance 
was comparable to controls on digit span and fluency measures; this provided evidence to 
suggest that any further memory impairment discovered was not due to frontal-lobe 
dysfunction. 
   Subjective Objective 
Chapter Paradigm Recog. 
deficit 
R 
reduced? 
F 
reduced? 
R 
impaired? 
F 
impaired? 
2 Neuropsych. tests  - - - - 
3 Source memory   x  - 
4 (Words) PDP   x  x 
4 (Faces) PDP    x x 
5 Associative recog.  - - x x 
6 Public events x  - - - 
Note: PDP = process-dissociation procedure, recog = recognition, R = recollection, F = familiarity. 
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There was some evidence of lateralised differences in memory. Somewhat surprisingly, left 
and bilateral TLE patients had the worst performance compared to controls on delayed recall 
of the BMIPB figure; based on lesion site, one can account for the greater impairment in 
bilateral patients as presumably verbal and non-verbal memory areas would be affected. The 
poor performance in LTLE was most likely due to worse overall memory capacity. Less 
surprising was the finding that LTLE showed the worst performance in story recall.  
Previous research has found the WRMT to have poor pre-operative lateralising value, but 
greater left/right TLE discriminability following temporal lobectomy (Hermann, Connell, Barr, & 
Wyler, 1995). In the current sample, this test revealed a preferential verbal impairment in 
LTLE, as well as worse performance for face recognition in RTLE. Based on the Hermann et al. 
study, this is likely due to the inclusion of pre- and post-operative patients. 
In terms of their experience of memory decline, all patients reported some degree of 
subjective memory complaint; the results of the neuropsychological assessment thus provided 
some validation of these. There was no direct quantification of perceived memory failure at 
this stage, however.  
 
8.2.2 Chapter 3 
 
Chapter 3 assessed source memory in TLE; the novel aim was to compare the types of 
contextual information available to patients and controls during different subjective states of 
awareness during recognition using the R/K paradigm (Tulving, 1985).  
Recognition of target words was impaired in patients, with LTLE having the worst performance. 
Overall retrieval of contextual details of items was not however different to controls. This 
finding is contrary to the previous TLE studies that have shown this patient group to be 
impaired in their retrieval of spatial context information (Kopelman et al., 1997), source 
memory for who performed an action (Schwerdt & Dopkins, 2001) and memory for the 
context in which trivia answers were provided (Thaiss & Petrides, 2003). The paradigms used 
are very different, however, and the main analysis looked at performance during different 
subjective experiences, as discussed below. 
TLE patients showed a reduction in the number of subjective Remember responses, whilst 
familiarity was intact. Consistent with recognition performance, LTLE patients made the fewest 
Remember responses. These results support the findings of Moscovitch and McAndrews 
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(2002), who showed material specific impairments in remembering in a similar recognition 
task. A selective reduction in subjective remembering for verbal material in LTLE is far from a 
consistent finding in the literature, however. Although impaired in comparison to controls, 
Bowles et al. (2010) found no difference in proportion of Remember judgments between left 
and right sided patients who had both had amygdalo-hippocampectomies. Moreover, Blaxton 
and Theodore (1997) found patients with a left epileptic focus provided significantly fewer 
Remember responses regardless of material type (words or abstract designs). Because non-
verbal memory was not assessed in this task, the results cannot directly speak to other studies 
that have found different patterns of impairment in subjective remembering between left and 
right TLE patients (Bengner & Malina, 2008; Blaxton & Theodore, 1997). Nevertheless, the 
results are supportive of this literature in that they provide further evidence that recognition 
memory is subserved primarily through assessments of familiarity in TLE. 
Objective recollection, as mentioned above, was measured in terms of the amount of 
contextual features that were retrieved with target words. When comparing Remember and 
Familiar judgments in TLE, it was found that these two subjective states of awareness could 
not be reliably distinguished on the basis of such contextual retrieval. However, in controls, 
Remember responses were associated with increased source memory performance. The 
findings in the control group therefore replicate a number of studies that have found 
subjective remembering to be associated with better retrieval of individual and multiple bound 
source features (Dudukovic & Knowlton, 2006; Meiser & Bröder, 2002; Meiser et al., 2008;  
Perfect et al., 1996; Starns & Hicks, 2005).  
The main question to emerge from these findings is, on what basis are Remember responses 
made in TLE? A recent study on older adults by Boywitt, Kuhlmann, and Meiser (2012) had 
similar findings in that source memory did not differentiate between Remember and Familiar 
responses, despite unimpaired overall objective performance. As with their suggestions, it 
could be that TLE patients base their Remember responses on contextual information not 
queried during the experiment; patients here reported a comparable level of external 
associations to controls, though. From one signal detection perspective (Wixted & Mickes, 
2010), a Remember response is made if enough source information is retrieved to pass a 
threshold. Therefore, it may be that control participants base their Remember response on the 
to-be-retrieved contextual information, but the other external associative information 
accompanying recognition in patients is sufficient to make a Remember response. The fact 
that Familiar responses were associated with the retrieval of some degree of contextual 
information is also consistent with a memory strength interpretation, whereby Familiar 
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responses simply represent weaker memories. Crucially, however, as Yonelinas (2002) states, 
the dissociations found between recollection and familiarity in MTL damaged groups and 
healthy adults provide the best evidence against such accounts. The issue of single trace 
interpretations of the data in this thesis is discussed further in Section 8.5 below.  
 
8.2.3 Chapter 4 
 
Chapter 4 looked at recollection and familiarity from the perspective of Jacoby’s (1991) PDP, 
which conceptualises the two processes as automatic and controlled bases for responding. 
This was achieved using the repetition-lag task (Jennings & Jacoby, 1997) with two novel 
methodological alterations. First, the R/K paradigm was incorporated into the task, in order to 
compare subjective recollective experience with the cognitive basis of recollection. Second, 
identical verbal and non-verbal (unfamiliar facial stimuli) tasks were employed in order to 
examine laterality differences and to more generally assess any potential change in the extent 
recollection and familiarity are utilised between different material types. 
In the word version of the task, recognition memory impairments were found, with LTLE 
patients performing the worst on items where successful performance was dependent on 
successful recollection (repeated lag items in the exclusion task). There only appears to be one 
other study in the published literature that has compared left and right TLE patients in an 
inclusion or exclusion task of this sort. Fell et al. (2011) used a continuous verbal recognition 
paradigm analogous to the inclusion test presented here, with the exception that there were 
no study phase items. Measuring hits and FPs with lag intervals ranging up to 30 items, they 
found performance did not differ between left/right presurgical patients. Differences in 
procedure make it difficult to compare these discordant findings, however. 
The pattern of results for subjective experience responses to study items mirrored those 
reported in Chapter 3, where a significant reduction was found in Remember judgments, 
whilst familiarity was intact in TLE. No laterality differences emerged on these items, however. 
For repeated inclusion items, patients made significantly fewer Remember judgments than 
controls, and these decreased as a function of lag. Critically, the objective process estimations 
converged with this finding; patients were impaired in their objective use of recollection 
overall and familiarity was shown to increase linearly as a function of lag comparably in both 
groups.  
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This finding contributed to the overall aim of this thesis in elucidating memory impairment in 
TLE from a dual-process perspective. Importantly, the convergence in subjective and objective 
recollection is in line with previous literature that has found high correspondence between the 
two measures (Jacoby, Yonelinas, & Jennings, 1997; Jacoby, 1998; Prull et al., 2006; Yonelinas, 
2001, 2002; Yonelinas et al., 2002). This is the first time, however, that this correspondence 
has been shown in a repetition-lag task, and moreover the first illustration of this in TLE. The 
results suggest that patients’ subjective reports are valid interpretations of their underlying 
memory processes.  
The finding of an impairment in objective recollection estimates and intact familiarity is 
supportive of two previous TLE studies that have used the PDP in the context of word-stem 
completion paradigms (Del Vecchio et al., 2004; Hudson et al., 2009). Moreover, a body of 
work in aging populations and Alzheimer’s disease has found similar patterns of results using 
the repetition-lag procedure (Boller, Jennings, Dieudonné, Verny, & Ergis, 2012; Jennings & 
Jacoby, 1997; Jennings & Jacoby, 2003; Tse et al., 2010). These consistent dissociations suggest 
this task is particularly effective in measuring MTL dependent memory dysfunction. Indeed, 
exclusion item performance has been found to have diagnostic power over standardised 
neuropsychological tests in highlighting memory impairment in Alzheimer’s disease (Tse et al., 
2010). It may therefore be highly useful in the field of epileptology. I return to this point in 
Section 8.4.  
The findings from the face version of the task were somewhat different. In patients, 
performance on study items was impaired and associated with lower levels of subjective 
Remember responses, with one of the familiarity estimates also being significantly below that 
of controls. Recent studies in amnesics by Bird, Shallice and Cipolotti (2007) and Bird and 
Burgess (2008) suggest that recognition of unfamiliar faces is driven primarily through 
familiarity and other processes operating outside the hippocampus; because the sample here 
included patients with a diverse range of aetiologies and epileptic profiles, it is possible that 
general MTL damage led to reductions in both recollection and familiarity. 
LTLE patients had the lowest performance on repeated inclusion items and also had the lowest 
subjective recollection estimates. These results do not support the three previous group 
studies that have assessed subjective experience for non-verbal memory recognition memory 
in TLE (Bengner & Malina, 2008; Blaxton & Theodore, 1997; Moscovitch & McAndrews, 2002). 
The repetition-lag task is however, more complex than the simple single item-recognition 
paradigms utilised in those studies; successful performance on each test requires increased 
attention due to constant interference created by new and repeating items. It was suggested 
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that the results of the LTLE patient group may be due to an overall greater impairment in 
general memory capacity. Unfortunately, there are no other published studies in the TLE 
literature that have used this task and made similar comparisons between left and right TLE 
patients; Martin et al. (2012) used an exclusion procedure involving categorised visual scenes, 
but they do not report laterality results. 
Despite evidence of reduced subjective remembering in patients for repeated inclusion items, 
the objective process estimations derived from overall task performance revealed no 
impairment in objective recollection and familiarity. Essentially, no difference was found 
between groups when taking into account exclusion FPs, which is surprising given that 
recollection is theoretically required to successfully reject these items. Although there was 
correspondence between some of the recollection measures, it was suggested that the 
difficulty of the task may have obscured any underlying impairment in the TLE group in their 
objective use of recollection. 
The divergence in findings between the word and face versions of the task is a good example 
of how controlled and automatic uses of memory, as conceptualised by the PDP, are context 
dependent (Kelley & Jacoby, 1998). Although participants have to apply the same basic set of 
principles to complete each task, changing the material type may have provided a different 
context in which recollection and familiarity operate. As the performance measures showed, 
the facial stimuli were more difficult, and this may have altered participants’ goals or 
intentions, which also constitute part of the ‘context’ (Jacoby & Kelley, 1998). The SMF 
outlined by Johnson and colleagues also ascribes importance to how memory operates 
differently when participants’ motivations change (Johnson & Raye, 2000; Johnson, 2006; 
Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Mitchell & Johnson, 2009). In sum, it is important to 
consider these additional factors when interpreting results between different tasks. 
  
8.2.4  Chapter 5 
 
Whilst Chapters 3 and 4 looked at patients’ experience of their memory impairment through 
application of the R/K paradigm, Chapter 5 aimed to contribute to this area further by 
employing a more standard metacognitive measure – subjective confidence. This was achieved 
by borrowing the associative recognition paradigm originally developed by Cohn and 
Moscovitch (2007). Using this paradigm, Cohn et al. (2009) had previously provided evidence 
of impairments in a number of measures that index relational binding ability in a group of post-
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surgical TLE patients. In Chapter 5, participants were asked to make confidence judgments for 
all recognition decisions; therefore the aim was to evaluate metacognitive sensitivity and 
accuracy over item types that were more or less reliant on recollection and familiarity. Due to 
the variation in patients, the results regarding recollection and associative memory were also 
suggested to be more representative than Cohn et al.’s (2009) study. 
TLE patients were found to be impaired in associative memory measures dependent on 
binding and strategic retrieval (associative identification estimate and rejection of rearranged 
items in the associative identification task). Whereas these measures are thought to engage 
both MTL and frontal regions, patients were also impaired in associative reinstatement, which 
is thought to be a purer index of MTL relational binding ability (Cohn et al. 2009). This was also 
in light of the fact that patients did not differ from controls in the number of sentences 
successfully created during encoding. 
Item memory and hits to intact pairs (which are solvable by recollection and familiarity) were 
equivalent between patients and controls, however. This supports studies that have shown 
disproportionate decreases in associative over item memory deficits in other groups with MTL 
dysfunction, such as older adults (Castel & Craik, 2003; Cohn et al., 2008) and amnesics 
(Giovanello et al., 2003; Kan et al., 2007b). The amnesic studies in particular have suggested 
that associative deficits are a result of hippocampal pathology; however, some authors have 
criticised this literature on the basis that memory encoding is not adequately matched 
between patients and controls (Stark, Bayley, & Squire, 2002). Matching procedures were not 
used in the experiment in Chapter 5, therefore a note of caution must be taken in interpreting 
the findings. 
There were several points of divergence between the results obtained here and those of Cohn 
et al. (2009). These authors found impairments in left and right patients on PDP derived 
recollection estimates, whereas familiarity impairments were found in the dominant TLE 
group. I found no impairment in either recollection or familiarity estimates. Cohn et al.’s 
(2009) data therefore provide evidence for material-specific verbal impairments in familiarity 
in LTLE, which was also recently shown by Martin et al. (2011). That there was no lateralised 
deficit in recollection in Cohn et al.’s (2009) study was explained in terms of the fact that 
recollection is probably more reliant on bound verbal and visual associations (i.e. making 
images when encoding sentences). Therefore, there is likely to be more of a bilateral 
involvement for recollection, whereas familiarity relies predominantly on verbal information.  
Both of the above studies included patients with anterior temporal lobe resections. Therefore, 
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the lack of laterality findings in Chapter 5 most likely represent differences in lesion extent and 
location.  
Initially, the lack of impairment seen in PDP derived recollection estimates seems to contradict 
the results of the other relational measures. However, these estimates take into account a 
larger set of data across both recognition tests and as discussed above, provide a measure of 
the extent to which different processes are used as bases for responding. In contrast, the 
relational measures provide specific indexes of binding at encoding or retrieval. The overall 
recollection estimate could thus be viewed in parallel to the control aspect of Nelson and 
Narens’ (1990) model. Whilst objective recollection generally controls the accepting and 
rejecting of items dependent on the task requirements, the subjective experience of 
remembering can be seen as the monitoring component of the Nelson and Narens (1990) 
model. The interaction between the two guides subsequent memory ‘behaviours’. In sum, 
these performance data add to the TLE literature and suggest associative memory impairments 
are observable in a more diverse range of patients. 
For the confidence data, several different analyses all provided consistent evidence that TLE 
patients were metacognitively intact, despite their associative memory impairments. Overall 
confidence was lower in the TLE group, but patients showed similar sensitivity to controls at 
this lower level of confidence. For example, both groups showed significantly higher 
confidence to intact pairs in both tests. Moreover, the means from the associative memory 
estimates suggested left sided patients had the lowest associative memory performance and a 
significant laterality effect was found such that this group had the lowest confidence.  
Metacognitive accuracy was assessed by comparing confidence to correct and incorrect 
answers across groups. The main items on which this analysis was based were the rearranged 
and intact pairs on each of the pair and associative identification tests. Patients’ confidence 
was found not to be different to controls overall, and both groups showed a comparable 
significant increase for correct over incorrect responses. Moreover, FPs to rearranged items on 
the associative identification task (resulting from a failure in recalling-to-reject) are what 
characterise the TLE associative deficit; a metacognitive account would predict that this occurs 
because patients accept two familiar (but rearranged) words as an originally bound pairing due 
to inappropriately high confidence. However, this was not the case, as no difference was found 
between patients and controls’ confidence to these items. 
The results support two recent empirical studies by Andrés et al. (2010) and Howard et al. 
(2010) who similarly found that despite significant recall and recognition impairments, TLE 
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patients had accurate metacognitive monitoring (using JOLs and FOK judgments) and 
appropriately shifted metacognitive judgments according to the difficulty of a task (they were 
able to adjust post-study metamemory predictions in the same way as controls). The 
assessment of confidence in Chapter 5 for such a variety of different item types builds on the 
two above studies because the data elucidated a range of associative memory impairments in 
TLE whilst simultaneously dispatching the hypothesis that these were a by-product of a 
metacognitive deficit. The empirical demonstration of recollection and binding impairments in 
the TLE group in the context of intact awareness confirms the existence of MTL damage and 
preservation of frontal functioning (as evidence by the neuropsychological assessment). 
 
8.2.5 Chapter 6 
 
Chapter 6 moved beyond the assessment of awareness and recollection and familiarity in the 
laboratory. Instead, two more naturalistic measures were employed in a much larger internet 
based sample, as well as a number of the participants recruited for the rest of the research in 
this thesis. First, drawing on the extant TLE literature that has shown patients to have 
significantly lowered subjective perceptions of memory function, the MMQ (Troyer & Rich, 
2002) was administered to patients and controls. Second, a novel public events task was 
completed by participants which included questions designed to assess objective memory 
performance, the contribution of recollection to retrograde AM, as well as provide another 
measure of awareness. 
Significant differences in overall MMQ score was found between the TLE group and controls. 
Significant differences were also found between each individual subscale (Contentment, 
Ability, and Strategy). The TLE group had the lowest score on the Contentment scale, 
suggesting high levels of dissatisfaction and negative affect related to their memory. The 
significantly lower score on the Ability scale indicated that people with TLE utilise memory aid 
strategies less than healthy adults. The low score on the Ability subscale indicated perceived 
difficulty with effectively using memory in everyday situations. There were no differences in 
subgroups of laterality and AED regime, nor was there an association between scores and age 
of onset or illness duration. These latter findings partially contradict a previous study by 
Hendriks et al. (2002), who found an inverse relationship between illness duration and 
perceived level of memory functioning. On the whole, however, the results are supportive of 
multiple studies in the literature that have suggested TLE patients subjectively complain of 
poor memory ability or have dissatisfaction with their memory (Corcoran & Thompson, 1992; 
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Elixhauser et al., 1999; Giovagnoli et al., 1997; Gleißner et al., 1998; Rayner et al., 2010; 
Thompson & Corcoran, 1992; Vermeulen et al., 1993). Moreover, this was evidenced through 
use of a different, reliable and valid questionnaire.  
The objective findings from the public events task revealed people with TLE were just as 
accurate as healthy adults in correctly dating public events. Additionally, the relative degree of 
inaccuracy showed the same level of dispersion as controls. Consistent with my other findings 
of intact awareness, the TLE group, like controls, were more accurate in dating when they had 
previously stated that they thought they knew the answer. Therefore, both groups accurately 
monitored currently available knowledge. Other studies in the TLE literature have found 
impairments in public semantic knowledge in a variety of different tasks (Barr et al., 1990; 
Bergin et al., 2000; Haag et al., 2010; Lah et al., 2004, 2008; Leeman et al., 2009; Seidenberg et 
al., 2002; Viskontas et al., 2002). Dating accuracy has not however been examined before and 
the results here suggest that the integrity of the systems used in the correct dating of events is 
not completely compromised in TLE. The results from the subjective memory measures 
provided further insight into such processes. 
The TLE group had significantly lower scores for all the subjective measures. These included 
the number of events recalled, the number of events where the initial encoding context could 
be recalled and vividness associated with recall of events. Because recollection is at least 
theoretically involved in all of these, the results are supportive of other TLE studies that have 
evidenced pervasive episodic AM impairments in this group (Addis et al., 2007; Butler et al., 
2009; Herfurth et al., 2010; Illman et al., 2011; Lah et al., 2004, 2006, 2008; Noulhiane et al., 
2007; Park et al., 2011; St-Laurent et al., 2009). 
Further analyses found that both groups’ dating accuracy was better for events when they 
reported recall of the initial encoding context; this was more so for controls, however. 
Increased vividness accompanying memory for events was also associated with better dating 
accuracy in a comparable way between groups. These results suggested that despite a 
significant reduction in subjective measures associated with items, people with TLE were still 
able to utilise information arising from recollective experience of the event to correctly date it. 
Whereas the retrieval of public semantic knowledge is not typically assumed to rely on the 
episodic memory system, these results support previous suggestions that dating of historical 
events is achieved by retrieving contextual information pertaining to the self situated in the 
wider sociocultural context (Brown, 1990; Fradera & Ward, 2006; Petrican et al., 2010) 
Analogous to the independent but combined influence of recollection and familiarity in 
recognition memory, the results support the idea that a combination of the episodic and 
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semantic memory systems is used in the retrieval of autobiographical information (Greve et 
al., 2007). 
Finally, a positive association was found between perceived memory ability and contentment 
(as measured by the MMQ) and the number of events subjectively recalled in the public events 
task. This was in the TLE group only. As described above, neuropsychological tests dealing with 
anterograde memory often fail to corroborate TLE patients’ subjective reports. One reason for 
the discrepancy between perception of memory and standardised scores has been suggested 
to be the fact that subjective memory follows a different time-scale. A recent study by Witt, 
Glöckner and Helmstaedter (2012) showed that delayed objective memory after a four week 
period was more diagnostic of subjective complaint than performance at 30 minutes or one 
week. The association between the MMQ Ability and Contentment scales and an experimental 
measure of subjective recollection-like autobiographical recall also suggests that the 
degradation of memory traces over time may contribute to subjective complaints. 
 
8.3 Theoretical implications 
  
The use of a diverse range of tasks and materials throughout this thesis allowed a 
comprehensive assessment of the extent to which subjective and objective recollection is 
reduced, or impaired in this TLE group. This was the main aim. However, because of the 
application of these different tasks in the same group of subjects, it was possible to contribute 
to a more theoretical aspect of the dual-process literature. Essentially, addressing the question 
of how comparable different forms and uses of recollection are. 
As mentioned in Section 1.8, the dual-process theories on which different tasks are derived 
from conceptualise recollection in different ways. As Jacoby et al. (1997) describe, by using 
subjective reports, the R/K procedure “...identifies consciousness with awareness. The 
inclusion/exclusion procedure in contrast, defines consciousness with reference to intentional 
control of responding” (p.41).  Moreover, as Gardiner et al. (1996) discuss, the R/K procedure 
embodies a first person perspective, whereas the PDP and objective methods provide a third 
person perspective. Due to these differences, the measures of recollection derived from each, 
although predicted to have some similarity, will not always be the same.  
Despite this cautionary note, the results of this thesis have provided converging evidence 
between first and third-person measures of recollection. The dissociations seen between 
recollection and familiarity across tasks in itself strongly suggests that the subjective 
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experience of remembering is related to its objective use as a basis for responding. Moreover, 
the two within task comparisons (source memory and repetition-lag) provided some evidence 
that patients’ subjective experience is intrinsically linked to recollective cognitive processing. 
This convergence supports a number of previous studies that have compared different 
methods. For example, PDP estimates, ROC functions and IRK estimates have been found to be 
effected in similar ways under a number of experimental encoding and retrieval based 
manipulations in healthy adults (Jacoby, 1998; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995; Yonelinas, 2001); 
similar results using PDP and R/K estimates in the same study have been used to provide 
evidence for the contribution of automaticity to free recall (McCabe, Roediger, & Karpicke, 
2011); deficits in recollection have converged through use of PDP, R/K and ROC methods in a 
within-subjects manipulation in older adults (Prull et al., 2006) and similar deficits in 
recollection or familiarity have been observed by comparing these three methods in hypoxia 
related amnesia (Yonelinas, 2001) and a post-surgical TLE patient (Bowles et al., 2007). 
Rather than simply observing the similarities in patterns of recollection estimates across tasks, 
Chapter 7 went further and specifically analysed any potential statistical relationships between 
them. A number of significant correlations emerged between the anterograde recollection 
measures. For instance, subjective Remember responses between the face and word versions 
of the repetition-lag PDP task correlated with each other. This suggests that the probability of 
engaging in a state of awareness accompanied by contextual retrieval of previously studied 
information is similar even when the type of material is qualitatively different. 
Multiple correlations were found between objective measures of recollection, which 
suggested that it is used in a similar way to aid task performance. For example, associative 
identification correlated significantly with the objective measures from all other tasks – both 
face and word PDP estimates and the level of contextual retrieval from the source memory 
task. As described above, associative identification is thought to rely on a complex interaction 
between MTL and frontal lobe dependent recollection like processes, involving relational 
binding and strategic search mechanisms (Cohn et al., 2009). Successful performance on the 
tasks that it correlated with are also reliant on such processes; source memory involves the 
binding and retrieval of multiple contextual features into a single coherent memory trace. 
Recollection estimates from the repetition-lag task are derived similarly from the ability to 
accept and reject repeated lures in inclusion/exclusion tests, which is dependent on the extent 
to which items are successfully bound to their source of acquisition (i.e. study or test list).  
Similar to the subjective correlation, the objective recollection estimates from both repetition-
lag tasks correlated with each other. Although caution has been noted about the highly 
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constrained manner in which recollection operates in different versions of the PDP (Kelley & 
Jacoby, 1998; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 2012), these results provide compelling evidence that 
despite alterations in the context of the task, this version of the PDP appears to be isolating a 
similar process.  
The correlational analysis between subjective and objective measures was most relevant to 
addressing the theoretical relationship between recollection as conceived by first, and third 
person perspectives. Within-task correlations were found for the source memory task and 
word repetition-lag PDP task. There are very few studies that have compared correlations 
between subjective and objective measures in the same task but this finding supports the 
study by Jacoby, Debner and Hay (2001). In a PDP word-fragment completion paradigm, they 
asked participants to subjectively report whether they had recollected completion words. This 
procedure did not, however, utilise the R/K paradigm like the experiments reported here as 
familiarity responses were not recorded. The authors found Pearson’s correlations of .71 and 
.81 between objective PDP estimates and subjective Remember proportions for younger, and 
older participants, respectively. The present work extends upon this as it showed correlations 
between subjective and objective measures in two different tasks – therefore support is 
provided for Jacoby et al.’s (2001) conclusion: “These correlations suggest that participants 
were indeed aware of when they were recollecting” (p.692). Moreover, correlations were also 
found between subjective and objective measures of recollection from different tasks. So, it 
would seem that TLE patients’ ability to use recollection, and their awareness of this process, 
transfers across different testing contexts.  
Of further theoretical interest was the relationship between retrograde and anterograde 
measures. The analysis in Chapter 7 revealed that a measure that is likely to index some form 
of retrograde recollective process (subjective recall of public events) correlated with subjective 
and objective recollection on the word repetition-lag PDP task. Additionally, the objective 
recollective measure from the source memory task correlated with the absolute number of 
events correctly dated. From a neurobiological perspective, dual-process theories of 
anterograde recognition (Yonelinas, 2002) and multiple trace theory of AM (Moscovitch et al., 
2005; Nadel & Moscovitch, 1997) both assert that the hippocampus is critical for the 
recollection of contextual and associative information for recently acquired information or 
previously experienced events. Therefore, there should theoretically be some overlap between 
antero-retrograde tasks. Although the present results cannot speak directly to this 
neurobiological debate, they at least provide some support for the relationship between the 
use of recollection in the retrieval of past and recently acquired memories. Importantly, the 
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lack of correlations between the other measures also suggests that the tasks may be 
measuring different things. For example, although recollection supports binding and retrieval 
of information, anterograde tasks presumably require the activation of pre-existing semantic 
representations in long-term memory also. The kind of semantic information retrieved in 
retrograde memory is likely to differ to this; thus the interplay between recollection and other 
neurocognitive systems will vary in antero-retrograde tasks. 
 
8.4 Clinical implications 
 
The results of this thesis address some of the major clinical issues evident in the field of 
epileptology. These include the factors that mediate the relationship between subjective 
perceptions of memory and objective test performance; the diagnostic and localising value of 
memory tests and; the development of efficacious memory rehabilitation programs.  
The extant literature has found that the discrepancy found between subjective and objective 
indexes of memory in TLE is unarguably influenced primarily by concomitant levels of 
increased anxiety and depression (Dulay et al., 2004; Elixhauser et al., 1999; Giovagnoli et al., 
1997; Hendriks, Aldenkamp, van der Vlugt, Alpherts, & Vermeulen, 2002; Piazzini, Canevini, 
Maggiori, & Canger, 2001). In the present research, anxiety and depression showed no 
relationship to measures of subjective perception of memory, or other neuropsychological and 
experimental measures. It was therefore concluded that any relationship between memory 
measures was not unduly influenced by mood in this sample. Contrary to the samples reported 
in many previous studies, the patients here in fact subjectively complained of memory both 
informally and through use of a standardised questionnaire, and neuropsychological and 
empirical findings corroborated this. The present results build on the above research – the 
correspondence between subjective awareness and objective measures throughout the dual-
process driven approach suggests that metacognitive awareness is intact in the absence of 
high levels of anxiety and depression.  
However, recent advances in the field suggest that the very way subjective and objective forms 
of memory are compared must be re-evaluated. As discussed in Chapter 7, current 
questionnaire based assessment may be fundamentally probing perceptions or awareness of 
longer-term memory, whereas typical neuropsychological tests constrain their assessment to 
shorter retention intervals of only up to one hour. Distinguishing between different fractions 
of the same cognitive function (e.g. shorter or longer-term declarative memory) has been 
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shown to be useful in conceptualisations of awareness in Alzheimer’s disease, such as in the 
Dissociable Interaction and Conscious Experience (DICE) model (Schacter, 1989; 1990). At the 
lowest level of this model, there are modules related to specific cognitive functions (such as 
memory). The output of these provides input to the conscious awareness system (CAS). Output 
arises when there is a change from the baseline state of the module, resulting in activation of 
the module and its link to the CAS. Once the CAS is stimulated, conscious awareness is 
experienced of the information being processed. The CAS then provides input into the 
executive system, which combines all the information needed for complex functions. Damage 
to the executive system or CAS will thus lead to widespread deficits in awareness. However, 
damage to specific modules or their individual input to the CAS will lead to differing levels of 
awareness across domains. For example, damage to the immediate memory module may lead 
to dysfunctional awareness of shorter-term memory ability but leave awareness of longer-
term memory intact. This, and other more detailed cognitive models (e.g. Agnew & Morris, 
1998) highlight the importance of considering how different levels of awareness interact with 
separable memory systems in light of neurological damage. Although they have been 
developed in the context of Alzheimer’s disease, the prevailing discussion in the TLE literature 
regarding awareness of memory function suggests there is value in considering them in this 
condition also.  
 A body of evidence has emerged documenting patients whose memory impairment is more 
easily identifiable at longer delays, ranging from intervals of 24 hours to 6 weeks (Bell, Fine, 
Dow, Seidenberg, & Hermann, 2005; Blake, Wroe, Breen, & McCarthy, 2000; Cronel-Ohayon et 
al., 2006; Davidson, Dorris, O’Regan, & Zuberi, 2007;   Giovagnoli, Casazza, & Avanzini, 1995; 
Holdstock, Mayes, Isaac, Gong, & Roberts, 2002; Mameniskiene, Jatuzis, Kaubrys, & Budrys, 
2006; Manes, Graham, Zeman, de Luján Calcagno, & Hodges, 2005; Muhlert et al., 2011). This 
has been termed ‘accelerated long-term forgetting’ (ALF; Butler & Zeman, 2008; Butler et al., 
2007). As Witt et al. (2012) found, subjective reports of memory function were most related to 
standardised neuropsychological memory performance after a 4 week interval. It is easy to see 
how taking a dual-process approach to this area would be useful. For example, research with 
healthy adults has showed that the trajectory in states of awareness changes as a function of 
learning over time; better immediate memory is associated with recollective experience but 
over time the schematization of knowledge means that accuracy is related also to subjective 
knowing as well as recollection (Conway, Gardiner, Perfect, Anderson, & Cohen, 1997; 
Dewhurst, Conway, & Brandt, 2009; Herbert & Burt, 2001, 2004; Herbert & Burt, 2003). It has 
been suggested that the cause of ALF in TLE patients is a result of a functional disturbance to 
memory consolidation mechanisms (Muhlert & Zeman, 2012). Therefore, assessing 
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recollection, familiarity and their corresponding subjective states of awareness may contribute 
to this literature because it would further elucidate how consolidation deficits interfere with 
specific processes. This work could then provide a basis on which to identify the type of 
patients who are more likely to experience ALF.  
That many of the neuropsychological test scores correlated with recollection estimates 
provides supporting evidence that these both index similar MTL functioning. An important 
overriding question here is whether there is any added value in synthesising results of 
empirical studies into well established testing protocols. Essentially, would including tasks like 
the PDP into neuropsychological assessment be any better at highlighting specific memory 
impairment than current tests?  It appears that the word repetition-lag PDP task has particular 
benefit as it was sensitive to verbal memory impairment in LTLE and correlated with a number 
of other neuropsychological tests. As previously mentioned, the exclusion task also seems to 
be powerful in detecting memory failure in other MTL damaged groups (Tse et al., 2010).  
There are clearly practical limitations with the application of experimental paradigms to a 
clinical setting. For example, many experimental tasks are too long to fit into routine 
appointments. As well as the application of them described above, the use of subjective 
reports may be more practical, however.  Neuropsychological assessment involves 
engagement with the patient and noting observations about their behaviour – subjective 
reports would allow the clinician to directly observe the patient’s phenomenology associated 
with their memory and gain a qualitative appreciation of their memory impairment alongside 
quantitative measures. One can also see how asking people to subjectively report on their 
memory throughout a test may help maintain focus and concentration.  Given that patients’ 
subjective Remember responses may reflect underlying cognitive impairment, it is not 
inconceivable that a brief test utilising the R/K procedure could provide an immediate measure 
of MTL function, or awareness of function. Incorporating these kinds of empirically derived 
measures is likely to be a challenge, though, not just because of time-constraints during testing 
sessions. As Loring (2010) discusses, the current direction toward evidence-based 
neuropsychology means that innovative test development and integration is likely to suffer.  
Comprehensive anterograde test batteries are used all over the world. However, this is not the 
case for measures of AM. The recent acknowledgment in the field that TLE patients often have 
significant difficulties with retrograde memory as well as new learning urges development of 
such measures. As this thesis showed, dissociations may exist between different types of AM 
and it is important to gain a broader understanding of the exact processes involved in longer-
term memory impairment. Although many empirical studies have utilised detailed and 
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innovative testing protocols, the only currently commercially available AM tool for clinical 
assessment is the AMI (Kopelman et al., 1990). However, the AMI has been criticised because 
of a lack of sensitivity and the difficulty with validating the veracity of reported of memories. 
Addressing this issue, Leeman et al. (2009) recently presented a TLE study that utilised the 
‘Transient News Events Test’ (TNET) – an instrument that has potential widespread use 
including measures of recall and recognition of public events. Their combination of subjective 
and objective measures of AM is consistent with the approach taken in the public events task 
presented here. The development of similar tools in the future will no doubt be instrumental 
in determining the extent of patients’ AM problems; this may be particularly useful in 
assessing risk of post-operative decline. 
So far, this thesis has concentrated only on the measurement of impairment of memory in TLE. 
One clinical implication here is the extent to which the findings can inform approaches to 
memory rehabilitation in this patient group. As Shulman and Barr (2002) discuss, management 
of cognitive impairment in TLE can be achieved with careful pharmacological intervention by 
reducing negative side effects associated with high serum levels or poorly tolerated AEDs. 
Moreover, targeting co morbid anxiety and depression with psychological intervention early on 
is also likely to alleviate both subjective and objective memory problems.  
There are a number of published studies that have assessed memory rehabilitation in patients 
with organic memory impairment arising as a consequence of TLE itself (Bresson, Lespinet-
Najib, Rougier, Claverie, & N’Kaoua, 2007; Engelberts et al., 2002; Gupta & Naorem, 2003; 
Cristoph Helmstaedter et al., 2008; Radford, Lah, Thayer, & Miller, 2011; Schefft et al., 2008). 
Training interventions can be broadly divided into two approaches. The first is the 
compensation method, which involves finding effective ways of circumventing the memory or 
cognitive deficit. For example, it has become common place to encourage patients to use 
external memory aids, such as smart phones or digital recorders (Shulman & Barr, 2002). Also, 
improving internal memory strategies can be of benefit. For example, by encouraging self-
generation procedures and deeper levels of encoding (Bresson et al., 2007; Schefft et al., 
2008). The second approach is the retraining method, which is predicated on the assumption 
that due to plasticity of the brain, repeated practice on tasks can lead to restoration of 
function.  
The dual-process approach taken in this research may be useful for contributing to the 
rehabilitation literature. Drawing on the retraining approach, modified versions of the 
repetition-lag task have already been used with older adults and Alzheimer’s patients in the 
context of memory training (Boller, Jennings, Dieudonné, Verny, & Ergis, 2012b; Jennings et al, 
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2005). These studies use an incremental difficulty approach, whereby the lag interval is slowly 
increased between repeating items, meaning recollective ability is gradually trained, or 
restored. Critically, these two studies have also found evidence for transfer effects to other 
tasks dependent on MTL function. It would seem then that by taking a theoretical approach to 
what causes the underlying memory disorder has much benefit. Like older adults and 
Alzheimer’s patients, this thesis has consistently shown that people with TLE are deficient in 
their use of recollective processing to complete PDP tasks. Thus, there is clearly scope for 
similar training approaches in this clinical population. 
Rehabilitation also involves drawing attention to a patient’s awareness of their cognitive 
abilities (Engelberts et al. 2002). It has been shown here that TLE patients are indeed 
metacognitively aware of their impairments. As Jacoby and Kelley (1998) state, “...people on a 
training program are motivated by the perception that they are learning from that program” 
(p. 136). Subjective experience therefore plays a crucial supervisory role, and any training 
program should evaluate patients’ awareness of training effectiveness, as well as typical 
objective measurements. Moreover, reporting on subjective experience in itself may aid 
memory - Naveh-Benjamin and Kilb (2012) recently showed that the very use of the R/K 
procedure enhanced associative memory in older adults, which they suggested was a result of 
participants initiating additional strategies to make conscious assessments about the contents 
of memory. In summary, drawing on dual-process theories is likely to be of benefit to further 
work in this field. 
 
8.5 Further considerations and future directions 
 
The overall aim was to make a contribution to the TLE literature by concurrently objective and 
subjective indexes of memory. The dual-process approach was adopted because it provides a 
useful empirical framework with pre-established experimental paradigms in which to assess 
this. The results have therefore been interpreted consistently in terms of the contribution of 
the independent processes of recollection and familiarity. However, it is important to consider 
alternative single-trace accounts of the data.  
The ongoing debate in the literature between signal detection accounts and dual-process 
accounts typically concentrates on the assumptions of the R/K paradigm. Evidence for the 
contribution of two independent memory processes, or states of awareness to recognition has 
typically come from studies that have found dissociations between them (see Yonelinas, 2002, 
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for a review). Single trace theorists, on the other hand, propose that a more parsimonious 
explanation is that recognition memory is characterised by a unidimensional continuum of 
trace strength. By this view, remembering and knowing simply reflect varying degrees of 
confidence; Remember responses in the R/K paradigm are proposed to stem from stronger 
memories that surpass a given decision criterion, whereas Familiar responses represent a 
wider range of weaker, or less confident memories (Donaldson, 1996; Dunn, 2004). This 
account would therefore suggest that in the current set of experiments, TLE patients have a 
general impairment in this single continuous process, meaning their ability to retrieve 
stronger, more highly confident memories is reduced. To provide a concrete test of these 
accounts, it is necessary to assess subjective experience responses after equating overall 
memory strength. This was only done in Chapter 3. The results showed that there were 
differences between patients and controls in the retrieval of qualitative information available 
even after proportions of subjective Remember responses were equal. Therefore, the 
importance of considering recollection as a graded process was highlighted (Parks & Yonelinas, 
2008; Wais, Mickes, & Wixted, 2008; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007).  
Yonelinas and Jacoby (2012) describe that, “...the single-process account is insufficient, 
because it fails to explain the occurrence of these two subjectively distinct states...” (p. 670). 
Moreover, because of the way single-trace accounts assume the existence of a continuous 
memory signal, there is no reason to believe there would be a correspondence between 
subjective interpretation of memory and objective measurement (Wixted & Micks, 2010). 
Yonelinas and Jacoby (2012) discuss how a combined approach using the R/K paradigm and the 
PDP provides robust evidence against single trace interpretations. Consistent with this, the 
evidence provided in this thesis suggests that the two processes are dissociable in terms of 
their strategic regulation and subjective experience.  
Hirshman et al. (2002) suggested that “one critical purpose of the SDT model is through 
appropriate falsification to allow stronger inferences about the nature of consciousness and 
recognition memory processes” (p.153). Whilst this may be true, the novel assessment of 
subjective experience with objective uses of recollection and familiarity presented here has 
provided a useful insight into the conscious (and unconscious) aspects of memory in TLE. 
Moreover, the paradigmatic approach adopted indirectly assessed the compatibility of first 
and third person dual-process approaches; attempting to incorporate a single trace approach 
would have run risk of diluting the original purpose of the research. For example, there is no 
doubt that complex signal detection models could be applied to the confidence responses 
derived from the associative recognition task to make further assumptions about the 
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underlying memory processes contributing to performance. However, they were included to 
assess the feasibility of a metacognitive account of objective memory performance.  As 
Gardiner (2008) discusses, the application of sophisticated signal detection techniques does 
not necessarily have an advantage over more conceptually driven ones. 
One general criticism of dual-process paradigms is that misunderstanding or misinterpretation 
of instructions can invalidate the recollection and familiarity estimates derived from the tasks 
(Dunn, 2004; Jacoby, 1998; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 2012). Indeed, evidence showing that 
participants can make Remember judgments in the absence of retrieval of qualitative 
information has been taken to suggest that they base these on high levels of confidence rather 
than a threshold based recollective process (Rotello et al., 2005). Every effort was taken to 
ensure participants in the current set of experiments understood and complied with 
instructions, but it is not impossible that idiosyncratic interpretations were made. The PDP is 
the task that has perhaps had the most scrutiny (see Curran & Hintzman, 1995, 1997, for 
examples) due to the difficulty of the inclusion and exclusion instructions. A recent study by 
Hudson et al. (2009) used a ‘guided’ PDP to overcome this problem, in which participants were 
given more detailed onscreen instructions on how to complete each test. Clearly, in patients 
who present with significant memory impairment and potentially low intellectual ability, it is 
important to make such considerations.  
The ROC method is less prone to the problems associated with the R/K paradigm and the PDP. 
Confidence responses may be easier to understand and are not subject to differences in 
interpretation. Also, only a single recognition condition is needed to estimate recollection and 
familiarity. Although this method was not used in the current thesis, it has been used in the 
context of amnesia and TLE and shown converging results to other methods (Bowles et al., 
2007;  Yonelinas et al., 1998). As well as the criticisms raised above, the main motivation for 
not including this method here was because the aim was not to use TLE to assess the 
appropriateness of different signal detection accounts of recognition memory. The source 
memory, PDP and associative recognition tasks provided a suitable test bed on which to 
contribute to understanding about subjective and objective recollection in TLE. However, a 
future study could combine the ROC method with subjective experience judgments in TLE to 
provide a ‘missing piece to the puzzle’. The combined use of the R/K paradigm and ROC 
method has seen little attention in the literature. Two previous studies using this approach 
have found mixed results. For example, Rotello et al. (2005) found that ROC recollection 
estimates converged with subjective proportions only when conservative instructions were 
used to define a true Remember response. Moreover, Kapucu, Macmillan, and Rotello (2010) 
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analysed ROC and R/K data by applying a number of different mathematical models. They 
found that participants could be classified in two ways based on which model provided the 
best fit to the data. For participants whose data was best fit by a dual-process high threshold 
signal detection model, the expected convergence between R/K and ROC measures was found. 
For participants whose data was best fit by a pure signal detection model, ROC intercepts did 
not predict subjective Remember rates. The noise created by variability in memory strength in 
groups such as TLE patients may make replication of this work a challenge. Nevertheless, such 
a project would no doubt appeal to a broad audience.  
An important point to note about the current research is that the results are based on the 
analysis of a highly diverse sample of patients. The benefits of this are that the reductions 
found in levels of recollection suggest this pattern is observable at the group level in patients 
with varying aetiologies and epileptic profiles. Previous TLE studies have typically assessed 
strictly defined groups of left and right sided patients, or pre- or post surgical cases with clear 
evidence of focal lesions. Using samples with well documented lesion data is highly useful for 
contributing to neurobiological debate regarding functional separation within the MTL. For 
example, the work of Cohn et al. (2009) and Bowles and colleagues (2007; 2010) has provided 
compelling support for the role of the hippocampus in recollective processing. In the current 
research, it was only possible to make inferences about the likely neuroanatomical areas 
involved in the tasks. 
 An important extension of the current research would thus be to conduct similar subjective-
objective comparisons of recollection in TLE patients with well circumscribed lesions. As was 
seen in Chapter 7, the evidence is suggestive that a common recollective process operates 
between tasks, and further examination would reveal the extent to which familiarity measures 
do also. Work with patients who have restricted damage to extrahippocampal structures, like 
the case presented in Bowles et al. (2007), is likely to aid further understanding of this.  
Whereas as the results here provided some evidence in favour of a preferential verbal 
impairment in recognition and recollection in LTLE, it was difficult to draw firm conclusions due 
to the unequal sizes of the laterality subgroups. The TLE literature is mixed on this topic 
regarding recollection, although two recent studies have found rather more compelling 
evidence for the material specific basis of familiarity (Cohn et al., 2009; Martin et al., 2011). 
The comparison of verbal and non-verbal PDP tasks in this thesis made some contribution to 
this area, but it must be acknowledged that the difficulty in tasks was not matched.  
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Associative recognition paradigms seem particularly suited to this area, because comparisons 
can be made between verbal and non-verbal binding ability individually (e.g. word-word or 
face-face pairs), and combined (e.g. face-word pairs). Whereas recent functional neuroimaging 
studies in healthy subjects have provided evidence that the hippocampus is involved in cross-
domain binding (Kirwan & Stark, 2004; Westerberg, Voss, Reber, & Paller, 2012), the study of 
recollection and familiarity in unilateral TLE patients is likely to contribute significantly to our 
understanding of the neuroanatomical structures involved in the processing and integration in 
different types of material.  
One of the critical findings of this thesis was that subjective and objective indices of 
recollection and familiarity appear to converge to a large extent in TLE. It would be 
advantageous to apply this kind of work to other memory impaired groups. For example, in 
older adults and patients with Alzheimer’s disease, where frontal damage leads to problems in 
awareness, it would be interesting to explore whether there is a breakdown in the relationship 
between subjective and objective forms of recollection. Older adults are known to make more 
FPs than younger adults, and this has been previously linked to frontally mediated failures in, 
or erroneous recollection (McCabe et al., 2009). Therefore, exploring the subjective experience 
associated with cognitive errors is likely to add to ongoing discussion of how conscious 
experience relates to behaviour. 
 
 
8.6 Conclusions 
This thesis aimed to elucidate the nature and extent of memory impairments in TLE empirically 
through the application of the dual-process framework. The studies presented here have 
added to an emerging literature which has begun to understand memory dysfunction in this 
group as a specific impairment in recollection. The novel approach taken was to compare 
measures of subjective experience alongside estimated contributions of a more strictly defined 
objective recollective process. Significant reductions or impairments in recollection were seen 
in patients across a number of tasks, whilst familiarity was found to be largely intact. By 
evidencing that a relationship exists between the experience of memory and its underlying 
activity, this work provided an important theoretical contribution. Moreover, by showing that 
patients have intact awareness in the context of identifiable episodic memory impairment, the 
research was also able to address a number of outstanding clinical issues in the field of TLE. 
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Appendices 
 
APPENDIX A – RFG Instructions 
 
You should make a remember (R) judgment if you can consciously recollect its prior 
occurrence. Remember is the ability to become consciously aware again of some aspect or 
aspects of what happened or what was experienced at the time the item 
 was presented (e.g., aspects of the physical appearance of the item, or of something that 
happened in the room, or of what you were thinking or doing at the time). In other words, the 
‘‘remembered” item should bring back to mind a particular association, image, or something 
more personal from the time of study, or something about its appearance or position (i.e., 
what came before or after that item). 
 
You should make a familiar (F) judgment if you recognize the item, but you cannot consciously 
recollect anything about its actual occurrence or what happened or what was experienced at 
the time of its occurrence. In other words, respond ‘‘familiar” (F) when you are certain that 
you recognize the item, but it fails to evoke any specific conscious recollection from the study 
list.   
 
Finally, you may have responded YES to an item but neither remember or know that it was 
originally studied. In this case, you must respond guess (G).  
 
 
To further clarify the difference between remembering and familiarity, here are some 
examples. You may see someone in the supermarket that is highly familiar to you and you are 
sure you have met them before, yet you cannot place where or when. Alternatively, when 
asked the last movie you saw, you would typically respond in the ‘‘remember” sense, that is, 
becoming consciously aware again of some aspects of the experience of seeing the movie.
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APPENDIX B – Individual patient neuropsychological test scores  
   BMIPB (z-score) WRMT (raw score/50) Working memory (raw 
score) 
Fluency (z-score) 
Patient Age: M/F WASI 
FSIQ 
Figure 
Imm% 
Figure 
Del% 
List A1-5 List 6 Story  
Imm. 
Story  
Del. 
Words Faces Digits 
Forward 
Digits 
Backward 
FAS Categories 
1 55: F 73 -3.90 -1.90 -1.17 -0.33 -1.12 -0.81 42 37 5 2 -0.05 -1.65 
2 54:M 89 -3.28 -1.48 -2.10 -3.00 -2.66 -2.14 42 28 5 4 -2.19 -2.27 
3 55:F 105 -1.88 -0.96 -2.83 -1.00 -1.56 -1.70 39 44 7 4 0.33 0.59 
4 33:M - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
5 30:M 84 -1.99 -1.46 -0.60 -0.78 -1.94 -2.22 38 43 7 6 -2.66 -1.36 
6 26:F 74   -2.90 -1.89 -1.64 -1.82 36 29 - - -2.94 -2.18 
7 36:F 110 -1.00 -1.60 -1.97 -2.84 -1.64 -2.30 - - - - - - 
8 24:F 100 -1.66 -2.13 -0.04 -1.09 -0.69 -0.33 47 35 6 5 0.51 0.02 
9 48:F 109 0.05 0.59 0.81 -0.67 -1.34 -1.37 44 46 8 6 -1.13 -0.17 
10 38:F 116 -1.48 -1.23 1.78 1.16 -0.92 -1.30 49 34 9 7 -0.06 1.36 
11 42:F 111 - - - - - - 41 40 7 5 0.38 -0.40 
12 45:F 98 0.59 0.87 0.71 1.00 -0.02 0.30 48 46 5 4 -1.22 -0.64 
13 46:F 104 -0.60 0.10 0.10 -0.70 -2.10 -1.50 47 39 9 7 -0.98 -0.88 
14 56:F 117 -0.61 -0.44 -0.23 0.00 -0.24 -0.48 47 30 7 7 0.98 -0.84 
15 47:F 92 -1.28 -0.52 -0.33 -1.33 -2.44 -2.70 41 36 8 5 -1.26 -0.17 
16 38:F 115 -1.71 -0.64 -0.86 -0.04 -2.12 -1.80 46 40 6 5 -1.17 -0.82 
17 39:F 100 -2.27 -2.19 -1.14 -2.44 -2.00 -2.18 38 29 8 5 -1.94 -1.90 
18 18:F 114 -0.19 0.16 1.17 0.33 2.30 1.55 48 48 6 4 0.03 0.80 
19 49:M 123 -2.61 -1.32 -2.63 -2.67 -1.56 -2.59 32 29 8 7 -0.60 -1.60 
20 38:F 110 -1.71 -1.60 1.78 1.16 -1.28 -1.43 46 45 6 6 -0.15 -0.81 
21 38:M 87 -1.79 -1.38 -3.22 -2.84 -2.60 -2.43 40 40 7 6 -2.19 0.81 
22 43:F 96 -1.63 -1.60 -1.56 -1.64 -1.52 -1.93 46 42 6 3 -0.69 -1.36 
23 44:F 120 0.11 0.55 2.06 -0.04 0.17 -0.18 48 44 7 6 1.54 -0.64 
24 57:F 126 -0.48 0.03 0.92 1.33 0.86 0.30 48 48 8 6 0.21 0.80 
25 23:F 87 0.22 0.09 -0.29 -0.04 -1.23 -1.31 46 40 7 6 -1.45 0.62 
26 30:F 109 -0.05 -1.67 -0.44 -0.44 -1.04 -0.93 49 42 7 4 -1.26 0.45 
27 37:M 85 -3.86 -3.82 -2.81 -3.64 - - - - - - - - 
Note:M = Male, F = Female, WASI FSIQ = Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (Psychological Corporation, 1999) Full-Scale IQ, BMIPB = BIRT Memory and Information Processing 
Battery (Coughlan et al., 2007), WRMT = Warrington Recognition Memory Test (Warrington, 1984). Dashes (-) indicate missing data resulting from participants dropping out from study 
before test was administered, declining to take part in test, or where alternative tests were carried out as part of routine clinical assessment.  
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APPENDIX C 
Number of participants included in each demographic and neuropsychological assessment 
analysis 
 
 
 
Variable Control 
N 
 TLE  N 
 
LTLE  N RTLE  N BTLE  N 
Demographics      
Age 19 26 12 9 5 
Gender (Male:Female) 19 26 12 9 5 
Yrs. Education 19 26 12 9 5 
Handedness (Right:Left) 19 26 12 9 5 
      
Mood: HADscale (raw score/21)      
Anxiety 19 24 11 9 4 
Depression 19 24 11 9 4 
      
IQ (standard scores)      
NART pred. FSIQ 19 24 11 9 4 
WASI VIQ 19 23 10 8 5 
WASI PIQ 19 23 10 8 5 
WASI FSIQ 19 25 11 9 5 
      
Memory: BMIPB (z-scores)      
Figure Imm %  19 24 10 9 5 
Figure Del % 19 24 10 9 5 
List A1-5 19 24 10 9 5 
List 6 19 24 10 9 5 
Story Imm 19 24 11 9 4 
Story Del 19 24 11 9 4 
      
WRMT (raw score/50)      
Words 19 23 10 9 4 
Faces 19 23 10 9 4 
      
Working memory (raw scores)      
Digits forward 19 22 10 8 4 
Digits backward 19 22 10 8 4 
      
Fluency (z-scores)      
FAS 19 23 10 9 4 
Categories 19 23 10 9 4 
Note: HADs = Hospital Anxiety and Depression rating scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), NART = National Adult 
Reading Test (Nelson, 1982), FSIQ = Full-scale IQ, WASI = Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
(Psychological Corporation, 1999), VIQ = Verbal IQ, PIQ = Performance IQ, BMIPB = BIRT Memory and 
Information Processing Battery (Coughlan et al., 2007), WRMT = Warrington Recognition Memory Test 
(Warrington, 1984). TLE = Temporal lobe epilepsy, LTLE = left temporal lobe epilepsy, RTLE = right temporal 
lobe epilepsy, BTLE = bilateral temporal lobe epilepsy. 
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APPENDIX D – Prompt sheet used for source memory task (Chapter 3) 
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APPENDIX E – Example of facial stimuli used in Experiment 4.2  
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APPENDIX F – List of public events and correct years (Chapter 6) 
 
1) Queen Elizabeth II of England marks 50 years as monarch with the Golden Jubilee (2002). 
2) Hurricane Katrina makes land fall along the U.S. Gulf Coast causing severe damage (2005). 
3) Global protests are held against the IRAQ war, with more than 10 million people in over 600 
cities across the world (2003). 
4) Former President of Iraq Saddam Hussein is executed by hanging, following conviction of 
committing war crimes by the Iraqi Special Tribunal (2006). 
5) The deadliest bushfires in Australian history begin; they kill 173, injure 500 more, and leave 
7,500 homeless (2009). 
6) Barack Obama is sworn into office as the 44th President of the USA – the first black president 
in history (2008).  
7) The British livestock epidemic, foot and mouth disease, reaches crisis levels and causes 
postponement of the general election (2001). 
8) A 9.3 magnitude earthquake, epicentered just off the west coast of the Indonesian island of 
Sumatra, generates enormous tsunami waves that crash into the coastal areas of a number of 
nations in South East Asia (2004). 
9) British toddler Madeleine McCann disappears from an apartment in Praia da Luz, Portugal 
(2007). 
10) Thirty-three miners near Copiapó, Chile, trapped 700 metres underground in a mining 
accident in San José Mine, are brought back to the surface after surviving for a record 69 days 
(2010). 
11) The death of American entertainer Michael Jackson (2009). 
12) Terrorists attack the USA by crashing aircraft into the twin towers of the World Trade 
Centre and the Pentagon, killing more than 3000 people (2001). 
 
13) Pope John Paul II dies; over 4 million people travel to the Vatican to mourn him (2005). 
14) The Columbia space shuttle disintegrates over Texas, killing all 7 astronauts on-board 
(2003). 
15) The Simpsons Movie releases in theatres (2007). 
16) A 7.0-magnitude earthquake occurs in Haiti, devastating the nation's capital, Port-au-
Prince (2010). 
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17) Former building society Northern Rock is the first bank in Europe to be taken into state 
control, due to the U.S. subprime mortgage financial crisis (2008). 
18) Brazil beat Germany in the FIFA World Cup final held in South Korea and Japan, to win a 
record 5th title. 
19) A series of coordinated bomb attacks strikes several commuter trains in Mumbai, India 
(2006). 
 20) Armed robbers in Northern Ireland steal over £22 million from the headquarters of the 
Northern Bank (2004). 
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APPENDIX G – Analysis of gender differences for Chapter 6 
 
Overview 
Gender differences in AM have been established by a number of studies, with women showing 
more accurate recall and higher degree of specificity than males in their AMs (see Piefke, 
Weiss, Markowitch, & Fink, 2005, for a review). Pertinent to the investigation in Chapter 6, 
women have also been shown to be more accurate at dating events in their life (Skowronski & 
Thompson, 1990) and shown to have superior semantic memory, which was driven by better 
performance on fluency tasks (Maitland, Herlitz, Nyberg, Backman, & Nilsson, 2004). ANCOVA 
analyses were conducted to evaluate the influence of this variable on the data. These analyses 
are presented below under the same subheadings that appear in the Results section of 
Chapter 6. 
 
Multifactorial Memory Questionnaire 
The main analysis was conducted again using ANCOVA, controlling for gender. The main 
effects of group and subscale remained significant, as did the interaction term: F(1, 161) = 
115.95, p = .001, ηp
2 = .42; F(2, 322) = 5.23, p = .007, ηp
2 = .03; F(2, 322) = 24.41, p = .001, ηp
2 = 
.13. A near significant association of gender was found, however, F(1, 161) = 3.69, p = .06, ηp
2 = 
.02. To investigate, further one-way ANOVAs were conducted looking at gender differences in 
individual subscales for the sample overall. For the Ability scale, males scores (Mean = 44.96, 
SD = 13.57) were significantly higher than females (Mean = 40.21, SD = 12.46); F(1, 163) = 4.56, 
p = .03, η2 = .03. Similarly, males had significantly higher scores on the Contentment scale 
(Male Mean = 37.62, SD = 15.70; Female Mean = 32.00, SD = 16.21); F(1, 163) = 4.05, p = .05, η2 
= .02. Finally, males had significantly higher scores on the Strategy subscale also (Male Mean = 
42.78, SD = 12.25; Female Mean = 36.08, SD = 13.15); F(1, 163) = 8.90, p = .003, η2 = .05. In 
summary, males in the sample tended to be more positive about their memory, and reported 
using more memory aid strategies than females. 
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Public events task 
Subjective measures 
The analyses were repeated using univariate ANCOVA to control for gender differences. For 
the proportion of events subjectively recalled, the main effect of group remained significant, 
F(1, 161) = 27.63, p = .001, ηp
2 = .04. However, a significant association was found between 
gender and these scores, F(1, 161) = 7.27, p = .01, ηp
2 = .04. One-way ANOVA in the sample 
overall displayed males (Mean = .79, SD = .14) to have significantly higher scores than females 
(Mean = .71, SD = .1); F(1, 163) = 10.17, p = .002, η2 = .06. For the proportion of events where 
the context was subjectively recalled, mean vividness ratings and the proportion of events 
participants said they knew the year of (metacognitive measure), the main effects of group 
remained:  F(1, 161) = 4.34, p = .04, η2 = .03; F(1, 161) = 8.43, p = .004, η2 = .05; F(1, 159) = 
10.05, p = .002, η2 = .06. There was no significant association between gender and these three 
scores (Fs < 1). Similarly, there was still no main effect of group on personal significance ratings 
after controlling for gender and gender had no significant association with this variable either 
(Fs < 1). In summary, just as males subjectively perceived their memory to be better as through 
the MMQ, they also reported recalling more public events than females. 
 
Objective measures 
ANCOVA analyses using gender as a covariate revealed this variable to have no significant 
association with the proportion of years attempted, proportion of years correctly dated, or the 
absolute and mean difference accuracy scores (Fs < 1). Therefore, although various subjective 
measures were found to be higher overall in males, objective accuracy was not different 
between the sexes. 
 
Subjective-Objective comparisons 
 The first analysis looked at dating accuracy following participants’ metacognitive judgment 
about whether they thought they knew the correct answer. This analysis was conducted using 
ANCOVA controlling for gender. There was again no significant effect of group, F(1, 145) = 2.00, 
p = .16, η2 = .01. The effect of accuracy type remained significant, F(1, 145) = 16.78, p = .001, η2 
= .10. The interaction between group and accuracy type was also again non-significant, F < 1. A 
significant association was found with gender, however, F(1, 145) = 3.93, p = .05, ηp
2 = .03. The 
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means of the whole sample revealed that dating accuracy for years predicted to be known by 
participants was higher in females (Mean = .61, SD = .30) than males (Mean = .53, SD = .31). 
This difference was not statistically reliable, F(1, 148) = 2.10, p = .15, η2 = .01. Similarly, the 
mean dating accuracy for items that were predicted not to be known was also higher in 
females (Mean = .10, SD = .13) compared to males (Mean = .06, SD = .11). One-way ANOVA 
showed this to be a near significant trend F(1, 148) = 3.38, p = .07, η2 = .02. This data presents 
a mixed picture regarding differences in metacognitive monitoring between males and 
females; the data first suggest that females are more able to correctly date events when they 
think they think they know the answer. However, the second analysis also suggests that 
despite claiming they do not know the correct answer, they provide more correct dates than 
males. Interestingly, these differences (although non-significant) are in the context of 
equivalent overall objective dating accuracy between the sexes (as reported above). 
The next analysis looked at dating accuracy for events where the participant had stated they 
recalled the encoding context versus events they could not recall the encoding context. 
ANCOVA analysis revealed no significant association with gender (F < 1), suggesting no 
difference between males and females.  
The final analysis compared the mean vividness for correctly dated items versus vividness for 
incorrectly dated items (or items where no response was made regarding the year). ANCOVA 
analyses revealed a significant association with gender, F(1, 143) = 4.98, p = .03, ηp
2 = .03. 
When controlling for gender, the marginal effect of group was removed, F(1, 143) = 2.37, p = 
.13, ηp
2 = .02. The main effect of vividness item type remained, F(1, 143) = 31.55, p = .001, ηp
2 = 
.18 and the interaction between group and vividness item type remained non-significant (F = 
1.10). To investigate the effect of gender, one-way ANOVAs were conducted on the mean 
vividness for correct and incorrect items. Vividness for correctly dated items showed men to 
have significantly higher scores than women (Male Mean = 5.14, SD = 1.39; Female Mean = 
4.41, SD = 1.53); F(1, 145) =6.79, p = .01, η2 = .05. Moreover, higher scores in males for the 
mean vividness for incorrect or undated items was of borderline statistical significance (Male 
Mean = 3.26, SD = 1.14; Female Mean = 2.90, SD = 1.05); F(1, 162) =3.67, p = .06, η2 = .02. 
These data suggest that males overall have higher levels of vividness associated with memories 
than females; however, they must be interpreted cautiously because the vividness for correct 
years analysis was based on smaller sample numbers than the overall mean vividness analysis, 
where no gender difference emerged.  
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Summary 
The results found here consistently suggest males have higher levels of subjective 
phenomenological experience associated with AMs for public events. This is matched by 
overall higher levels of perceived day-to-day memory function. These data contrast a variety of 
studies that have found women to have higher scores on a number of AM measures (Davis, 
1999; Maitland et al., 2004; Skowronski & Thompson, 1990). However, other neuroimaging 
studies have found no difference in behavioural measures of AM, but varying patterns of 
neural activity between males and females (Piefke et al., 2005; St Jacques, Conway, & Cabeza, 
2011). In TLE, gender differences in declarative memory appear more complex, being affected 
to a great extent by language dominance and lateralisation of lesion (Helmstaedter, Brosch, 
Kurten, & Elger, 2004; Trenerry, Jack, Cascino, Sharbrough, & Ivnik, 1995). Whilst the male 
advantage here is interesting, further research is needed with equal numbers of participants in 
each of the neurological and normal control groups. 
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APPENDIX H - Pearson’s correlations for TLE and control groups on selected predictor and outcome measures from Chapter 6 (original N for both groups = 82). 
  
 
 
 
TLE  
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
 
 
8 
 
 
9 
 
 
10 
 
 
11 
 
 
12 
 
 
13 
 
 
14 
1. Age -              
2. Education yrs -.15 -             
3. Age diagnosed .44 -.06 -            
4. Illness onset .20 .10 -.46 -           
5. MMQ Ability .08 .12 -.04 -.08 -          
6. MMQ Contentment -.08 .07 .00 -.13 .64 -         
7. MMQ Strategy .13 -.03 -.09 .03 .71 .59 -        
8. Prop events recalled .12 .21 .03 -.03 .26 .27 .17 -       
9. Prop context recalled .16 .26 -.09 -.25 .05 .10 .14 .34 -      
10.Prop yrs claimed to know .00 -.25 -.07 .04 .02 .02 .06 .02 -.03 -     
11. Accuracy for yrs predicted to know .19 .09 .17 -.10 .03 .03 -.05 .14 -.20 -.20 -    
12. Accuracy all attempted yrs .09 -.09 .07 -.01 -.07 -.11 -.13 .00 -.27 .02 .61 -   
13. Mean personal sig. -.07 .01 -.05 .02 .06 .17 .15 .01 .10 .31 -.10 .03 -  
14. Mean vividness .05 -.07 -.06 .11 -.12 -.05 -.05 .02 .10 .43 -.02 .07 .37 - 
               
Controls               
               
1. Age -              
2. Education yrs -.28 -             
5. MMQ Ability .06 .00   -          
6. MMQ Contentment .08 -.03   .70 -         
7. MMQ Strategy .36 -.24   .61 .49 -        
8. Prop events recalled .06 -.01   .04 .04 .07 -       
9. Prop context recalled .04 -.15   .03 -.01 .16 .17 -      
10. Prop yrs claimed to know -.13 .02   .07 .05 -.01 .15 .23 -     
11. Accuracy for yrs predicted to know -.07 .23   .09 -.02 .07 .08 -.02 -.21 -    
12. Accuracy all attempted yrs -.17 .15   .07 -.04 .01 .02 .14 .03 .58 -   
13. Mean personal sig. -.17 .13   -.01 -.07 -.03 .36 .38 .14 .16 .19 -  
14. Mean vividness -.12 .10   .01 -.07 -.03 .45 .47 .19 .19 .15 .55 - 
Note: TLE = temporal lobe epilepsy, HAC = healthy adult controls, MMQ = Multifactorial memory questionnaire (Troyer & Rich, 2002), prop = proportion, sig = significant. 
Pearson correlations underlined are significant at p < .05; correlations with solid underline are significant at p <.01. 
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APPENDIX I – Supplementary Correlational analyses for Chapter 7 (TLE only) 
 
Correlation matrix between anterograde recognition recollection measures and MMQ 
subscales. 
 MMQ subscales 
  Ability Contentment Strategy 
Source Memory R  .02 .03 -.16 
Source Memory Total Context Prop -.18 -.18 -.24 
Word PDP Combined Lag R .10 .44 .08 
Word PDP Hit Subjective R -.03 .25 -.34 
Face PDP Combined Lag R -.11 -.07 -.14 
Face PDP Hit Subjective R -.46 -.13 -.34 
AR Associative Reinstatement d’ -.19 .02 -.36 
AR Associative Identification d’ -.38 -.18 -.38 
AR R estimate -.07 .03 -.10 
 
Note: R = remember, Prop = proportion, Word PDP = word repetition-lag process-dissociation procedure, Face PDP 
= face repetition-lag process-dissociation procedure, AR = associative recognition, MMQ = Multifactorial Memory 
Questionnaire (Troyer & Rich, 2002). 
 
 Correlation matrix between neuropsychological measures and MMQ subscales.  
 
  
 MMQ subscale 
  Ability Contentment Strategy 
BMIPB Figure Imm -.10 .28 -.03 
BMIPB Figure Del -.07 .26 -.05 
BMIPB List A1-5 .05 .07 -.08 
BMIPB List 6 .14 .18 .00 
BMIPB Story Imm -.26 .18 -.37 
BMIPB Story Del -.23 .19 -.27 
WRMT Words -.10 .06 -.06 
WRMT Faces -.23 .06 -.25 
FAS verbal fluency -.43 -.26 -.67 
Category fluency -.22 .14 -.26 
Digits forward -.12 -.15 -.14 
Digits backward .10 -.09 .03 
Note: BMIPB = BIRT Memory and Information Processing Battery (Coughlan et al.,2007) , WRMT 
= Warrington Recognition Memory Test (Warrington, 1984), MMQ = Multifactorial Memory 
Questionnaire (Troyer & Rich, 2002).  Pearson correlation coefficient values underlined are 
significant at the p < .05 level; values underlined in solid line  are significant at the p < .01 level. 
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  Correlation matrix between anterograde recognition recollection and public events measures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Public events measures   
  Prop events 
subjectively 
recalled 
Prop events 
context 
recalled 
Number of 
events 
correctly dated 
Prop years 
attempted that 
were correct 
Mean 
vividness all 
events 
Mean vividness 
events subjectively 
recalled 
Source Memory R .48 .22 .43 -.30 .15 -.04 
Source Memory Total Context Prop .33 .41 .55 .17 .24 .12 
Word PDP Combined Lag R .64 .31 .36 -.26 .26 -.15 
Word PDP Hit Subjective R .78 .32 .32 -.05 .38 -.18 
Face PDP Combined Lag R .32 .00 .31 -.14 .08 -.14 
Face PDP Hit Subjective R .33 -.08 .02 .28 .07 -.30 
AR Associative Reinstatement d’ .29 .12 .21 .29 .05 -.21 
AR Associative Identification d’ .52 -.09 .40 -.28 .47 .22 
AR R estimate .31 -.10 .22 -.31 .15 .17 
Note: R = remember, Prop = proportion, Word PDP = word repetition-lag process-dissociation procedure, Face PDP = face repetition-lag process-dissociation 
procedure, AR = associative recognition. Pearson correlation coefficient values underlined are significant at the p < .05 level; values underlined in solid line  
are significant at the p < .01 level. 
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Correlation matrix between anxiety, depression and subjective and objective anterograde 
recollection, public events and MMQ measures. 
 
 
  HADs 
Anxiety 
HADs 
Depression 
 HADs Anxiety -  
HADs Depression .64 - 
    
Su
b
je
ct
iv
e
 Source Memory R  -.21 -.20 
Word PDP Subjective Hit R .03 -.19 
Face PDP Subjective Hit R .36 .25 
   
O
b
je
ct
iv
e
 
Source Memory Correct Context Prop .00 .04 
Word PDP Combined Lag R .01 .11 
Face PDP Combined Lag R .00 .08 
AR Associative Reinstatement  d’ -.22 -.10 
AR Associative Identification d’ .01 .13 
AR R estimate .02 .16 
   
P
u
b
lic
 e
ve
n
ts
 
PE Prop events subjectively recalled .08 -.18 
PE Prop events context recalled -.23 -.50 
PE Number of events correctly dated -.06 -.19 
PE Prop years attempted that were correct .20 .30 
PE Mean vividness all events .18 -.01 
PE Mean vividness events subjectively recalled .04 .08 
   
M
M
Q
 
Ability subscale -.41 -.27 
Contentment  subscale -.30 -.34 
Strategy subscale -.48 -.22 
Note: HADs, Hospital Anxiety and Depression rating scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983); 
PDP, Process dissociation procedure; AR, Associative recognition; MMQ, 
Multifactorial Memory Questionnaire (Troyer & Rich, 2002). 
